

THE ISLAMIZATION OF POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: HOW RELIGIOUS
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS INFLUENCE RELIGIOUS
FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING

by

WAN KAMAL WAN NAPI

B.A. Political Science, Southern Illinois University, 1997
M.S. Education, Southern Illinois University, 1999

A Dissertation
Submitted In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy Degree

Department of Sociology
in the Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
December 2007

UMI Number: 3291649



UMI Microform 3291649

Copyright 2008 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

DISSERTATION APPROVAL

THE ISLAMIZATION OF POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: HOW RELIGIOUS
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS INFLUENCE RELIGIOUS
FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING

BY

WAN KAMAL WAN NAPI

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctoral of Sociology Degree

in the field of Sociology

Approved by:

Dr. Darren Sherkat, Chair

Dr. Rob Benford

Dr. Mark Schneider

Dr. Thomas Burger

Dr. William Turley

Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
August 20, 2007

AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF

Wan Kamal Wan Napi, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology,
presented on August 20, 2007, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.

THE ISLAMIZATION OF POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: HOW RELIGIOUS POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS INFLUENCE RELIGIOUS FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING

MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Darren Sherkat

This dissertation examines how religious values and belief systems were used in the political contest between Malaysia's two principal political parties: (a) The United Malay National Organization (UMNO), which holds governmental power, and (b) the Political Party Islamic (PAS), the country's strongest opposition movement. Using comparative analysis of movement documents such as manifestos, books, and papers garnered from the groups' periodic conferences and conventions, along with media reports from five major newspapers regarding four specific historical events, I examine the use of religious values and beliefs by each party as they frame ethnic and religious identity issues to facilitate achievement of their political goals and respond to shifting opportunities and threats.

Key to the comparisons are the shifts in religious framing that are fostered by historical events presenting opportunities and threats created by (a) the success of PAS in the general elections in 1990 and 1999; (b) the wave of protests in September 1998 that followed Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's arrest under the Internal Security Act (ISA), providing an opportunity to PAS and a threat to UMNO; and (c) the aftermath of the attacks of

September 11, 2001, which offered an opportunity to UMNO and represented a threat for PAS.

The study highlights the importance of comparative historical analyses to reveal how framing and counterframing efforts respond to political opportunities and threats. UMNO and PAS have engaged in framing disputes over religious issues and have framed the other's perspectives in ways that highlight differences and generate counterframes. The rhetoric of both parties evokes frame construction in contentious politics, in defining existing circumstances as unjust and constructing exclusive identities, and in fostering tactical differences for addressing political problems.

It was concluded that, under electoral threat, UMNO amplified its support for Islam, arguing that it had created an exemplary Islamic state. However, this opportunity for PAS led to the amplification of Islamic beliefs and values that could unite diverse religious and ethnic conditions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the Name of Allah the Most Gracious Most Merciful. All praise and glory belong to Allah, the Creator, who created the heavens and the earth. I sincerely give thanks to Allah s.w.t for giving me the strength, the ability, and the courage to successfully complete my research. Without His guidance and blessing, I would not have had the capability to finish this piece of work.

I would like to thank my wife Raja Iza Raja Izzaham, my children Wan Fayhsal Wan Kamal, Wan Kuzac Wan Kamal, Wan Kuzain Wan Kamal, and Wan Kuzri Wan Kamal, and to my parents and in-laws for their patience, support, and prayers. I would also like to express my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation for the support, advice, and sheer perseverance of my advisor Dr. Darren Sherkat. With his invaluable expertise and knowledge, provided finishing touches and made himself available to help me complete this study despite the overwhelming demands on his time. I cannot thank him enough.

Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Rob Benford, Dr. Mark Schneider, Dr. Thomas Burger, and Dr. William Turley who were kind enough to serve as committee members. I thank you very much for your time, support and advice.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CHAPTER</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
ABSTRACT	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
LIST OF TABLES.....	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xi
CHAPTERS	
CHAPTER 1: Aim Of This Study.....	1
Theoretical Considerations.....	2
Frame Alignment.....	3
Frame Disputes	4
Counterframing.....	7
Structural Conditions: Opportunities versus Threats... ..	9
Religious Identity in Social Movements	14
Malaysia's Religious Identity	18
UMNO's Conceptions of Religious Identity.....	19
PAS's Conceptions of Religious Identity	23
Chapter Outline, Key Events, and Analysis.....	33
Expectations as a Result of this Study	40
CHAPTER 2: Methodology of Content Analysis.....	43
Overview of Methods.....	44

Data Collection	45
Manifest Content Analysis	48
Rhetorical Analysis of News Framing	51
<i>New Straits Times</i>	52
PAS News Sources	55
The Independents	57
Secondary Sources	58
CHAPTER 3: Event 1—Opportunity and Threats, Framing and	
Counterframing in Malaysia's 1990 General Election.....	62
UMNO and Islam	66
UMNO's Political Culture	68
UMNO's Religious and Ethnic Identity	69
UMNO's Organizational Frame	74
UMNO'S Religious Framing	76
<i>Parti Islam Se-Malaysia</i> and Islam	81
PAS's Political Culture.....	85
Opportunities for PAS in the Eighth 1990 Election	87
PAS Framing of Religion Prior to 1990 Election	89
Framing Islam as a Way of Life (<i>adeem</i>)	93
PAS Framing <i>sharia</i> and <i>hudud</i> Laws	94
Religious Freedom and Religious Persecution.....	95

PAS's Islamic Economics Framing.....	97
Framing Socioeconomics for the Poor	98
Framing the Islamic Economic System	100
Framing Economic Justice (<i>al-adl</i>)	101
UMNO's Response to PAS	102
Post-Election UMNO	106
Post-Election PAS	109
Conclusion.....	113
CHAPTER 4: Event 2—Opportunity and Threats, Framing and	
Counterframing in the Anwar Ibrahim Saga 1998	117
Anwar as a Religious Islamic Symbol.....	121
Anwar's Character and Reputation.....	123
Naming and Framing the Event.....	124
Anwar's Responses to Allegations	130
Anwar and the Protests	131
PAS Amplified Religious Beliefs and Values	136
UMNO's Resolute Allegation	140
Sodomy Allegations a Threat to Mahathir	140
Mahathir's Response to Threat	142
Conclusion.....	146

CHAPTER 5: Event 3—Opportunities and Threats, Framing

and Counterframing Leading to the 1999 Election	151
PAS's Religious Issues Framing prior to the 1999 Election	154
The Kelantan State Model— <i>Serambi Mekah</i>	155
Islamic Governance and Moral Economy	160
<i>Sharia</i> Success in Kelantan and Islam as <i>adeen</i>	164
<i>Sharia</i> and <i>hudud</i> Law	165
Between Democracy and Islam.....	168
PAS and the Impact of the Anwar Ibrahim Saga	171
PAS and <i>Barisan Alternatif</i> religious Framing.....	172
UMNO's Response to Anwar Issues	177
UMNO's Response to PAS	179
UMNO's Response to <i>Barisan Alternatif</i>	182
Post-Election UMNO	184
Blasting PAS	187
"Malaysia Is an Islamic State"	189
Post-Election PAS and BA	191
Conclusion.....	197

CHAPTER 6: Event 6—PAS Faces Political Threat Conditions

due to September 11 Attacks	200
UMNO Amplifies Religious Beliefs and Values	201

Terror Attacks are Contrary to Islam	202
UMNO Connects PAS to September 11	205
PAS is Connected to September 11	205
“Malaysia Is an Islamic State”	208
PAS Wants a Taliban-Like State and <i>jihad</i>	210
Islam Supports the Repression of Misguided Religion	218
Internal Security Act (ISA)	222
PAS’s Response to UMNO	224
PAS Amplifies Religious Beliefs and Values	224
Terror Attacks are Contrary to Islam	225
PAS: Not Associated with Terrorists.....	227
PAS Demands a Fundamentalist Islamic State.....	229
PAS Encourages <i>jihad</i> for Western Aggression.....	232
Women’s Role In PAS.....	238
PAS and ISA	238
Conclusion.....	241
CHAPTER 7: Overview of Findings	244
Application of the Conclusions to the Four Historical Events ...	244
The 1990 Elections.....	244
The 1998 Anwar Ibrahim Saga.....	246
The 1999 Elections.....	249

September 11, 2001	252
Summary of Religious Framing	254
Opportunities or Threats in Political Mobilization.....	255
Counterframing.....	256
Four Conditions for Effective Political Frame Alignment	256
Conclusion.....	257
REFERENCES.....	271
APPENDICES	
Appendix A: FAQ—Introduction to PAS	296
Appendix B: The Islamic State Document.....	301
Appendix C: 50 Reasons.....	310
Appendix D: Chronology of the Case against Anwar	331
Appendix E: Acronyms and Definitions	343
VITA.....	345

LIST OF TABLES

<u>TABLE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Table 1 Key Term –the Concept of Ethnic and Religious Identity	49
Table 2 Frame Terms Used by the Opposing Movements	50
Table 3 UMNO Major Newspapers UMNO Major Newspapers	54
Table 4 Government of Kelantan-1957 1999.....	90
Table 5 Proposals of PAS and UMNO in the 1999 Elections	105
Table 6 Barisan Nasional <i>the</i> Election	155
Table 7 Changes in Government in Trengganu 1957-1999.....	186
Table 8 Why People Join and Commit to Extremist Groups	229
Table 9 Social Characteristics	255

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>FIGURE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Figure 1 Structural Condition.....	13
Figure 2 Theoretical Model of Religious Motivation.....	99

CHAPTER 1

AIM OF THIS STUDY

This is a comparative study of frame construction, focusing on the secularist/nationalist organizations: (1) *Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu* or United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and (2) the Islamic movements—Partai Al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in Malaysia. The primary goal of this research is to provide an understanding of the roles of religious identity within the context of political opportunities and threats frame contests between the competing parties in Malaysia. Differing religious identity construction and social movements within Malaysia cause these competing political parties to amplify their religious values and beliefs under condition of opportunities and threat. Within this context, this study seeks a heightened understanding of how religious political opportunities and threats influence religious framing and counterframing.

I argue that UMNO and PAS members are involved in framing religious issues not only to construct a collective political identity but also to portray an image to constituents. UMNO is explicitly Malay, while PAS is predominately Malay but also mobilizes Indian Muslim and Chinese ethnic groups. They have contrasting worldviews in the context of the role that religion should play in both the private and public lives. UMNO and PAS have engaged in frame contests over religious issues and have framed each other's perspectives on religion in ways that highlight differences and generate counterframes.

This analysis is intended to contribute to the literature on religious identity in the context of social movements.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: FRAMING THEORY

The frame analytic perspective in social movements refers to *schemata of interpretation* that allow movement members to “locate, perceive, identify, and level” incidences within their immediate environment life and the world at large (Benford and Snow 2000:614; see also Goffman 1974; Snow et al. 1986).

These frames help them to assess features of the world around them and to compare that world to preferable alternatives or, as Snow and Benford (1992) state, to “underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a particular social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable” (P. 137). Moreover, framing theory asserts that frames are crucial to social movement dynamics because they serve to guide individual and collective action (Benford 1993; see also Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000).

Framing is considered to be the deliberate construction of shared connotations and definitions to describe social problems such that they legitimate protest and motivate supporters toward collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Snow et al. 1986). The process of constructing and communicating the meanings of frames of understanding—through amplified symbols, rhetoric, and collective actions—is pivotal to the social movement organizations dealing with varying events. The process of framing thus essentially consists of “conscious strategic efforts of people to fashion shared

understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996:6).

Frame Alignment

Snow et al. (1986) use the concept of “frame alignment processes” to describe ways in which individuals link their personal interpretative orientations of interests, values, and beliefs (individual frames) within the set of interpretative orientations represented by the activities, goals, and ideology of a movement organization (movement frames) (P. 467). According to Snow et al., “Frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation” (P. 464). The concept of frame alignment is important, especially for understanding how social movements recruit participants and sustain their participation.

Snow et al. (1986:467-473) outlines four distinct types of alignment: (1) frame bridging, (2) frame amplification, (3) frame extension, and (4) frame transformation. *Frame bridging* can be understood as “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem.” *Frame amplification* involves “the classification and invigoration of an interpretive frame bearing on particular issues.” *Frame extension* occurs as a movement attempts to “enlarge its adherent pool by portraying its objectives or activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of potential adherents.” *Frame transformation* takes place “in order to garner support and secure participants.”

Framing encompasses both the construction of interpretive frames and their representation to others, social movement organizations may use framing

not only to interpret events, but also to promote strategic advantage. This means that movements may make strategic attempts to produce frame alignment with other actors and institutions. In the case of mobilization for action, social movement actors frame their beliefs and actions to gain support and attract participants in the hope that more participants might join a movement as its frame becomes more inclusive and flexible (Benford and Snow 2000).

Benford and Snow (2000) also argue that successful frame alignment is contingent on fidelity with: (1) cultural narratives, symbols, and identities, (2) the reputation of the frame articulator, (3) the consistency of the frame, (4) the frame's empirical credibility, and (5) the personal salience of the frame to potential participants. In other words, how much frames resonate with potential participants may depend on frame consistency ("the congruency between [a movement organization's] articulated beliefs, claims and actions"), empirical credibility ("is there evidence of the claim embedded in the framing?"), and the perceived credibility of frame articulators ("the status and/or perceived experience of the frame articulators and/or the organization they represent") (PP. 619-622).

Frame Disputes

Frame disputes reflect conflicts over the meaning or content of frames (Benford 1993). Frame disputes usually occur between a movement's members and its opponents (Ryan 1991). A frame serves to accomplish three task objectives for movement organizations: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational (Snow and Benford 1988). First, the frame identifies the problem (diagnostic). Second, the

frame calls for solutions to the social problem that is being recognized (prognostic); the prognostic frame can serve to recruit potential adherents who feel that the articulation of the problem resonates with their own experience and understanding of the problem. Third, the frame calls for a consensus to mobilize efforts among movement participants who share the movement's goals (motivational).

Within a movement, frame disputes may occur over the definition of the problem (diagnosis framing). As Benford (1993) explains, diagnosis "involves the identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality. The focus here is on what is reality (P. 699). In other words, diagnosis is the formulation of the problem; the cause of the problem must be defined. The diagnosis of the problem is necessary to suggest a solution (prognosis framing).

Some use the term *master frame* to designate the action of social movement organizations to collectively articulate their grievances through a basic "problem-solving schema." Schemas are cognitive structures that make up the members' knowledge base (Sweller 1988). In the context of religious frames, they are based on "interpretative schema that simplifies and condenses the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one's present or past environment" (Snow and Benford 1992:137). Snow and Benford (1992) explain that a master frame provides the grammar, or structure, for elaborative frames provided by social movement organizations. In other words, the function of master frame strategies is to identify the basic nature and cause of the problem,

including attribution of blame or responsibility to social movement actors, institutions, or societal structures. Only on the basis of a master frame can a movement seek to rectify the perceived problem.

Prognosis suggests solutions to the problems, including how to achieve the solution. The focus here is on how that “reality should be changed and on what is to be done to change that reality” (Benford 1993:699). The solutions that are propagated belong to the prognostic frame because they are yet to become reality. Prognostic frames propose views, aims, and tactics to draw attention to the problem—a necessary early step in solving a problem—to suggest strategies for action to resolve the problem, and to identify targets of the actions (Gamson 1992a). Whereas diagnostic frames identify the problem (capture the issue), prognostic frames focus on what must be done to address the problem. Social movement organizations may be complex in form and, they may differentiate themselves according to their process of identifying solutions (prognostic frames), even if their master diagnostic frames appear similar.

Motivational framing indicates the strategies that are to be employed to motivate action (Snow and Benford 1988). Motivational framing adds a moralizing dimension to the specification of problems, culprits, and strategies, and produces cognitively strong arguments that demand collective action to redress perceived injustices. Motivational frames must be capable of stirring a movement’s adherents to action. An issue must have mobilizing potential for supporters and participants to become actively involved, and the frame must succeed in characterizing a social problem as an injustice (Snow and Benford

1992). An injustice frame is a collection of ideas and symbols that provides a dual illustration: how vital the problem is as well as what the movement can do to translate ideas into action. To simplify; We mobilize through social networks, and it is the injustice frame that provides the motivation for people to contribute to the movement's success or failure.

Counterframing

Benford and Hunt (2003) state that counterframing attempts to “rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person’s or group’s myths, versions of reality, or interpretative framework” (P. 163). The interaction between social movements and counterframing is a key effect of movement framing (Benford and Snow 2000). For instance, movements often come to be viewed primarily as an attempt to garner favorable public opinion at the limitation of opposing movements (Kent 1990).

There is only limited research examining counterframing processes. Few sociologists have focused on the interaction between framing and counterframing, most notably Benford (1987) and Benford and Hunt (2003), who discuss attempts at framing and counterframing strategies (such as problem denial, counter attribution, counter prognosis, attack on character) and movement responses to these actions (such as ignoring, keying, embracing, distancing, and counter maligning). These and other studies provide some insight into counter-rhetorical strategies regarding social problems (Iberra and Kitsuse 1993; Spector and Kitsuse 1977).

Benford and Hunt (2003) identify four types of counterframes that are used in the public problem marketplace:

1. *Problem denial* is the main counterframing strategy. “By denying the existence of a problem, movement antagonists essentially question a movement’s *raison d’être*.” In other words, by denying the existence of a problem, antagonists in the conflict may question the rationality, logic, or legitimacy behind the claims of the opposing organization. If there is no problem, then the antagonists may argue that everything claimed is simply pointless.
2. *Counter attribution by counterframe movement* ideology implicitly questions identity claims of movement protagonists.
3. The third counterframing strategy is *counter prognosis*. Antagonists often maintain that movement actors focus on the wrong prognosis. Similar to the foregoing type of counterframing, counter prognosis involves challenging protagonist frames and offering alternative solutions. As with counter attributions, counter prognosis reflects on movement identities.
4. Perhaps one of the most powerful counterframing tactics is for antagonists to *attack the collective moral character of a movement group*. This is done by discrediting its claims by defacing or devaluing the character of an opposition leader. This makes any claims made by that person—even if the claims are valid—seem less credible. In the realm of social movements, collective character is a main part of

collective identity. Protagonists generally attribute positive traits to their members collectively, and antagonists attribute negative traits to the other group. Benford and Hunt's (2003) findings support an earlier study by Wittner (1984) that this can be summed up in three counterframes: (1) the supporters are on the enemy's side, (2) the supporters have hidden agendas, and/or (3) the supporters are too naïve. These can be used individually or in combination (Wittner 1984, as cited in Benford and Hunt 2003:166).

Another way of conceptualizing attempts in response to counterframing strategies is to utilize what Benford and Hunt (2003) called "reframing strategies"; that is, embracing, distancing, and counter maligning. This reframing may lead to important shifts on both sides to readdress and identify opportunities for action or solutions not yet attempted. From this viewpoint, it can be concluded that social movements are targeted through frame alignment processes, and the antagonists in the conflict marketplace are targeted through counterframing. Given this relevance, framing and counterframing, as well as reframing, may be used to compete for recruitment of unaffiliated bystanders (see Kent 1990).

THE STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS

In this study, the structural conditions that produce opportunity or threats in the interaction between social movements and countermovements are a key aspect of framing and counterframing processes. This study explores how counterframing is influenced by political opportunity and threat. These opportunities and threats play an important role in the outcome of social

movements and countermovements, since they may secure political gain or undermine the group's mobilization efforts. However, it should be noted that this research does not directly draw on political opportunity structures theories in social movements that focus on the institutional political factors favorable for collective action; notably, Eisinger (1973), Kriesi, Kooopmans, Duyvendal, and Giugni (1995), McAdam (1982, 1999), Tarrow (1994), and Tilly (1978).

The structural conditions are the institutional social structures deriving from public events and issues surrounding that influence possibilities for political success or failure. Such events and issues require the adoption of new perspectives and often require some assumption of risk by the social movement organization and the countermovement. Structural conditions that may produce opportunities or threats result from historical events that recast the competition between social movements and countermovements. However, for an opportunity to arise in collective action, events and issues must resonate positively with social movement organization positions and with public beliefs and values. In other words, opportunities must promise positive effects in the public eye for it to act, support, or contribute to successful collective action.

A simplified description is that people's beliefs, ideas, and values help them to align ideologically with particular events and issues that produce opportunity for them or their organization, such as a social movement organization. If the events and issues do *not* align with the public's beliefs, ideas, and values, opportunities may become threats and, thus, become part of the countermovement's strategies.

Threats are associated with varying levels of situational stress (e.g., discontent, frustration, psychic and/or ideological tension) generated by events that are not congruent and complementary with public beliefs and values. Stated differently, opportunity or threats are aimed differently by groups that are vulnerable to new claims that would *enhance* the contender's realization of its interests, and by groups that are threatening to make claims that would *reduce* the contender's realization of its interests (Tilly 1978). Although threats have negative consequences, they can be overcome by using counterframing strategies such as problem denial, counter attribution, counter prognosis, and attacks on character (Benford and Hunt 2001).

To arrive at a deeper understanding of the conditions that produce opportunity and threats in framing and counterframing in social movement research, a brief outline of the problem is appropriate. This study argues that social movements must distinguish opportunities from threats.

The main difficulty facing an analysis of opportunities and threats is the variety of contexts in which these terms are used. In this study, the UMNO and PAS groups create certain images that were affected by favorable (opportunities) and unfavorable (threats) events during four periods: 1990, 1998, 1999, and on September 11, 2001. Opportunities and threats can be loosely classified as political, religious, social, or economic. These events had the potential to produce opportunities or threats for both sides; by utilizing framing and counterframing strategies, these organizations had the potential to use the

events to garner favorable public opinion or to compete for recruitment of unaffiliated bystanders.

Put simply, “Once a countermovement is mobilized, movement and countermovement react to one another” (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1632). Most importantly, when social movements and countermovements compete, the latter tend to use counterframing strategies that focus on threats of potential loss rather than on opportunity for gain. Once counterframing is activated, people or countermovements react differently to a proposed action when its consequences are framed in terms of loss as opposed to gain (see Tilly 1978). Moreover, “When a movement shows sign of success, others may see its gains as threats to their own interests” (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1638). Preventing a perceived loss is often more highly valued than capturing a commensurate gain. Under such conditions, counterframing works best when the context can be changed such that there are more incentives to consider new perspectives or there is a strong focus on improving communication and building issues that may change, or be aligned with, people’s beliefs and values. Benford and Hunt (2001) explain that one of the counterframing strategies is *counter prognosis*, which acknowledges the causes of a problem but argues for a different solution. In this sense, counterframing strategies can be sympathetic or unsympathetic to social problems (Iberra and Kitsuse 1993). This counterframing, then, can become a formative analytic strategy for counterattack.

This study is designed to lead to an understanding of how social movements and countermovements can both coordinate and articulate their

grievances through a basic problem-solving schema. In my own view, opportunities and threats, and framing and counterframing, are the materials of reality needed for the construction of social movements and countermovement strategies (see Figure 1).




Figure 1 Structural conditions under opportunity and threat leading to framing and counterframing.

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Any discussion of religious identity should begin by examining the theoretical underpinnings of the sociological study of self-identity and collective identity.

Sociologist commentator Cerulo (1997) explains:

The study of identity forms a critical cornerstone within modern sociological thought. Introduced by the works of Cooley and Mead, identity studies have evolved and grown central to current sociological discourse. Micro-sociological perspectives (social psychology, symbolic interactionism), perspectives focused primarily on the individual, dominated work published through the 1970s. Sociologists focused primarily on the formation of the “me,” exploring the ways in which interpersonal interactions mold an individual’s sense of self. (P. 385)

Within European sociological perspectives, the catchphrase for the new social movements has become *collective identity*. Melucci (1980) claims that new social movements arise in *defense* of identity (P. 218). For him, collective identity is not stable but rather “negotiated through an activation of the social relationships connecting members of a group or a movement” (Melucci 1992:49). He criticizes social movement studies that “assume the existence of ready-formed collective actors” and asks, “Who acted?” This is a typical question and a hallmark of the social psychology from which Melucci has drawn. According to Melucci (1992), studies should focus on how those actors produce interactive and shared goals of their actions. In the new social movement studies, the construction of a collective identity is treated as an ongoing process that occurs when the members of the social movement interact with each other and with the social environment. The formation of a social movement critically depends on the creation of a collective identity (Melucci 1988:342-343).

The emergence of a social movement via the constructionist approach can clearly be seen in African-American leaders and the African-American

culture through their ethnic identity portfolio. Generally, African-American religious framings of injustice and political action have been springboards for political mobilization. These religious framings were sharply discounted by white Christian countermovements (Ellison 1991; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Morris 1984).

Religious beliefs are often in conflict occurs within the same ethnic groups, and this can be clearly detected in Malaysian political discourse between Islamic fundamentalists and secular nationalists. Another important factor for establishing collective identity is the concept of group consciousness. Consciousness refers to “interpretive frameworks that emerge from a group’s struggle to define and realize [its] members’ common interests in opposition to the dominant order” (Taylor and Whittier 1992:114). The formation of a group’s consciousness, like religious fundamentalism, connotes “a set [of] cognitive strategies by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group . . .”—in response to a real or imagined attack from those who apparently threaten to draw them—“ . . . [into a] syncretic, areligious, or irreligious cultural milieu” (Marty and Appleby 1993:3). This indicates that it may be particularly difficult to separate and pinpoint the defining characteristics of a group’s composition when religious beliefs and values are an integral part of a people’s self-identity.

Indeed, defensiveness to threats develops into political demands that can generate ethnic and religious mobilization, often with a result of altering the current socioeconomic political order of the state. Perceived threats are an

inevitable negative consequence of the increasing global expansion of economies, which can impact the integration of minorities, shape the pattern of migration, and stratification affect the politics of ethnic and religious relations. An example given by Statham (1999) regarding the Muslim mobilization in Britain notes a relative *absence* of mobilization by Indian, Sikh, and Hindu minorities, which achieved better levels of socioeconomic success than did Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, suggesting a strong socioeconomic basis for shared experiences and grievances as Muslims in Britain (P. 597).

By the same token, the race minority relations' framework does not offer a favorable environment for redress of perceived and actual Muslim grievances. Muslims have a strong natural basis for self-identification through a shared religious identity; that is, they are groups sharing the most discriminated-against and underprivileged statuses. Muslim demands for social and political equality are perceived as a threat by the majority of society because the majority also has a religious identity (see Eriksen 2001). However, the majority's social demand is that we interpret Muslim mobilization primarily as a status group desiring straightforward social and political rights, with only a small minority within that mobilization emphasizing religious differences (Modood 1997).

Notably, if there is one lesson to be drawn from the past three decades, it is that Western scholars have not been attentive to or properly analyzed the ethnic or religious mindset that enables such atrocities as revolution, genocide, or communal massacres. Although media and local governments often portray these as massacres—for example, Hutu rebels in Rwanda, sectarian violence

between Sunnis and Shiites, Kosovo versus Albania, Czech versus Sudeten, and apartheid in South Africa—social movement theorists either neglect the role of religion as a factor in historical movements. Take Iran's revolution of the late 1970s as another example. As Salehi (1996:51) suggests, "The Islamic groups had thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of fully devoted individuals under their command." Interestingly, this devoted religious group embraced the notion of martyrdom—"a concept that had become an internalized idea" (P. 51)—meaning that they were willing to lay down their lives for the sake of religion in pursuit of divine sanction of a transcendent nature. In this context, it is rather surprising that relatively little research has focused on the topic of ethnic and religious identity mobilization.

This absence reminds me of a Western maxim: "Sociology is about us, and anthropology is about them." Sociological studies have focused mainly on the first world rather than on third world nations (Wallenstein 1995). The study of genocide and massacres must broaden to enhance the understanding of ethnic and religious conflicts and social mobilization in the third world. Such conflicts are sometimes called "identity-based" and are seen as stemming from differences in ideologies. The term *identity-based* is often used interchangeably with another commonly used phrase, *ethnic conflict* (Verba, Sclozman, Brady, and Nie 1993). Perhaps, as framing creates movements and collective identities (Snow et al. 1986), the same concept of framing processes will be useful in analyzing collective identities at specific historical movements of the ethnic and

religious identity construction in collective action. I believe that this study will expand the theoretical research development of social movements as a whole.

MALAYSIA'S RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

In this discussion, I hope to distinguish between UMNO's and PAS's conceptions of religious identity. Making this distinction is important to highlight the differences between these two political forces and is an effective way of seeing the range of alternatives in ethnic and religious identity that UMNO and PAS advocate. There has been an ongoing conflict in ethnic and religious identity between PAS and UMNO (Liow 2004; Mutalib 1993) because each organization must have a sense of collective identity about itself and its adversary, each side believing that the fight is between "us" and "them" (see Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997; Jasper 1998; Polleta and Jasper 2001). Indeed, these definitions are critical to an understanding of the root of the problems and to essentially question a movement's *raison d'être*.

Malaysia is a multicultural society, blending 61% Malay 28.1% Chinese, and 7.9% Indian into a single state structure (see *The World Factbook* 2005). However, within the country, there are stark contrasts in opinion as to what role religion—especially Islam as an official country religion—should play in identity formation and in different spheres and on different planes of life as espoused by UMNO, with its secularist/nationalist view, and PAS, with its Islamic view.

The anti-British movement—led by MNP and its rival UMNO—was sparked by, among other things, the growing economic power and influence of the ethnic Chinese under the British rule (Noor 2004). Indeed, throughout its

two-decade tenure, UMNO sponsored and articulated the economic, social, and political aspirations of the country's Malay majority. The attainment of the goal that UMNO pursued has now largely been successful, achieved in the form of state contracts, licenses, and development grants to the Malay *bumiputra* (Case 1994).

In the course of asserting Malay rights and interests, the two parties have been divided by a basic question: "Who are the Malays?" In other words, what constitutes Malay identity and Malay culture? UMNO emphasizes race (Malay rights), language (the Malay language *Bahasa Melayu*), and custom as the three pillars of "Malayness" (Ratnam 1985). On the other hand, PAS emphasizes Islamic religion, race, and language as the keys to "Malayness" (Noor 2003).

UMNO'S CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

UMNO was formed in 1946 as a political organization to express Malayan rights (*bumiputra* or "sons of the soil"). It is the largest political party in Malaysia and a founding member of the *Barisan Nasional* coalition—along with the Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)—that has ruled the country without interruption since its independence in 1957 (Funston 1980).

UMNO is made up primarily of urban, middle-class professionals whose religious identity has taken shape around secular interpretations and activities (e.g., capitalism, Western culture, and modernization). While constructing an identity to serve as the basis for its nation-state, UMNO drew upon both the legacy of a monarchical British imperial tradition that predates Islam and the

distinctive *Sunni Wa Jama'al* faith (Ratnam 1985; Hussein 2002). The UMNO follows Islam Hadhari or "Civilizational Islam" that has facilitated the production of moderate secular Islam. Islam Hadhari was originally founded in 1957 by Malaysia's first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. It was subsequently promoted by Mahathir Mohammad and then by his ex-deputy Anwar Ibrahim to overcome the considerable political challenges UMNO faced from the PAS Islamic movement (Hussein 2002).

As the government's ruling party, UMNO has the legitimacy provided by an *al-Islam al rasmi* (establishment religions). An establishment religion is one that adheres closely to the ideals as described in texts and interpreted by religious scholars (Noor 2003). In many instances, it is a State religion and, as such, is formally bound up in the legitimacy of government. For instance, in return for material favors and recognition of their status, *ulema* have generally facilitated the legitimization process by using their prerogatives accordingly. The establishment *ulema* have contributed to the identification of *al-Islam al rasmi* with government control by preaching Friday sermons that underscore obedience to authority and issuing *fatwas* (Islamic legal opinions) supportive of governmental policies and emphasizing the inseparability of Islam and government (Muzaffar 1987; Mutalib 1990).

During its emergence and development, there was political space for UMNO to ignore the issue of religion, until it faced a growing Islamic opposition. The secular system favored by UMNO created an atmosphere in which religion is less visible in the public sphere and considered a private matter, so religious

organizational groups such as PAS developed, pushing their agenda of more public space for religion.

The most important thing to remember is that as a result of independence, for the last three decades, the ruling UMNO has presided over a massive experiment in social engineering: They put forth religious as well as an affirmative-action programs that were designed to lift the poor Malay out of poverty and mold them into the white collar elite. On one front, UMNO uses religion to regulate the daily lives of most Malaysians and profoundly influence their beliefs and attitudes (Milner 1994). Perhaps, as several studies indicate, religion in today's society is indeed still an important source of attitudes, norms, and values in the realm of family life (Ellison and Sherkat 1993; Sherkat and Wilson 1995). This means that pluralization—or the segmentary differentiation of the subsystem religion (Luckmann 1967)—offers the trivial insight that religion is social and, therefore, still considered good for family, community, identity, and *society*.

On the second front, UMNO also believes that better education and economic development can gradually achieve political renewal. The prognostic framing of the UMNO economic approach focuses on the need for mechanisms to improve the rural Malay or *bumiputra* and balance inequities. Mahathir Mohamad argued that the only way for the Malay to maintain their distinct Islamic lifestyle was by attaining economic power (Samsul 1995; Khoo 1995). These goals may be realized through the New Economic Policy (NEP) and government assistance launched in 1971. The NEP called for a financial redistribution from

the minority of wealthy non-*bumiputra* ethnic groups to the *bumiputras* (Neher 1994) and corporate equity of 30% *bumiputra*, 30% foreign, and 40% Chinese-Malaysians (Esman 1987). This goal was supposed to be realized through an expanding economy, so that no ethnic group would suffer from economic or social deprivation (Esman 1987; Neher 1994).

At the same time, in framing the economy, the Malaysian government responded with the placatory policies of the National Development Policy (NDP). Like NEP, the NDP subsidized poor Malays through a Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) organized as early as 1950 with the short-term objective of resolving underemployment or helping landless farmers, along with the long-term goal of promoting economic growth (Ongkili 1985).

Nevertheless, an equal social and economic position for the people was the central concern of the Malays, while the UMNO's concept of a secular nation referred to high ideals encompassing dignity, equality, freedom, justice, democracy, and independence; materialistic values such as wealth, property, education, rural infrastructure (*kampongs*); and an acceptable standard of living (Samsul 1995). But as the government prepared to mark three decades under the NEP, its failures became increasingly apparent. Affirmative action, critics said, had morphed into cronyism. "The government transferred wealth to a small pool of politically well-connected businessmen" (*HK* August 28, 1990).

There is no debating that the UMNO government spent hundreds of millions of dollars sending the country's native population—the "sons of the soil"—to leading universities in the United States, Britain, and Australia. As a

result, the program created a native urban middle class and avoided such outbreaks of ethnic violence as had marred Malaysia's early years of independence in the 1960s (*NST* June 5, 1990). Yet, there was growing unhappiness among the vast majority of Islamic opposition and other Islamic groups, which criticized the UMNO-led government for explicitly denying Islam's relevance to politics (see Mutalib 1990); that is, that UMNO felt the people should look to religion (Islam) only for spiritual solace and for family matters (*AM* August, 1993, Issue 8), but not in the public sphere (e.g., politics and economy). Of course, UMNO's ideological and class outlook—aristocratic, free-market, nationalist, and in favor of privatization (Noor 2003a; Case 1994)—reject the idea of *sharia* law as being inappropriate for Malaysia as multiethnic-based society.

PAS'S CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

The Partai Al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) originated from the pathway of *Hizbul Muslim* (Funston 1980). It was established in November 1945 with the name Malayan National Party (MNP) out of efforts to resist British occupation and defend the rights and interests of ethnic Malays. The party was renamed Pan-Malaysia Party (PMIP) in 1951 and received its current name in 1973. The adoption of a Malay name was meant to underscore its commitment to replacing British English with the Malaysian language (*Bahasa Malaysia*) as the official language of the country (Ratnam 1985; Noor 2004).

Against UMNO Policies; PAS's competing frames argued that these were merely "repression with concessions" (*HK* August 14, 1990:5). PAS claimed that

the NEP frame of UMNO was about the reduction of interethnic economic disparities but had nothing to do with poverty reduction (Gomez and Jomo 1999).

The ultimate aim of PAS is to form a government and society that fundamentally embraces Islamic values and ordinances in order to seek God's (Allah's) blessings (Musalib 1990). While UMNO proponents have a secular worldview, the PAS movement approaches identity issues from an Islamic point of view (Musalib 1990; Liow 2004; Goh 2002).

The Islamic PAS movement consists mainly of traditional rural Malays who have worked to transform the Malaysian secular state into an Islamic state. However, it is important to note that many professional, business and middle-class educated Malays have recently joined PAS. The PAS Islamic doctrine supports the belief that all Muslims, regardless of ethnicity, belong together in one *Ummah* (Noor 2003a). For them, the nation should be considered in religious terms to encompass those beyond and across the territorial boundaries of the individual state (Musalib 1990). It is important to note, though, "the establishment of the *Ummah* was not a matter of human choice but of divine will" (Dabasi, cited in Robbins and Robertson 1987:193).

The choice of Islam as a fundamental criterion for Malayness sets PAS apart from UMNO and soon became the defining element in the evolution of its identity. However, like sects, PAS cannot exploit economies of scale as fully as mainstream State churches, because of the costs involved as the sect membership grows. According to Iannaccone, religious sect membership is more attractive to individuals with limited secular opportunities. Sect

membership has no room for compromise and assumes total abstinence from several secular commodities (1991, 1998).

Importantly, both of these groups put emphasis on their targeted identity/belief criteria in an attempt to orchestrate and sustain participation (see Benford 1997; Snow et al. 1986). In their discussion of value amplification, Snow et al. (1986) stress the relevance of the values that people already hold, reminding people of their own values. Values must be set regardless of the values and structures of those they are opposing, and those values are expressed overtly and symbolically in the ebb and flow of everyday actions (Taylor and Whittier 1992:111).

Amplifying the concept of a broader *Ummah al Islamiyya*, the community of believers, contrasts with the idea of ethnic identity that is emphasized by UMNO nationalists, who identify themselves with reference to a specific territory and state (Hussein 2002). On the other hand, PAS members do not constitute a state nor is their faith associated with any specific land. The PAS movement approaches religious identity issues from an Islamic point of view. PAS upholds the holiness of Islam and its supremacy as well as its independence. Islam and *Allahuakbar* are the underlying principles. PAS proclaims its religious identity with a distinct set of fundamentalist beliefs and values (Musalib, 1990; Musalib, 1994; Liow 2004). PAS—like any other Islamic political party, such as *Jamaat Islami* of Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt—is influenced by the Pan Islamic movement (see Munson 2001). PAS aims to establish Malaysia as a country based on Islamic legal theory derived from the primary sources of Islam,

the Qur'an and Sunnah, combined with the Hadith (teachings and sayings attributed to Muhammad) and the Sunnah (the compiled form of traditions) to constitute the sources for *sharia* (Islamic law). *Sharia* is the body of legal and ethical knowledge that is the foundation of an Islamic lifestyle, demarcating what is lawful and what is prohibited (Hussein 2002; Hussein 1998; see also Esposito 1998).

The context in which Malaysia operates has not resolved the contradictions that resulted from basing national identity squarely on secularism and Malay ethnicity (Ratnam 1985; Hussein 2002). This definition is unacceptable not only to PAS but also to significant numbers of committed Muslim groups who want Islam to be enshrined as the State religion (Hussein 2002; Case 1994). Similarly, emphasis on Malay language (*Bahasa Melayu*) and religion relegates UMNO to what is, at best, an ambiguous status. Thus, the PAS Islamic movement poses threats to the definition of Malay national identity (Ratnam 1985; Liow 2004).

Unlike UMNO's *al-Islam al rasmi* (establishment religions), PAS's *al-Islam al-shabi* (populist Islam), on the other hand, is comprised of those religious beliefs and practices that prevail among the people; it emanates from the underside or the periphery of society. Residence in outlying provinces or sprawling slums, illiteracy, and other factors that impede access to religious scholars and written texts tend to distance people from established religions and make possible the existence of lively populist movements. Fitting loosely within the category of populist Islam are those members of the *ulema* who have, in

recent years, become PAS leaders and have directed their messages to the masses separated from the state and from official Islam (Liow 2004).

In the early 1980s, PAS leadership was taken over by a more Islamic core. The new leaders were Yusof Rawa, Fadzil Mohd Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang, and Nik Aziz Nik Mat. All of them were *ulama*, religious scholars, or theologians (Hussein 2002). Since that time, PAS has been undergoing an ideological transformation, progressively turning itself from a platform of Malay ethnonationalism to Islamism or political Islam (Hussein 2002; Noor 2004).

PAS leaders believe that the problem with UMNO is that it is a secular party, content with giving Islam the dubious status of State religion. As Noor (2003a) points out, all UMNO-led governments, from past to present, “have not treated Islam as a living, vital faith, but more as a legitimizing instrument” (P. 12). In other words, although UMNO seems to treat Islam as a way of life that involves all institutional sectors—such as bureaucracies or educational systems—and successfully organizes the annual National and International Qur’an recitation competitions, the *maulud* celebrations marking the birthday of the Prophet, the investitures of the Sultans (King), the building of mosques and *suraus* (small mosques), and general support of other Islamic symbols and rituals, all this may simply be seen in the context of securing legitimacy (HK March 14, 1998; see also *Star* October 12, 1990). The article was eventually challenged by prominent Islamic activists, with criticism appearing in *MalaysiaKini* on September 15, 2003:

While the Islamic institutions of the state like IKIM and ISTAC were engaged in their project of re-presenting Islam as a modern system of values and way of life, they overlooked the fact that their message was not being delivered to the rest of

society. Despite all its efforts, the Islamic institutions known as Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM) and International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC) were seen as institutions that had been set up under the patronage of the Mahathir administration and as part of the government's own Islamisation campaign. (quoted in Noor 2003a:4)

According to Smith (1791), free religious competition not only generates more religious activity but also reduces religious conflict, satisfies the demand for religious instruction, and produce higher quality religious services. This claim appears to promote an institutional separation of religion and politics. However, in Malaysia's case, this separation was not acceptable to PAS and other religiously committed groups. Mutalib (1990) described it more "as a legitimizing instrument which the contents are not being met according to true Islamic principles" (P. 12). It was further described as a cosmetic gesture, at best, by PAS *ulema*. In this instance, activist Dr. Farish Noor (2003a) pointed out:

The *ulema* of PAS argued that Islamisation programme proposed by the UMNO-led government was not really designed to lay the foundations of an Islamic state but in fact part of an elaborate scheme to make the country appear more Islamic while remaining firmly entrenched within the global liberal-capitalist economic system. (P. 5)

At the outset, it is worth noting that the UMNO government used state religion as a way to control the citizenry, and this control would be facilitated by having a monopoly of religion (See Smith 1791; Iannaccone 1991). As Smith notes, state religion tends to become a religion for the elite. This assessment is relevant to UMNO's case, as its clergy became an elite minority group. During UMNO's government activities, its clergy tended to engage in secular activities, including politics, to promote a State religion. Smith (1791) and Iannaccone (1991) attest that a State religion diverts the government's attention away from the religious needs of their congregants. Stark and Bainbridge (1997) agree that

State religion promotes monopoly, poor service and low rates of church attendance. Consequently, one might argue that a religious movement such as PAS is able to penetrate and enter the religious market by providing a better service to its members and community.

Such an explanation, however, needs further elaboration to explain the religion-state relationship. One of the central features of Malaysia's State religion, as Stark (2003) predicted, is that "a State religion is more likely to [emerge] when the main religion is monotheistic" (P. 32). In essence, Islam is the religion of the federation, so it must be assumed that UMNO has assembled a group of religious believers that accepts the social environment status quo. On the other hand, PAS would then represent a religious group that *rejects* the social environment in which it finds itself (Stark and Bainbridge 1985). There is ongoing debate among Malaysian scholars as to whether PAS is even organized into a movement; however, in my opinion, PAS does fit the description of a religious movement because it attempts to mobilize elements of society in a way that either causes or prevents change in the current system of beliefs, values, symbols, and practices and is, according to Stark and Bainbridge (1985), concerned with "providing a supernaturally based general compensator" (P. 23).

PAS embraces a sectarian religious identity, requiring substantial religious commitment and piety. In other words, Islam was reconstructed by PAS as a counter-hegemonic discourse not only against Malaysian society's stratification, corruption, social dislocation, and alienation—brought about by the government's developmental and modernization drive—but also against the form of religion

produced by UMNO (Muzaffar 1987, quoted in Liow 2004). Borrowing from Smith's (1791) and Iannaccone's (1991) religious market viewpoints, we can argue that the tenets of the PAS Islamic movement resonates because PAS is more attuned to providing better services to the Malaysian community as a whole. Religious sects such as PAS tend to become the established denominations (Iannaccone 1991).

An accurate description of the contention between UMNO and PAS in terms of religious issues is that "it was not whether Islam was liberal or tolerant in the Western sense, but rather whether as a system of belief and values it could be used to promote a dynamic outlook toward economic and political issues instead" (Noor 2003a:5).

However, it is clear that relations between UMNO power and populist Islam have become more ambivalent. Recognizing the mobilization capacities of an Islam that is under the direct control of *ulema* and that frequently espouses highly emotive beliefs and practices, UMNO has been wary of *al-Islam al sha-bi*, even outlawing various manifestations of it. In the early part of the 20th century in Malaysia, for example, the UMNO government has sought to suppress Sufi *tariqas* (orders), which are brotherhoods of Islamic mystics. Sufism, a search for divine knowledge through the emotions rather than purely through the intellect, emerged in the 20th century as an antidote to the austere, scripturalist, rational nature of Islam (Noor 2003a). It has always met with an ambivalent response from *ulema*, some of whom have opposed Sufism and others of whom have themselves joined *tariqas*. Large orders were also formed, including the Darul

Arqam, founded by *ustab* Ashaari Muda in 1968, starting as a study group among Muslim scholars. This order has swept through the Malaysia State at various times in history, carrying with it the potential for widespread political mobilization and disruption (Noor 2003a).

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Malaysian government, under the ruling UMNO, sought to bring Sufi orders under control in the early stages of their consolidation of power. Initial efforts focused on ridding the orders of distinctive practices that reinforced their identities and elicited strong loyalties and sacrifices from their members. Thus, the practices of the *sheikh/ustab* (leader) of the order riding on horseback over the backs of prostate members, as well as the self-infliction of wounds, were outlawed by the Malaysian government. In 1994, the Darul Arqam was banned and its leader, Sheikh Ashaari Muda, was arrested under the Internal Security Acts (Noor 2003a; see also Suhakam 2004).

Ultimately, the struggle to control the Malaysian State, which in my own view can be seen as *al-Islam al rasmi* (establishment) versus *al-Islam al sha'bi* (populist Islam), attests to the contemporary intensity of the conflict between the two Malays and two Islams: UMNO's and PAS's differing conceptions of religious identity. Highlighting the different conceptions of ethnic and religious identity between these two movements leads to what frame analysis calls a *frame dispute* (Benford 1993), which the heart of this study examines in detail. In this instance, PAS is embroiled in a bitter frame dispute with the UMNO *ulama*

(religious scholars), each asserting a particular interpretation of the Islamic tradition and the right to sacred authority.

PAS and several other religiously committed organizations (such as Darul Arqam, Jamaah Islah Malaysia [JIM], and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia [ABIM]) desire a more profound role for Islam in public life. The PAS Islamic movement seeks to overturn the established secular sociopolitical and economic order and implement the *sharia* laws in contemporary Malaysian society (Noor 2003b). Needless to say, PAS continues to be influenced by events taking place throughout the Islamic countries. Although difficult to prove, one may suspect that Ayatollah Khomeini's success in the Iranian revolution inspired PAS groups to continue their struggle to establish an Islamic state (Abu Bakar, 1991) and gave PAS ample reason to believe that *ulema* rule is a possible alternative to secular leadership (see Hussein 2002).

As stated earlier, PAS leaders are *ulema*. Therefore, PAS emphasizes Islamic religious knowledge and moral character as the basic principle of political leadership (Hussein 2002). The teachings and tenets of Islam have become the ideology of PAS rule, and all aspects of community life (under the PAS government) are to be regulated by this ideology. This is elegantly simple and well suited to the requirements of the *umma al mu'minin* community of believers to "Obey God, obey his prophet, and obey those in authority over you" (Arjomand 1984; Mohamad 1994; see also Esposito 1998). This 59th verse from the fourth *sura* (chapter) of the Qur'an points to a fundamental difference between the conception of legitimate government in Islam and that of the secular UMNO.

This kind of ideology may bear little relation to the hard realities of secular politics, since, as UMNO believes, Malaysia is a multiethnic society. As a multi-ethnically based society (Malay, Chinese, and Indian), UMNO fits into the domain of “conservative religions” (Case 1994), and Beyer (1994) argues that the leaders of any conservative religious community seek to—sometime successfully in—transfer their personal religious values into political principle and legal tenets. Offering spiritual solace in family matters such as marriage or divorce in accordance to *sharia* law is one obvious example of UMNO’s conservative religious response to Muslim Malay society (Case 1994; Goh 2002; Liow 2004).

In sum, Islamic religious practice has always been tied closely to the Malay identity, and it should not be surprising that religion forms an important part of the past and present argument or debate on identity and politics between PAS and UMNO, despite efforts to reconcile and resolve their differences. Religion will inevitably be part of the old and new awakening in contemporary Malaysian public discourse. On the other hand, it offers little support for a single and uncontested unity as Malaysian, in large part because it has so few institutional mechanisms for controlling interpretation and is thus always open to competing uses.

CHAPTER OUTLINE, KEY EVENTS AND ANALYSIS

The chapter highlights the four critical events of importance to the interaction between the political and religious factions in Malaysia—chiefly characterized as

“secularism” and “Islamism”—especially the political development leading to the escalating divide between PAS and UMNO frame disputes.

Chapter 1

The study begins with the historical development of PAS and UMNO, leading to the escalating division between these two groups. The historical development of PAS and UMNO is useful in understanding the nature of the two groups’ religious conflict.

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 reviews the paper’s analytic methodology. Primary and secondary documents related to the events will be used to examine the religious issues framing— characterized as “secularism” and “Islamism”—especially the political development and leading to the escalating contentiousness between PAS and UMNO frame disputes.

This paper aims to analyze key historical comparisons of four major events that involved shifts in ethnic and religious framing, fostered by patterns of opportunities and threats. These four critical events that this paper analyzed are:

1. The electoral success of PAS in the State of Kelantan during the 1990s.
2. The wave of protests in September 1998 that led to Deputy Prime Minister Anwar’s¹ arrest through the ISA.

¹ It should be noted that, throughout the paper, due to the nature of Malaysian names in which Malaysians use first names prominently instead of last names, I will most often use first names for the players or the actors in these four events.

3. Another electoral success by PAS in the States of Kelantan and Terengganu that offered opportunity to PAS while posing a threat to UMNO.
4. The impact of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States that reversed the situation for both PAS and UMNO in that it became a potential threat for the prior while it presented an opportunity for the latter.

Chapter 3

The study in Chapter 3 focuses on Event 1, PAS's opportunity in the 1999 general election and its electoral success in the State of Kelantan. Chapter 3 discusses the key shift of UMNO's and PAS's religious framing, and how how religious framing and counterframing are influenced by political opportunities and threats. It further provides a theoretical underpinning to understand of the structural conditions that contributed to political opportunities for one side and threats for the other. The chapter delineates the internal structure of each organization in respect to subgroups and ideological factions, as well as their major political activities.

For PAS, ideally there *is* no separation between religion and politics: Islam is both *din wa dawla* (religion and state) (Mutalib 1990). In July 1990, a session was held bringing together PAS and Islamic students in Birmingham, England. PAS leader Nik Aziz—before he became Kelantan Chief Minister—rejected the notion that an Islamic state can be achieved through a step-by-step process that commences from the individual, progresses into the family and the society, and

finally reaches the State. He surmised that such a theory of progression was “concocted by the enemies of Islam to obstruct the Islamic struggle” (*AM* August, 1990, Issue 8:12).

The PAS diagnostic frame recognized its degeneration as a result of secularism and decline in Islamic values for the Malay society. It was too hasty in its attempt to seize control of authority structures, including the government, to impose its views. In addition, prior the 1990 elections, PAS had used an important diagnostic frame as it exerted effort in recruiting and educating Malay Muslim professionals and the middle class who were deemed to be unaffected by secularism and sought spiritual and political renewal in Islam. As McAdam et al. (1996) described, participants and supporters of collective actions must anticipate that their actions and their association with others concerning the situation will help to resolve the problem.

Through its own media outlets, PAS leaders and its supporters are framed as honorable (less corrupted), independent, and truly religious in their embrace of Islam, whereas UMNO members are framed as “political opportunists that are susceptible to the abuses of corruption, favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism” (Gomez and Jomo 1997:144). Put in simple terms, PAS’s framing strategy in the 1990 election was designed to position PAS as the solution to sociopolitical incoherence and conflict between the sacred texts of Islam’s Qur’an—the holy book, as well as Hadith—the religious practice, teachings, and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 focuses on Event 2, the Anwar Ibrahim episode of 1998 and the opportunity and threats, framing and counterframing that took place. Anwar was the second-most powerful man in Malaysian politics as Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO vice president. He was dismissed on September 2, 1998, and waves of protests led to his arrest justified by reference to the ISA. The period featured a backdrop of religious framing that involved sexual practices of a government official but also, through the actions of the government, a spotlight on the lack of religious values of President Mahathir Mohamad himself. The entire fiasco was positioned as a religious issue and heavily framed by both UMNO and PAS.

This event was critical because Anwar first refused to resign from his government positions after being accused of “inappropriate behavior.” A book entitled *50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister* in May of that year (*MK* September 10, 1998) put forth graphic sexual allegations and accusations of corruption regarding Anwar (see Appendix C). On April 15, 1999, Anwar was found guilty and sentenced to more than nine years in prison (see Appendix D).

All media in Malaysia are controlled by UMNO. Malaysian readers were offended by the sodomy and corruption charges against Anwar and the fact that the papers denied space to publish Anwar’s responses (*MM* December 16-31, 1998). *MalaysiaKini* reported the human rights activist frame that “most

Malaysian have reached a threshold of disbelief in anything the government media has to say now” (November 6, 1999:2).

Chapter 5

Chapter 5 addresses Event 3: how UMNO and PAS constructed religious issues to mobilize their potential constituents and the general public, as well as gain the media’s attention. In the 1999 general election, PAS increased its parliamentary presence and won the State of Terengganu after UMNO had held it for 40 years. Chapter 5 analyzes important key shifts in religious framing of PAS opportunities and threats to UMNO as follows:

1. PAS and UMNO religious issues framing prior to and after the 1999 election and the dramatic shifts as a result of the Anwar factor.
2. PAS’s alliance with other *Reformasi* opposition parties in the *Barisan Alternatif* (BA) coalition and the resultant religious framing.
3. UMNO’s use of religious issues framing prior to and after the 1999 election.
4. UMNO’s use of counterframing strategies in response to a threat in an attempt to regain the confidence of Malaysian mainstream society.

Chapter 6

The fourth and final critical event is different from the last three, because the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States reversed the situation for both PAS and UMNO, creating an opportunity for UMNO and a threat to the PAS fundamentalist Islamic movement. September 11 changed the political environment in Malaysia. Chapter 6 examines UMNO’s framing of religious

issues that strengthened its political opportunities after September 11 and, second, PAS's own framing to attempt to prevent the threat. A detailed analysis of print media coverage will reconstruct the religious issues framing that occurred as a result of September 11, 2001.

Under these opportune conditions, UMNO framed PAS by equating its brand of Islam to obscurantism, extremism, fanaticism, intolerance, backwardness, and militancy. UMNO projected itself as the right against the wrong. Islam, UMNO claimed, was associated with modernity, economic development, material progress, rationality, and liberation (Noor 2003a; Khoo 1995).

In one negative framing, Mahathir and the UMNO government tried to amplify PAS by linking it to a political movement known as *Kumpulan Mujahiddin Malaysia* (KMM). Mahathir argued:

These people have gone abroad, became involved with the Taliban and accumulating weapons overseas, and now they have returned. . . . We believe that the PAS influenced members of KMM. These are party members who are extreme and feel that the democratic process is too slow or did not help them. They are happier using violence to topple the government. (MK October 12, 2001)

Chapter 7

Chapter 7 presents a summary of the findings and recommendations for future research. It is anticipated that this study will contribute to the literature on religious identity construction in social movements through understanding how political opportunities and threats are influenced by religious issues framing and counterframing.

EXPECTATIONS AS A RESULT OF THIS STUDY

As accounts of previous social movements have shown (see Buechler 2000; McVeigh 1999; Van Dyke and Soule 2002), structural changes and positions can lead to new grievances in response to opportunities and threats that interact to influence movement framing and counterframing. More specifically, I expect that, for the period under examination in this study, all four events to be documented involved a shift in religious framing fostered by patterns of opportunities and threats. The first three events—the electoral success of PAS in the state of Kelantan during the 1990s, the wave of protests in September 1998 that led to Deputy Prime Minister Anwar’s arrest through the ISA, and another electoral success of PAS in the States of Kelantan and Terengganu—offered opportunity to PAS while posing a threat to UMNO. In the case of these three events, UMNO was under political threat conditions, as PAS’s religious issues framing in the 1990 and 1999 elections resonated with the Malay heartland states. I also expect that, in contrast to these three events, the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., reversed the situation for PAS and UMNO, presenting a potential threat to PAS and an opportunity for UMNO.

To present their positions to the public, these groups employ social movement and countermovement strategies that are characterized sometimes by positive approaches (presenting their proposals as opportunities for society if successful) and sometimes by negative approaches (presenting threats to society if the proposals do not meet with success). The choice of these two basic strategies—opportunities and threats, framing and counterframing—are

generated by religious beliefs and values that play a critical role for the construction of social movement and countermovement strategies. Specifically, the focus of this study encompasses the following:

1. First, I expect that this study will reveal that UMNO and PAS engage in frame contests over religious issues, and that they frame each other's perspectives on religion in ways that highlight differences and generate counterframes.
2. I expect that, in response to threats, UMNO will tend to reemphasize its religious beliefs and values as an important asset for framing events. Under threatening conditions, UMNO may hope to use the State religion to gain control and public support and, at the same time, overcome the momentum generally enjoyed by PAS. In a threatening environment, it is possible for UMNO to amplify the religious beliefs and values used by PAS to neutralize framing efforts of the countermovement. In other words, I expect that when UMNO operates under conditions of threat, it will focus on the interplay of religious beliefs and values that people already hold, then remind people of those values (Snow et al. 1986) while at the same time discrediting PAS as having a backward Islamic ideology.
3. I expect that the study will reveal that under conditions of opportunity, PAS will further amplify religious beliefs and values to focus on differences between PAS and UMNO in the religious framing of issues and institutions. PAS framing efforts will focus on specific Islamic

values and beliefs, such as the importance of *sharia* law and the value Islam as both *din wa dawla* (religion and state)—implying a belief in the need for a radical reconstruction of the state to replace existing structures with Islamic institutions.

4. I expect that, while in a threatening environment, PAS frames will be presented to society as calls for equality, compassion, and unity in a world dominated by inequality, self-aggrandizement, and disunity to portray that UMNO Islamic version is a wrong version and its practices are un-Islamic.

CHAPTER 2

THE METHODOLOGY OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

The intended audience for this document includes both academics and the lay public. Therefore, a research design of content analysis seems most appropriate. The methodology is selected to present the context and meaning of newspaper-based event data investigation (Eisinger 1973; Gamson 1992a), which is part of a new trend in social movement research (Gamson 1992b; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Koopmans and Rucht 1999; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; Riechert 1996; Rucht and Neidhardt 1999; Tarrow 1998).

In the present study, the research strategy is to identify, categorize, and track multiple frames in context between the PAS Islamic social movement and the UMNO nationalist countermovement organization. This will be done through the interpretation of press releases, news stories, and editorials but omitting public commentaries.

The term *multiple frames in context* refers to competing frames (that is, frame alignment, frame dispute, and counterframing) that were influenced by the structural conditions involving shifts in contention that were fostered by patterns of opportunities and threats between PAS and UMNO in ethnic and religious framing. By tracking competing frames, I hope to provide a better understanding of religious cultural framing and counterframing in terms of the contrast in beliefs and values between PAS and UMNO regarding Malay rights as well as the interests of the both organizations as they seek to answer the unresolved question: "Who are the Malay?" The contrasting choices of a frame of religion

(Islam) by PAS and ethnic or secular/nationalist concerns by UMNO set them apart and become a defining, discursive element in the evolution of their identities. Through content analysis, this research addresses the question of how PAS and UMNO consciously negotiate and express aspects of their ethnic and religious identities.

OVERVIEW OF METHODS

My first step was to define the scope of the analysis by identifying research questions in order to guide the study. In an attempt to fill the analytical gap regarding the development of movements and countermovements, this study followed Riechert's (1996) methods of Frame Mapping that were used by the news media to identify, in context, multiple frames that affected public opinion. Using data from the media, this study locates, identifies, and compares UMNO and PAS frames in the context of the research questions. The data includes press releases, editorials, and collective action stories about UMNO and PAS as they competed for public attention. The multiple frames revealed through this process were then categorized into two frames: one frame representing PAS rhetoric and one frame representing UMNO rhetoric. Within this context, the research focuses on (1) how the competing movements, UMNO and PAS, have framed religious and cultural issues under conditions of opportunity and threat in order to secure political gain or undermine their opponent's mobilization efforts, (2) conditions that produce opportunities or threats that influence how UMNO and PAS have amplified religious and ethnic beliefs and values, and (3) how

UMNO and PAS have had components of both challenging and countermovement frames.

DATA COLLECTION

The next step was to select the media sources and media types. Because this study seeks to provide an historical comparison of cultural framing and counterframing between PAS and UMNO, I examined primary and secondary data sources related to both political parties. The sources included PAS and UMNO secular documents—bulletins, programs, newsletters, journals, magazines, taped religious and political speeches, books, protest announcements, and press releases—as well as newspaper accounts of the groups' activities.

The primary newspaper data were collected from four elite newspapers. These data consisted of editorial reports, press releases, and newspaper stories related to collective action events in 1990 1998 1999, and 2001 in Malaysia; the years chosen are related to the four selected events described in the first section of this paper. The first source was the *New Straits Times (NST)*, which is published and controlled by the government. The second source was the PAS bimonthly newspaper, *Harakah (HK)* or *Muslimedia (MM)*. The remaining sources were three Malaysian newspapers that are generally considered to be independent: *MalaysiaKini (MK)*, *Asian Times (AT)*, and *The Star (Star)*. These independent newspapers were selected because of the powerful influence that their neutral and balanced news coverage has had on other papers throughout

the country. All five newspapers are English-language based. Data includes full text in some instances and excerpts in other instances.

Breed (quoted in Winter and Eyal 1981) described how news “flow[s] downward from the elite dailies” (P. 379). The five newspapers selected as data sources for this study were considered to be these “elite” sources. It was anticipated that they would provide a combination of neutral and biased views, or at least provide a reasonable representation of both sides in order to frame a message to the general public. Regardless of whether these newspapers were neutral or biased in their representation, they were expected to provide both breadth and depth in their coverage of the selected events. They were also expected to reveal—through the time span of their coverage of these events—what Gamson (1989) called the “ebb and flow of frames in news coverage across time,” which is important for frame analysis.

It is vital to note that “news” coverage related *only* to collective action (that is, social, religious, identity and economic issues), straight news coverage, press releases, and editorials was chosen for this analysis. Letters to the Editor or other public opinion venues were not used on the presumption that they would introduce distracting bias.

Thus, the data were limited to coverage by these five newspapers of the four major events in 1990 1998 1999, and 2001—events deemed to reflect shifts in contention fostered by patterns of opportunities and threats. These selected organizational frames were assigned to particular time spans of analysis. The exact time span for the first event’s analysis is from August 1, 1990, to the dates

of the election, October 20 and 21, 1990, and two months after the election that gave PAS the State of Kelantan for the first time. It is important to note that although the time span for the first event covers only the five months prior to the election, I did not restrict analysis to that exact time span, as I considered some news stories printed prior to and after that five-month period to be important for this analysis.

The date for the second event was September 2, 1998, when Anwar was sacked by Mahathir. The third event took place on December 29 and 30, 1999, the Malaysia general election in which PAS unseated UMNO in the State of Terengganu. The time span for the fourth event—the September 11 terrorist attacks—began with reaction to the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and Washington’s Pentagon, continued through the Malaysian government’s use of “terrorist” smear tactics to bolster its political fortunes in February 1, 2003, and ended with Washington’s announcement on May 28, 2002, that the Bush administration embraced Malaysia’s autocracy. Rather than presenting a neutral and balanced view of the facts, the government-controlled media framed and “predigested” all of these events for public consumption, denying the public a chance to evaluate the meaning of the events for themselves (Wang 2001). Nevertheless, for each event, both PAS and UMNO used the public’s crucial information sources—the media—as tools to advance their causes, strengthen their positions, and gain either larger constituencies or new audiences. Research has shown that “movements need the news media for three major purposes: mobilization, validation, and scope

enlargement” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993:116). Mobilization was achieved chiefly through the use of the movements’ own publications to frame a message. Public newspapers were used chiefly to overcome structural disadvantages (that is, the lack of a political machine) in an effort to fight back or respond to attacks by opponents.

MANIFEST CONTENT ANALYSIS

The next step in the research was to identify the frames used by UMNO and PAS that represented their positions on key issues associated with the concept of ethnic and religious framing in Malaysia’s political discourse. As Hertog and McLeod (1995) explain, “The frames used to interpret an event determine what available information is relevant” (P. 4). These frames were used to influence how the public thought about an issue by defining the issue, stating who or what caused the problem (diagnostic frame), and determining which solution should be considered (prognostic frame).

Given the nature of frames in this study, manifest content analysis was used to identify the frames’ key terms: words and phrases used frequently and consistently in news releases, public opinion pieces, news stories, or editorial columns in all five selected newspapers. Manifest content analysis—that is, content in which the meaning is obvious—involves those elements that are clearly recognizable terms or phrases in the texts. In this study, UMNO and PAS used the words and phrases frequently, consistently, and exclusively to present their positions on issues of ethnic and religious identity; the frame terms are presented in table 1.

Table 1

Key Terms Used by the Opposing Movements Related to the Concept of Ethnic and Religious Identity

(+) Religion	(-) Religion	(+) Ethnicity	(-) Ethnicity
+ Islam	- Secular	+ Malay	- Non-Malay
+ <i>Ummah</i>	- Fundamentalist	+ <i>Melayu</i>	- <i>Bukan Melayu</i>
+ Brotherhood	- Extremism	+ <i>Bumiputra</i>	- <i>Bukan Bumi</i>
+ Allah	- Idol/ <i>Jahiliyya</i>	+ Son of the Soil	- Migration
+ Muslim	- Irreligious	+ Native	- Non-native
+ Quranic	- Jinn/Evil spirits	+ Indigenous	- Non-local
+ <i>Ulema</i>	- Saint worship	+ Aboriginal	- Foreign

Next, I categorized this list of terms according to the four events for the purpose of analysis. It is important to note that not all the events were related to the concept of ethnic and religious identity key issues, but they were related to social issues. Therefore, in order to understand the reasons behind the multiplicity of PAS and UMNO activities related to the key concepts of ethnic and religious framing, it was useful to “unpack” the various meanings attributed to the frames in the paragraphs of press releases, news coverage, and editorials.

Consequently, I expanded the search by selecting issues that were associated with the events: election, the Anwar saga, social reform, and terrorism. Using a HighBeam research online comprehensive search string—that is, key words, names, or phrases—I identified the related issues from *New Straits Times* in news releases, news stories, and editorials. I identified 16

occurrences of the frame terms representing PAS and UMNO contentions in all four events. The frame terms clearly represent PAS and UMNO positions and had thematic meaning related to issues surrounding the beliefs and values discussed by both sides in ethnic and religious framing and counterframing. The frame terms were then categorized into two general positions: terms representing PAS and terms representing UMNO. These two sets are presented in table 2.

Table 2

Frame Terms Used by the Opposing Movements

UMNO Frame Terms		PAS Frame Terms	
Nationalism	UMNO model Islamic state	Islamic state	Capitalism
Multiethnic	Antiracism	Women head	Cronyism
Economic Power	Sodomy	Dictatorship/ Mahathirism	Nepotism
Terrorism	New economic policy	Anwar sufferings	Justice

These frame terms explain PAS, whose Islamic identity was threatened by the UMNO's (and its allies') secular interpretation of pursuing a policy of economic capitalism. The second frames recognized and called for social justice regarding Anwar's suffering, economic disparity, and hardship in the daily experience of hostilities, and plots to convey their unshakable determination to establish a truly Islamic state society. The second frames—other than religious issues such as economy and social injustice of PAS—were a legitimate means to address societal problems under ruling UMNO.

The frame terms representing UMNO served as counterframing strategies, mainly problem denial strategy and the strategy of attacking the opponent's character. The predominant strategy that UMNO used was problem denial, revealed in press releases and news coverage of Mahathir's speeches. For Mahathir and the UMNO organization, given the nature of Malaysia as a multiethnic community, the answer was simple: The notion of an Islamic state was inappropriate for a multiethnic society. Its counterframing strategies also emphasized the economic power of the Malays.

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF NEWS FRAMING

The final step in this study was a rhetorical analysis to examine PAS and UMNO frames in the context of press releases, the five newspapers' articles related to collective action, and newspaper editorials. I retrieved only complete press releases, articles, and editorials that were related to the four events.

In the rhetorical analysis, UMNO and PAS frames of the four events could be categorized as "framing and counterframing efforts." It was assumed that coverage supporting the government was written by pro-UMNO sympathizers and clientele who had consistently supported UMNO frames. Coverage favoring PAS frames was assumed to have been written by pro-PAS groups, sympathizers, or affiliates composed of religious, committed participants. It was assumed that each organization attempted to frame the issues to its own advantage. It was also assumed that the independent media newspapers *MalaysiaKini* and *The Star* presented somewhat neutral and detached coverage.

Therefore, using the headlines of the four events, I retrieved competing frames in context, one representing PAS rhetoric and the other representing UMNO rhetoric. Their choices of frames defined and highlighted their ethnic and religious identities.

New Straits Times

The mainstream media and the government of Malaysia have always had a close-knit relationship, woven as the result of the government's awareness of media as its tool to advance its own causes and to further solidify its position. Not perceivable on the surface at times, the government's manipulation has far-reaching and wide results—so much so that in every aspect of the media (the institution, its content, and the personnel) are all directly or indirectly under the influence of the government (Wang 2001). Research has discovered that, aside from governmental control through publications and the Printing Act, the ownership of media is interwoven: The four main national language dailies published in Malaysia are owned by two local media giants: the News Straits Times Press, which publishes *Berita Harian* and *Harian Metro*, and *Utusan Melayu Berhad*, which publishes *Utusan Malaysia* and *Utusan Melayu* (Loh 2002). The same two companies also publish the two leading national language dailies, *Berita Minggu* and *Mingguan Malaysia* (Loh 2002).

According to the publications and the Printing Act of 1984, all publications are subject to the approval of the Home Minister, who has the power to terminate a publication. No grounds need be given. The ministerial decision cannot be

challenged in any court. However, the publication of books is not controlled (see Loh 2002).

Of course, UMNO rhetoric in all four events was found in media that were pro-government, such as the *New Straits Times*. In my content analysis research, I found that a common source for data on government-controlled media, not without limitations/bias, was the *New Straits Times*, which provided the best in-depth daily coverage of events relevant to this study. Topics included the political discussion of UMNO and PAS activities that took place in 1990 1998 1999, and 2001. It is important to note here that regarding government control of media, only *New Straits Times* will be used in the content analysis, given its nature as an official English Malaysia Newspaper (see table 3) and News Straits Times Press's involvement in the media industry that is controlled by UMNO. Also, as for electronic media, Radio Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) “. . . is government owned and run by the Information Ministry and is subject to direct state control through the Information Minister and UMNO preserve” (Munro-Kua 1996).

The rhetorical analysis of UMNO and PAS frames offered a means by which to observe how frame terms were manifested in new content. In the rhetorical analysis of *New Straits Times* and in conjunction with the results of the frame mapping, more than 30 published articles were selected and printed for the frame analysis. These data sets were used to identify how UMNO had portrayed itself as the only organized Malay political party capable of leading Malaysia into the future, with additional promise of economic stability.

Table 3

New Straits Times under UMNO Control of Major Newspapers in Malaysia

Subsidiary Companies	Associated Company	Newspapers Published	Magazines Published
Berita Harian	Asia Magazine	<i>New Straits Times</i>	<i>Malaysian Business</i>
Berita Book Centre	Kloffe Capital	<i>Berita Harian</i>	<i>Investors Digest</i>
Berita Publishing	Commerce-Asset	<i>Malay Mail</i>	<i>Her World</i>
American Malaysian Life Assurance		<i>Business Times</i> <i>Shin Min Daily News</i> <i>Harian Metro</i>	<i>Jelita Information</i> <i>Malaysia Periodica</i> <i>Islamica</i> <i>NST</i> <i>Annual</i>

The government attempted to play a sincere role in neutralizing the increasing influence that the PAS Islamic movement may have had on the general Muslim population. The government's underlining of UMNO's counterframing strategies highlighted its political views by justifying Anwar's arrest on the grounds of sodomy and other forms of corruption during his government tenure. Mahathir viewed such acts as unfit behavior for the Malaysian Prime Minister's predecessor. The government-controlled and regulated media were used to paint a negative picture of the Islamic movement, with the aim of creating fear in the Malay society. Finally, the issues of Malaysia's national security—especially in the aftermath of September 11—were collected for deeper analysis.

PAS News Sources

Second, I had planned to use the PAS daily *Harakah* newspaper to analyze how the PAS used its own media to portray both itself and the UMNO. However, on March 3, 2000, Malay Information Minister Khalid Yaacob issued a press release stating that *Harakah* had been punished because its Internet edition had been uploaded more often than twice a week, a requirement in its print edition (*MK* April 26, 2000). Since that announcement, both *Harakah*'s Internet and print editions have been published only twice a month instead of twice a week.

Currently, the *Harakah* Internet edition no longer exists. However, all *Harakah* news archives were moved to the Crescent International website (www.muslimedia.com), which became an important source for my content analysis, especially to counter the biased effects of *New Strait Times*' pro-UMNO coverage. After a preliminary scanning of most issues, more than 40 articles published at muslimedia.com were printed for analysis. It is important to note that the printed copy of *Harakah* news had the same content as *Muslimedia* news on the Internet. Clearly opposition news, the articles dealt with issues ranging from religious and moral values to Islamic political culture and social justice. The topics included women's head covering, Mahathirism and dictatorship, parenthood in Islam, poverty (specifically as it relates to young Muslims and the Internal Security Acts), the Malaysian economic crisis of 1997 (such as UMNO's spending on mega-projects), social justice related to Anwar's arrest in 1998, and the events related to September 11.

PAS frames in the 1999 election were a message designed to win non-Muslims and women as well as mobilizing the middle class and professionals to its party. Issue after issue addressed “government by cronyism and corruption” in a way designed to engage the interests of the middle class and encourage its member to join PAS and the National Justice party headed by Wan Azizah, Anwar’s wife. The messages were clear, and there were reasons that the Malaysian contemporary society could not take UMNO rhetoric seriously: UMNO’s secular views were simply wrong in the eyes of PAS. Its outlet newspaper spoke for the common good in moral language, and the members believed what the party said.

For instance, one of PAS’s persistent reminders was the sacking of former Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. These articles provided the impetus for the massive turnout of university protestors and reform groups in gatherings and demonstrations throughout the country, all calling for moral justice and economic reform. The frame terms were the message of the pro-PAS groups, who were portrayed as facing hardship, poverty, and humiliating conditions because of UMNO’s wrongdoings and disruption, as well as problems in PAS caused by the dictatorship of Mahathir. The image by which PAS members portrayed themselves was designed to inspire the groups to fight back against UMNO’s propaganda attack machine.

These issues led many to view PAS as a responsible, intellectual, and courageous movement to defend the rights of society, especially the poor, the underprivileged, and the disenfranchised. In evidence of this, *Harakah’s*

circulation soared from 65,000 copies to nearly 300,000 copies. That number matched the circulation of *Utusan Malaysia*, the nation's biggest mainstream daily (MM December 16-31, 1998). Because the Malay/Muslim majority was especially unhappy over Anwar's arrest, they found *Harakah* coverage to be far more credible and informative (December 20, 1998). It is my view that, in many cases, the government's media machine was being used for propaganda against Anwar, which many people no longer believed. This helps to explain why *MalaysiaKini* was packed with news on jailed politician Anwar Ibrahim and pictures of antigovernment protests that did not appear in any of the mainstream media.

The Independents

Next, the independent newspapers *MalaysiaKini*, *Asian Times*, and *The Star* were used in this analysis. These newspapers were sources of data that presumably was free from the bias of the *New Straits Times* and its pro-government/UMNO stance and pro-opposition/PAS stance (see description of this bias by McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996). These three were used as sources to confirm the reliability of information collected from, and to fill gaps uncovered by, *New Straits Times* and *Harakah/Muslimedia* sources. The Internet was used to obtain articles from these major newspapers. These articles were useful in revealing the points of dispute between UMNO and PAS, and the State's responses.

Secondary Sources

Aside from UMNO control of the major newspapers in Malaysia since 1980, my research has found that *Aliran Monthly* (AM), as a secondary source, has faithfully recorded and analyzed issues during the turbulent days of the late 1980s, the economic boom time in the early 1990s, the economic crisis and Reformasi in the late 1990s, and the period of political transition over the last few years. First, *Aliran Monthly* covered the news through its newsletter and then through *Aliran Quarterly*, which later evolved into *Aliran Monthly*. Every so often, well-meaning Malaysians criticize *Aliran Monthly* for being “negative,” “biased,” “anti-government”—you name it. *Aliran Monthly* writer Anil Netto puts forth this defense:

It seems that the people who put forth this sort of criticism do not understand what we are all about. *Aliran Monthly*'s concern is for justice, human dignity and rights, democratic freedoms, solidarity—especially with the marginalized—economic and environmental justice, and freedom for all. So naturally, we are interested in these issues. And there is precious little space in Malaysia to highlight these concerns given the stifling control of the mainstream print and electronic media—and that is why it is so important to create free spaces to highlight these concerns.

Some people say we should also highlight some of the good things about Malaysia (which we have done from time to time). Since our interest lies in issues of social justice, human rights and democracy, we would be the first to highlight and welcome any positive developments in these areas. For instance, if the government were to repeal the Internal Security Act and other preventive detention laws that deny Malaysians natural justice, we would be the first to congratulate the government and celebrate. If the government were to revive local government elections, we would be the first to applaud this commitment to democracy at all levels. If the government were to provide decent, affordable housing and health care for all Malaysians, we would be the first to say “well done!”

But as long as there is one single ISA detainee who is denied the right to a fair trial, we will not rest. As long as there are Malaysians who are evicted from their “squatter” homes—the only dwelling they have because they cannot afford to buy low-cost houses, which are scarce to begin with—we will not remain silent. As long as the gap between the rich and the poor is growing and there are Malaysians who find it hard to make ends meet on their take-home pay or pensions, or who cannot afford expensive medical treatment, we will highlight

such issues. If that's being negative, so be it. For to be "objective," "impartial," "neutral," or "positive" in the face of blatant injustices is tantamount to supporting the status quo. So, yes, we are biased—we believe in taking a strong position in favour of human rights, justice, freedom and democracy. We don't believe in sitting on the fence and being "impartial" when people are suffering out there. For the suffering and the marginalised and the victims of human rights violations are our brothers and sisters, too. This is what *Aliran Monthly* is about, and this is what we have tried to do over the last 25 years. (December 30, 2005).

Other publications by PAS and UMNO were analyzed as secondary sources of discourse of both movements. A variety of papers streamed from periodic conferences and congresses such as ideological constitutive manifestoes, articles written by group members, and so forth. These were valuable sources for understanding the key features of the organizations' ideologies. I reviewed the editorials and ideological articles in *Aliran Monthly* newsletter, magazines, and publications written by both groups, as well as several position and ideological texts such as constitutive manifestoes or speeches (see Appendix A). I encountered a slight problem: the absence of accessible scholarly journals and books written in English. PAS members generally write in Arabic, which may be due to the fact that most PAS members received their education in the local Malaysian university system or in Arabic-speaking Middle Eastern universities, whereas members of UMNO generally received their education in the West and, thus, write in English.

The preliminary analysis examines publications by PAS leaders and their approach to subjects related to religious lessons that place emphasis on Islamic moral values, ritual, practice, norms and beliefs. Books about UMNO were also written by prominent leaders, including Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad such as *The Malay Dilemma* (1970) and *The Building of a Nation*

(1998b), and Malaysia ex-Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's 1996 *The Asian Renaissance*, all of which cover issues about Malay identity, language (*bahasa*), religion (*ugama*), future economy and political activities in Malaysia.

In the book *The Malay Dilemma*, Mahathir describes ethnic identity of the Malay as an alleged set of genes from which she/he cannot escape except through marriage and procreation with a member of a superior race. A later edition (1998) argues that Malay Muslims are an oppressed community that could be set free and gain respect under the leadership of UMNO and its alliances.

I made e-mail requests for relevant materials that could support the thesis to both the UMNO and PAS headquarters. PAS responded with a generous donation of more than a dozen recorded tapes from the organization. One taped lesson was a message from PAS leaders after Anwar's arrest and prior to the 1999 election, appealing to an audience in both Islamic and non-Islamic communities (that is, Malay, Chinese, and Indian) regarding the importance of working together as the opposition party trying to free Anwar and restore justice to all Malaysian society, regardless of their ethnicities. In another of the tapes, PAS leaders urged people pay no attention to UMNO because its followers discredit society, and the tape assured voters that people have a chance to change a corrupt government to a citizen-based government guided by the Qur'an, stating that there is no book like it: a perennial spring of wisdom, a wonder of surprises, revelation of mystery, infallible guide of conduct, and an

unspeakable source of comfort to all Malaysian society, regardless of their race and ethnicity.

CHAPTER 3

EVENT 1: OPPORTUNITY AND THREATS, FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING IN MALAYSIA'S 1990 GENERAL ELECTION

This chapter addresses the key shift in religious framing that was fostered by political opportunities for PAS after its success in the 1990 election, and by threats to UMNO. With this shift and its attendant amplification of religious values and beliefs, PAS emerged victorious in the political scene during the 1990 elections by capturing one of the states in Northern Malaysia—Kelantan—for the first time in 22 years, which represented political opportunities for PAS and a political threat for UMNO.

As is true of other forms of human action, religion is subject to both sociological important implications—rational and irrational processes. The UMNO nationalist and PAS Islamic fundamentalist movements in Malaysia must be placed in historical context so that a meaningful comparison between beliefs and values of the two groups can be developed and understood. Analyzing how two ideologically different organizations/parties emerged—and subsequently developed—necessitates a close look at the organizational frame disputes between UMNO and PAS regarding Islam's role in political life prior to Malaysia's October 1990 general election.

Chapter 3 analyzes how social movement organizations (such as PAS Islamic fundamentalists or Islamic traditionalism) and countermovements (such as UMNO) use the normative argument that their actions are based on religious identities rather than on secular concerns. Chapter 3 provides comparisons of

and explanations for ways in which UMNO and PAS translated their religious beliefs into political positions and presented them to the general public. These presentations, especially in terms of the social movement and countermovement strategies, are sometimes characterized by positive approaches (presenting proposals as opportunities for society if their proposals are enacted) and sometimes by negative approaches (presenting failure to enact their proposals as threats to society). The movements' choices about the two approaches—opportunities and threats, framing and counterframing—are influenced by the religious beliefs and values upheld by each group as critical to the quest for the construction of social movement and countermovement strategies, as seen in Malaysia's October 1990 general election.

In this chapter, special attention is given to the continuing struggle of religion and politics between UMNO and PAS in the Malay ethnic community. In particular, the chapter focuses on these two political parties prior to and after the October 1990 election, as each group sought to distinguish itself on the basis of its long history of contested religious and ethnic identity. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the two groups' strategic discursive uses of religion, including the rise of PAS fundamentalism in comparison with UMNO frames that had enjoyed long-term success.

Throughout Malaysia's political history, there have been remarkable church-state contentions between UMNO (the establishment) and PAS (populist Islam). The establishment religion, based on the UMNO version, adheres closely to the ideas described in sacred texts and interpreted by UMNO-

appointed and credentialed religious officials or scholars. In many ways, it is a state religion and, as such, is formally bound up in the legitimization of government. Two important analyses of religion—Weber's (1930) and Smith's (1791)—largely involve the secularization hypothesis and the religious market model. According to Weber, economic development leads to contribute to secularization. This process happens not only with individuals but also with political and social institutions—including churches themselves. According to Smith's religious market model, religiosity is influenced by government intervention, government regulation and even by the suppression of organized religion, as under authoritarian rule. Smith further argues that monopoly in religion restricts a society's religious innovation so that clergy become indolent.

Important in this latter theory, Iannaccone (1991) asserts that a state religion would mean government subsidies to the church, which encourages formal religious activity. Iannaccone further maintains that an establishment religion has little incentive to fully serve the religious market but rather tailors religious products to the desires of the political elite—to the extent to which the clergy itself becomes the elite group, offering services only to other elite groups. Iannaccone (1997) says, "A state-sponsored religious monopoly will provide only the appearance of piety—an ineffective clergy and an apathetic population lie just below the surface" (P. 40).

Therefore, if we assume the presence of an established state church, a religious monopoly model based on Smith's 1791 religion-market model and expanded modern analyses (Stark and Bainbridge, 1987, Iannaccone, 1991, and

Finke and Stark, 1992) will help illuminate Malaysia's case. Populist religion in contrast is based on religious beliefs and practices that prevail in such group-oriented religions as cults, sects, or fundamentalist groups; it emanates from the underside or the periphery of society. Access to religious scholars and written texts is difficult in outlying provinces, sprawling slums, or areas of low literacy; religious tenets are learned strictly from traditional religious teachers, known as *ustab*. In other words, UMNO has profoundly influenced religion in Malaysia by using political resources to subsidize what is essentially a state religion, and then assembled a group of religious believers who accept the social environment status quo (Noor 2003a). In contrast, PAS represents a religious group that rejects the social environment in which it finds itself (Stark and Bainbridge 1985).

This chapter tracks the history of these two political parties' manifestoes through reviewing the literature: pro-government newspapers such as *New Straits Times (NST)*, the bimonthly opposition Islamic PAS newspaper *Harakah (HK)*, as well as the independent *The Star (Star)* newspaper and *Aliran Monthly (AM)*. Specifically, these newspapers were reviewed as published two months prior and two months after the October 20, 1990, election. The research strategy was to identify, categorize, and track multiple frames in context, comparing and contrasting UMNO and PAS Islamic movements. In this context, the term *multiple frames* refers to processes of competing frames—that is, frame alignment, frame dispute, and counterframing—influenced by shifts in patterns of opportunities and threats in religious framing.

The review begins by examining the relationship between (1) UMNO and Islam, (2) PAS and Islam, and (3) PAS's religious framing success and UMNO's reaction to this threat. Thereby, we can understand the religious frame disputes between UMNO and PAS and how these disputes led to the 1990 surprise victory of PAS, producing an opportunity for PAS and a threat for UMNO.

UMNO AND ISLAM

The relationship between UMNO and Islam regarding certain aspects of society is bidirectional (see Barro and McCleary 2003, 2004). A country's political and economic development affects its level of religiosity. Since Malaysia's independence in August 1957, it can be argued that UMNO's new government struggled—gradually with greater success to establish its ideological hegemony over competitive calls for allegiance and identity. The UMNO nationalist ideology of secularist orientation seeks to legitimize control of the Malaysian government using the principle of Malaysian nationalism and Malay unity (Noor 2003a). For UMNO, the collapse of British rule provided an opportunity to redefine the country to as a modern nation-state using Malay ethnicity along with Islam as central to its inclusiveness and unity. In Malaysia, Malay ethnicity is intimately linked to being of the Muslim faith. As ex-Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tan Sri Musa Hitam stated in a *New Straits Times* editorial published September 23, 2001:

Constitutionally (or legally), a Malay would not be a Malay unless he is a Muslim. In other words, being Muslim is automatically linked to the racial connotation of the term *Melayu* [Malay]; from a social arrangement standpoint, being a Malay Muslim is a ticket to enjoying important privileges. The Malay Muslims have adhered to Islam for a number of centuries, yet they are conservative, feudal, and traditional. (P. 18; see also Case 1994)

Prior to its independence from Britain, Malaysia was comprised of “the Malay States.” Each state had its own sultan or king, and Islam was accepted as an integral part of each state. Each state’s sultan had full power to make decisions on all matters, including construction of mosques. The *imans* (priests or religious leaders), *Qadis* and *muftis* (Muslim judges) were the sultan whose power in this regard was absolute. According to Malay culture, this system was normal and accepted without question. But with the coming of independence, the legitimacy of religious authority was put in doubt. Economic growth soon created a burgeoning middle class and the expansion of secular education. Sherkat and Blocker (1994) found that social class influences religious socialization and political efficacy. Those from the upper and middle classes have less faith in religion than those from a lower class origin; upper- and middle-class individuals are less submissive to authority than are people from lower classes and, thus, are more likely to participate in social movements. Education may also reduce respect for authority (Ellison and Sherkat 1993). Applying these findings to Malaysia suggests that the majority middle class is more likely to adopt perspectives that question the legitimacy of a government that regulates religion. It could take the instrumental view of religious as a means for controlling the lower class.

The official Islamic code applied by the UMNO-dominated state is the mostly government written (Khutbah)—the Summons—which is read faithfully by *imans* and generally followed by the people. Indeed, most Malay Muslims found that “the administration of Islamic Law has ensured that *fatwas* issued [religious

rulings] by appointed state *muftis* [higher Islamic authorities] be enforced without having to be tint debated in the State Legislature or Malaysian Parliament” (Anwar 2005:123, as cited in Lily Zubaidah Rahim 2006:8). In church-state relationships, the presence of an established state church, with a monopoly in religion, would restrict religious innovation in society, with no-official or heterodox or *fatwas* --interpretation and application of Islamic law having no legal status. According to Smith (1791), the monopoly in religion led to a reduction in service quality. Not surprisingly, government regulation of religion depresses religious participation (Iannaccone 1991; Stark and Bainbridge 1987).

Another important point is that only the officially sanctioned *mufti* can revoke or amend a *fatwa*, which, if challenged or violated, constitutes a criminal offense. This situation is like “handing a ‘blank cheque’ to the bureaucratic division of government to make law as it deems fit without any public debate” (Othman 2004:132). According to Malaysian ex-deputy minister Tan Sri Musa Hitam, “Islam was not a factor in the political process before independence. Once independent, politics become open, religion then becomes a factor” (*NST September 23, 2001:18*).

UMNO’S POLITICAL CULTURE

At the political level, UMNO from its creation has attempted to foster a Western-style secular nationalism to integrate the multiethnic and religiously diverse population (Noor 2003a; Abdul Hamid 2001). However, independence under UMNO rule has presented concerns for Malay citizens: issues of modernization, political development, and issues of social and economic justice for all (Abdul

Hamid 2001). For UMNO, modernization and the politics of economic development are two of the most critical problems confronting the Malay people and culture (Muzaffar 1987; Noor 2003a). According to the secularization hypothesis, economic and scientific development should lead people to become less religious (Berger 1967). Under UMNO's rule, Malaysia has become the locus of secularist policies and attitudes; at the same time, religion intertwined with tradition has continued to play an important role in many people's lives (Khoo 1995). The same argument leads to the notion that, in countries such as Malaysia, a secular system creates an atmosphere in which religion is excluded from the public sphere and considered a private matter and, at the same time, religious oppositional groups steadily push their agendas for more public space for religion.

UMNO'S RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY

Since Malaysia's independence, UMNO has amplified the construction of religion and ethnicity by defining the Malay identity in terms of economic power and strength. UMNO assures that it is presented itself as a proponent of Malay nationalism, the *Ketuanan Melayu* (Malay supremacy), and limited Islamic ideology. UMNO Manifestoes state that the Malay people are the defenders of Malaysia or "masters of this land" and deserve special privileges as their birthright (Ratnam 1985). As Von der Mehden observes, "To the Malay, it is almost unthinkable to be anything but a Muslim. . . . Within Malay society, there is an integrated perception of religion, traditional values, and village and family life" (1987, as cited in Esposito 1987:183). It should be acknowledged that

UMNO and its *Barisan Nasional* (i.e., alliance with the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], Malaysian Indian Congress [MIC]) operates under its own model of multiethnic organizing, constructing its political culture around an appeal to the ethnic identity of marginalized (minority group) Malaysians who are non-Muslim. In reality, however, as a defender of Malay supremacy, UMNO's cultural strategy appeals first to its constituent ethnic identity of *Melayu*/Malay, and on this basis forges a shared cultural identity with other ethnic groups such as *Masyarakat Malaysia*, or people of Malaysia.

More recently, in 1991, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad popularized the term *Melayu Baru* or "the New Malay" (Samsul 1995; Khoo 1995). The New Malay are a community of Malays rooted in Islamic tradition who now possess "a culture suitable to the modern period, capable of meeting all the challenges, able to compete without assistance, learned and knowledgeable, sophisticated, honest, disciplined, trustworthy, and competent" (Khoo 1995:335). Malays, the nation's cultural core, are constitutionally defined as people who (1) profess the religion of Islam, (2) habitually speak the Malay language, (3) conform to Malay customs, and (4) are endowed with special privileges and the status of *bumiputra* (sons of the soil). It is this sort of sentiment that characterizes UMNO-supported interpretation of Islam (Ratnam 1985).

The newly established nation-state in Malaysia, while modeled after the Western ideal of equating nation with an ethnic identity, is also one that has practiced a distinction between the nation-state and its cultural foundation; that is, ethnic identity (*bangsa*, or race) is not used to define the nation (Harper

1996). Rather, there is a distinct cultural core for the nation-state—the *bangsa Melayu* (Malay race)—for the indigenous people and a legalistic definition of citizenship (*warganegara*) accorded to the non-Malay community (Harper 1996: 241; Ratnam 1985). As Samsul (1996b) wrote, “It is UMNO’s concept of *bangsa* and *kebangsaan Melayu* which informed the construction of Malaysia’s national character” (P. 25).

Traditionally, UMNO consists mainly of urban, middle-class professionals whose identity has taken shape around secular ideals and activities such as capitalism, Western culture, and modernization (Muzaffar 1987; Rahim 2006; Abdul Hamid 2001). Its members are oriented to a secular lifestyle and hold various interpretations of the same religious beliefs. UMNO keeps a close association with the Malay elite and middle class as defenders of privilege and as collaborators with British imperialism, the Chinese, and Indians (Hussein 2002). Despite the fact that the majority of the country’s population remains religious traditionalists, the bureaucratic middle class is a strong proponent of secular nationalist ideologies (Jomo and Cheek 1988). Noticeably, too, UMNO’s political success can be attributed to its recognition and acceptance of the major ethnic groups’ political, economic, and ideological interests and to its successful pursuit of a reasonably stable semi-democracy, even if by default (Lijphart 1969). Samuel Huntington (1991) similarly classifies Malaysia as a “quasi-democracy” (P. 19). Perhaps UMNO’s use of nationalism and the secular character of the state have encouraged a communal consciousness. If so, and for this reason alone, UMNO has managed to win every election since 1957. PAS, on the other

hand, has failed to make much of a dent in the political structure because non-Muslims fear what PAS's more exclusivist brand of Islamic rule would bring. PAS has found success only in the "Malay heartland," a term referring to the poorest states in the Northern Malaysian peninsula: Terengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis.

Islam is the religion of the Federation, and UMNO has typically sought to cloak itself in the legitimacy provided by *al-Islam al rasmi* (establishment religion), whose followers are variously called liberals, reformists, or modernists (Noor 2003a). Government-run religious institutions organize all of the country's rituals, functions, and symbolism. Despite the appearance of secularism, UMNO's state-controlled religion could be a setup for a religious monopoly and subsequent intolerance in Malaysia's multiethnic and multi-religion society.

As an example, the UMNO government emphasizes the Islamic character of the state in many ways. The Constitution of 1957 provides for Islam as a religion of the Federation, with the sultan or king to be head of the Islamic religion and protector of Muslims from proselytizing, while ostensibly allowing freedom of worship for other religions. Article 3(1) stipulates, "Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation." Similarly, Articles 8(1) and 8(2) reassure non-Malay communities that "there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent, or place of birth" (*Constitution of Malaysia*). The Constitution provides citizenship and neutralization rights for non-Malays, but Article 12(2) makes it "lawful for the Federation or a State to

establish or maintain . . . Islamic institutions or provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose.” It should be kept in mind that there are State-run *sharia* courts—available only to Muslims—that deal with personal and family matters (see *Constitution of Malaysia*). However, the government has attempted to develop a synthesis between Islam and modern practices and institutions, particularly as pertains to education and economics (Von Der Mehden 1987:183-198).

After the constitution was written and began to function within the bureaucracy, formal religion became distanced from government (see Chaves 1994). For instance, in the course of religion in public life, conflicts developed where nationalists/secularists led by UMNO did not follow fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic principles, especially the *sharia* (ethical and legal code of Islam). Islamic law became secondary to canon law, following a Western lifestyle (Abdul Hamid 2001). This Western path, according to PAS, is a harbinger of the collapse of traditions and values in Malaysia (Hussein 2002, Abdul Hamid 2001). The external signs of the Western lifestyle are numerous. For example, a large percentage of Muslim/Malay females—young or old—are not veiled, gambling establishments are mushrooming, and the sale of alcoholic beverages has increased rapidly. After independence, the Malaysian middle-class community became attracted to materialism and lost much of its Islamic identity and values (Abdul Hamid 2001). From a PAS perspective, UMNO is

using Islam as a basis for solidarity among secular Malays in an attempt to control the country's power and wealth (Von Der Mehden 1987:183).

As this trend grew, the conflict between PAS and UMNO intensified and continued throughout the late Malaysia nation-state building era. This is of seminal importance, because the diverging growing PAS and UMNO responses to religious division were as unsettled (contested) then as at any time in a generation. The battle lines had been drawn, and the fight was on to determine the true defender of the Islamic faith. In speeches, newspaper columns, rumors swirling on the Internet, and occasionally bursts of strife, the conflict was expressed in highly symbolic rhetoric and predominately amplified to appeal to the religious sentiments framing Muslim votes for political gain. This notion is relevant, as McAdam (1988a) suggests that movement participation is “‘simply politics by other means,’ often the only means open to relatively powerless challenging groups” (pp. 127-128).

UMNO'S ORGANIZATIONAL FRAME

Frame-theoretical analyses of social movements have posited three main components of the frame: diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation for solving the problem (Snow and Benford 1988). Using framing analysis, the results from the UMNO rhetorical analysis suggests that, while UMNO's diagnostic frame recognized the insufficiencies of the Islamic way of life as the foundation for a modern nation, the prognostic frame called for increasing Islamization activity in Malaysia. Through government intervention under ex-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, a full program of Islamization of state and society was gradually carried out prior to the 1990 election. UMNO's regimes tried to change a long

tradition mixed with Islamic rules and values, so it was not surprising that it faced some opposition; nevertheless, since 1957, the ruling National Front coalition (UMNO) has captured at least a two-thirds majority in the lower house in nine consecutive general elections.

The unifying function of UMNO's organizational frame is exemplified by an early confrontation with PAS on religiosity by recruiting Anwar Ibrahim to UMNO in 1982 (Hussein 2002). Anwar is the charismatic and well-respected leader of the Muslim youth movement ABIM, which was established in 1971 by Anwar and a group of university graduates. ABIM was a proponent of an Islamic society, and under Anwar's leadership, its ranks grew rapidly and became powerful. The group's non-political status appealed to followers at a time of government intolerance toward Islamic political organizations (Hussein 2002; McAmis 2002).

Soon after Dr. Mahathir Mohammad became Prime Minister in 1981, however, Islamic opposition increased in strength, and Mahathir responded by co-opting Anwar Ibrahim, promising to carry out his own Islamization campaign. In the critics' eyes, Mahathir only legitimized the PAS agenda and engaged in an "Islamization race" that UMNO could not win. It should be kept in mind that the period during which Anwar Ibrahim joined UMNO in 1981 was marked by high Islamic sentiment in Malaysia (Hussein 2002). McAmis (2002) describes Anwar's popularity as "the linchpin of Malaysian Islamic revivalism, which has been characterized as a balance between the return to and strict adherence to Islam among the faithful, and by emphasis on education, modern technological skills, and economic progress" (P. 81). In other words, UMNO's political system

in place since 1957 was under pressure for engaging in secular activities that resulted in society becoming less religious and more skeptical of their Islamic faith-based claims. There is no question that the frame amplification of Anwar Ibrahim's adoption by UMNO could successfully unite Muslim Malay groups and, at the same time, boost UMNO's Islamic credentials. Astute observers noted that Ibrahim's endorsement was the government's attempt to gain some semblance of a strong Islamic social movement (Khoo 1995; Hussein 2002).

UMNO'S RELIGIOUS FRAMING

Analyses of articles in the Malaysian press—including *New Straits Times*, *Harakah*, *Aliran Monthly* and *The Star* newspaper—for two months prior to the October 1990 elections have yielded the data presented here. On September 24, 1990, the lead story in both the *New Straits Times* and *The Star* was the announcement that Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad had dissolved parliament for the eighth Malaysian General Elections, to be held less than a month later on October 20 and 21.

In early October, the government-controlled *New Straits Times* ran a series of feature articles regarding UMNO and its Islamization. The initial news reports and analyses show how UMNO used framing functions rhetorically. It is no secret that UMNO claimed to be just as faithful to the spirit of Islam as PAS fundamentalists; however, UMNO proposed reforms that would make Malaysia more materialistic and worldly. With its advantage as the ruling party, UMNO hoped to translate its organizational strength into political influence to deliver a

large block of votes to those Malay educated candidates willing to advance the UMNO agenda.

Not surprisingly, collective action frames constructed by UMNO leaders amplified race (Malay ethnicity), religion, and economic issues on specific problems that confronted some Malaysian states, and UMNO's framing efforts on religion were specifically targeted toward PAS's Malaysian heartland stronghold—a constituency that UMNO hoped to recruit. An article published in the *New Straits Times* on October 3, 1990, expressed the UMNO supporter/writer's view that UMNO was the only party able to protect the Malay supremacy or Malay nationalism (*Ketuanan Melayu*). Indeed, UMNO leaders had more to say about race and economics than about religion. This UMNO race rhetoric had become its ideological frame to methodically align or alienate Malay constituents throughout the states. UMNO's diagnostic framing—in particular, the framing of race—resonated strongly with the Malay in many states, with the exception of the PAS-friendly heartland. The rhetoric also pointed out the benefits given to Malay Muslims after independence, in contrast to their appalling living conditions during the British era.

According to *New Straits Times* editorial reports and UMNO records, it is undeniable that UMNO had already fulfilled most of the pledges made in the previous general election in 1986, especially actively “repenting and reforming the Islamization programs” (October 7, 1990:5). The *New Straits Times* focused its articles not on any religious topics but rather on UMNO's extensive religious activities. For example, in order to attract the Malay Muslim voter, a *New Straits*

Times editorial maintained that for decades, UMNO motivational frames engaged in many “feel-good” Islamic initiatives such as sponsoring Qur’an-reading contests, building new mosques, scheduling Islamic television programming, and providing subsidies to civil servants who performed the Hajj to Mecca (October 10, 1990:4-10).

Moreover, an editorial in *The Star* stated that since the early 1980s, UMNO had greatly contributed to the rise of new Islamic institutions such as Islamic banks that operated in accordance with the *sharia* (Islamic law), Islamic insurance (*takaful*), Islamic People’s bank (*Bank rakyat*), and the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). In addition, the government had established a number of high quality Islamic educational universities and colleges such as the International Islamic University of Malaysia (*Star* October 12, 1990; see also Noor 2003a).

One could say that these views showed UMNO as simply wishing to secure its legitimacy and reach out beyond religion to a wider social and religious audience; however, they were also a backdoor accusation by Islamic resurgent and PAS Islamic movements for not doing enough to boost religious consciousness (Salleh 1999). This study will argue that UMNO built on earlier attempts to develop a rational, market-based model of religion that preserved religious plurality in Malaysia. As an example, under the UMNO regimes, the State sent tens of thousands of young Malay students to educational institutions at home and abroad (*NST* January 5, 1990). The mutual beneficial relationship between the Malay population (especially *bumiputra*) and the state created

massive a new middle class, one that undoubtedly played a significant role in the construction of and support for religious pluralism and the rejection of an Islamic state on Malaysian soil (Hussein 2002).

Over the decades, most Malay Muslims have had experiences with the Islamic faith within the Islamic religious establishment. For many, the conventional view of the Islamization of race and economy framed by UMNO appears to hold empirical credibility, experiential resonance, and narrative fidelity with the vast majority of Malay society, especially in the cosmopolitan areas.

The UMNO frame that was presented to the Malaysian Muslim constituents, or the Muslim world in general, was amplified by the examples described above. Frequently, new mosques and *madrasah* –surau (small mosques) were constructed with government and private UMNO funds (*Star* May 11, 1990). Even at the time of this research in 2006, more mosques were being built to accommodate large numbers of Malaysian Muslim citizens. UMNO constructed its political culture around two models: first, an appeal to Malay ethnic identity and, second, an appeal to multiethnic constituencies such as the Chinese and Indian, to consider themselves a part of the Malaysian people (*Masyrakat Malaysia* or *warganegara Malaysia*).

Viewed in broad terms, Islamic thought contains a variety of perspectives and political orientations. The presence of Islam in the daily life of Malaysian Muslim communities is increasing throughout the country. This new phenomenon of the return to the sacred under Mahathir and UMNO also included the use of Islamic greetings and salutations; for example, starting in the

early 1990s, many government speeches began with the Arabic greeting *a salam a laikum*—peace be upon you (Miller 2004). The government sought to inspire religious faith spontaneity while underscoring its own religiosity. They also attempted to more closely control the activities of *imans* who preached in the mosques and to prevent the proliferation of independent or private mosques, especially those operated by PAS fundamentalists. The *Aliran Monthly* newspaper reported that religious facilities for training *imans* had expanded greatly and that the government would be providing officially recognized training for *imans* and even placing them on the public payroll (July 1990, Issue 7:34).

Among other incidents, it has been reported publicly on several occasions that politicians and supporters from both parties were embroiled in *kafir-mengafir* framing, accusing one another of being *kafir* (unbelievers) and *munafikin* (hypocrites) (Ratnam 1985). It is important to note that, in Islamic theology, labeling a person as *kafir* is a particularly serious accusation, and counteraccusations of this sort made by PAS and UMNO dominated the media's attention throughout the 1980 campaigns.

However, in the 1980s, the issue of having two competing kinds of *imans* (leader of prayers) was seen as dividing the *ummah* and was typically blamed on PAS intolerance (Ratnam 1985). Since that incident, the Malaysian government endeavored to reinforce the *imans'* political loyalties and commitment toward the government and UMNO in particular (Salleh 1999). It has been argued that “increasing state control over and support of churches may also be consistent with a conservative drive to revitalize patriotic civil religion. It means the state will

sponsor religion—but also control more” (Robbins and Robertson 1987:73). This extra support was meant to attest to the government’s devoutness and to attract worshippers away from less closely supervised mosques. Of course, many observers believe that UMNO used its prognostic frame of increasing Islamic activities as part of the government campaign to exemplify and display Malaysia as an example of a modern Islamic state (Noor 2003a; *HK* March 14, 1998). It would be reasonable to assume that controlling the Malay citizens would be easier for UMNO if there were a monopoly of religion, an official and organized state religion. Sociological commentator Stark (2003) states that such control is most often seen in the three principal monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

On October 12, 1990, *The Star* editorial declared UMNO to be the best political party for the poor Malays because of its promotion of equal educational opportunities and support for peasants and workers who manage their own farms and small businesses. For UMNO, its 1990 political organizing efforts can be described as a “good harvest” of its Islamic programs and economic activity for the Malay race.

PARTI ISLAM SE-MALAYSIA AND ISLAM

The continuing struggle between PAS and UMNO must be seen within the context of early Islam in the church-state relationship and the colonial experience of the nation-state building period. In 1951, five years before independence, the *ulama* met in the northern state of Muar Johor to exchange views on the promotion of religion with an emphasis on ethno-nationalist objectives (Hussein 2002). That meeting was the birthplace of *Parti Islam Se-Malaysia* (Pan Islamic

Party or PAS). In essence, PAS was partly the creation of UMNO itself—a movement originating from marginalized Islamic *ustab* teachers and *ulama* who were heavily involved in the fundamentalist religious subculture (Noor 2003b; Kessler 1978).

PAS is fundamentalist in that it espouses a government that seeks a return to the Sunnah (custom of the Prophet) and rejects the Western political model (separation of religion and state). Ideally, if not always in practice, power in a Western political model resides with the people, the ultimate authority to which government is responsible. In Islam, sovereignty rests with God, to whom both rulers and ruled alike are responsible. In the early days of PAS, the issue of *wahabi* (strict observance) was a subject of lively controversy and debate. In reality, PAS is not influenced by the *wahabism* movement; instead, PAS is more of a political movement. PAS's justification is cast in ideological terms: condemnation of UMNO policies and practices as being an un-Islamic innovation and the call for a return to the Qur'an and the practices of the Prophet (Funston 1980; Kessler 1978). Its agenda calls for implementation of political, social, and legal reforms in the name of Islam, reforms that would establish a system of Islamic life and social justice by *adeem* (Hussein 2002). PAS has developed a model of a faith-based Islamic movement, organizing and constructing its political culture around an appeal to the Islamic religious identity of Muslim Malaysian (Liow 2004; Noor 2003a).

The fundamentalist-PAS political movement operates similar to a sect (see Iannaccone 1992b), attracting members mainly from groups such as low-

wage, traditional rural, lower-class, artisans, petty civil servants, *ustab* teachers, and the lower ranks of the *ulama* priests, all of whom have taken action to transform the social structure and have politicized religion as an assertion of their collective identity (Muzaffar 1987; Rahim 2006; Kessler 1978). Political opposition groups, including PAS, claim that these potential recruits with lower-class backgrounds have not been afforded the same benefits or opportunities as have UMNO constituency groups (Salleh 1999).

PAS had long focused on ethnonationalist objectives (see Appendix A). However, by 1982, PAS had changed its political strategy. The old guard nationalists were cast out through party elections and replaced by an *ulama* leadership (Hussein 2002; Noor 2004). In an effort to build an anti-secular culture and catch up to UMNO's rapid economic and technological development, PAS recruited a large number of rural and recently urbanized youth, along with middle-class and professional educators (Noor 2003a). While Bernstein (1997) noted that, "Changing or challenging mainstream culture is rarely considered a goal of activism" (P. 524). McAdam et al. (1996) observe that much a move is strategic because it is a conscious act of choosing and using cultural and political themes for a purpose. Moreover, while the church served as a model for secular political organization in the West, the absence of an equivalent organization in Malaysia Islamic society meant that secular groupings had no prototype to emulate (see Stark and Bainbridge 1985).

Most recently, the majority of PAS leaders have been educated at Islamic universities throughout the Middle East, although their followers have little or no

education. By bringing the *ulama* to the fore as the organization's new leadership, emphasis is now on the pursuit of authentic Islamic goals and practices (Noor 2003b). With this transition from ethnonationalism to Islamism or political Islam, PAS has been able to attract Muslim Malay professionals, educators, and middle-class Malay to join its movement, partially because these *ulamas* were able to get across the message of Islam as a way of life (*adeen*) (Noor 2003b). This concept means that Islam would not only regulate the daily lives of the Muslim community but also profoundly influence beliefs and attitudes (Hussein 2002).

PAS's structural choices and strategies reflect both the past and today. While it has professionalized its leadership, the membership remains agrarian and lower class with a more traditional form of organization (Kessler 1978). Indicative of this structure is the movement's funding: Unlike UMNO, which garners resources from the State (Liow 2004), PAS remains entirely self-funded by voluntary contributions from members. Based on e-mail communication with some UMNO group members, rumors abound that PAS receives money from the Middle East—especially Saudi Arabia—through *Zakat* and *sadaqa*, called *vakifs*. The *vakifs*, also known as *baitumals* in Malaysia, are established to support communities and organizations for the Islamic cause. Of course, a religious organization cannot survive, much less grow, unless it obtains sufficient resources from the environment (Iannaccone 1994a, 1994b). Inside Malaysia, PAS's scanty fund-raising efforts include self-produced tapes on religious teachings; sale of PAS-related lectures, patches, and T-shirts; and, more

recently, a PAS benefits compilation CD. This all means that, compared to UMNO, the PAS movement's income is marginal, erratic, and highly unpredictable.

PAS'S POLITICAL CULTURE

A group-oriented religion such as that promoted by PAS often attracts those who have been negatively affected by the expansion of the modern market and state power. PAS Islamic fundamentalists believe that UMNO is trying to interpret the Quaranic sacred texts and the Hadith liberally—mainly for its own political agenda—which is opposed by PAS on the grounds that such interpretation amounts to *bidat* (innovation), which is considered as bad as heresy (Noor 2003b). Instead, PAS members wish to see society attain an ideal Islamic state, bringing an authentic Islamic order to the Malaysian soul and in Malaysian Muslim society. PAS fundamentalists and other committed Islamic groups believe they stand for purity in public life and that present-day Malay/Muslim secular leaders use religion opportunistically. As PAS leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat, put it, “The Malaysia government under ruling UMNO is in a state of apostasy—of Islam they preserve nothing but its name although they pray, fast, and pretend to be Muslims” (as cited in *HK* August 28, 1990:25). Gauhar (1978) describes a secularized world:

The fundamental assumption of secularism is that material well-being does not only remain the means to an end but becomes an end in itself. This is the major dilemma of secular culture. As secular society progresses from lower levels of material well-being to higher levels, efficiency becomes its sole preoccupation. Production and prosperity are the twin gods of secularism. Inflation, like Satan, becomes its mortal enemy. Hell is a place with high prices, recession, and unemployment. Its concept of paradise is affluence with full employment and lots of leisure. Since there are no limits to man's desires, his life becomes a baseless quest in pursuit of pleasure. (Cited in Zakaria 1988:298)

PAS encompasses committed individuals and organizations and is structurally organized into three sections: Dewan Ulama or Ulama Council, Dewan Pemuda or Youth Wing, and Dewan Muslimat or Women's Wing (Noor 2004:74-75). Of course, a barrier to PAS's efforts to promote a distinctively Islamic agenda has been its failure to relate Islamic precepts to modern life. For one thing, PAS has repeatedly failed to articulate a model for interreligious cooperation in the context of Malaysia's multireligious and multicultural society; a case in point is PAS's manipulation of Malay-Chinese cooperation for electoral gain. PAS's inability to relate this universalistic Islamic vision to the solution of practical problem has alienated non-Muslim communities and strained its relations with Chinese-based political parties (*AM* August 1990, Issue 8:32).

As mentioned in Chapter 2, both political organizations under study are Malay but have contrasting worldviews namely Islamism versus secularism and position regarding the role of religious culture in both the private and public sectors. UMNO's broad success notwithstanding, there is a different story in the heartland of Malaysia (Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah), where PAS fundamentalists have successfully confronted UMNO and where the cultural dimension of these successes is of utmost interest to PAS. The concerns of the Malaysian heartland states are different from those in the other states because the majority is Malay, conservative in their Islamic views. This religious community believes strongly in *akhirat* (the afterworld) as opposed to *dunia* (the world). In this sense, their tastes, norms, and beliefs are characterized by the afterlife consumption motive or utility (see Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975). This

explains why the PAS frame in the heartland states, especially Kelantan and Terengganu, is far more successful than the UMNO frame.

For example, in his closing remarks in a *New Straits Times* interview, Nik Aziz Nik Mat stated, “The majority of voters in Kelantan may be rural folks, but they are not naïve about politics. They are just as sophisticated and are aware of what is good for them” (September 25, 1990:16). The PAS organization is capable of reinforcing social solidarity and of resolving socioeconomic crises. Social embeddedness, cultural solidarity, and group spirituality are perhaps more important to PAS than seeking to resolve material and socioeconomic concerns. Given the heartland people’s inclination to think about the *akhirat* as opposed to *dunia*, this explains how PAS was able to capture the state of Kelantan from the ruling UMNO in the 1990 elections.

OPPORTUNITIES: PAS IN THE EIGHTH 1990 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The data in this section come from *Aliran Monthly*, *Harakah*, *The Star*, and the *New Straits Times* archives for the 2 months period before and after the 1990 election. The news releases, news stories, and editorials used for this study were gathered from hard copies and from sources on the HighBeam research online database. Among this collection of newspaper articles, the ones studied had the main topic of religious framing and showed a clear position supporting either PAS or UMNO.

One of the most important implications in the 1990 election was that PAS was running under the banner of the *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah-APU*—comprised of PAS, HAMIN, BERJASA, and *Semangat 46* (Spirit of ‘46), the latter

being formed in 1946 as a breakaway branch of UMNO, claiming to represent the party's original values.

In analyzing the news media's content—either pro-government or pro-PAS—it should be kept in mind that the Islamization framing is not just a hallmark of the 1990 election. By the 1990s, social movements sought to draw attention to issues important to their political constituencies and the general public. An intense, discursive competition between PAS and UMNO highlighted their particular concerns—or at least what they felt would resonate or align with the general public. Much of their religious rhetoric in the 1990 election was an effort to exploit longstanding political disagreements about an Islamic state versus a secular state. In PAS's views, "UMNO as a waning party that sold out to materialism and Western values" (*Star* October 10, 1990:8). In the same vein, PAS also views UMNO as having sold out Malay interests to the Chinese and India in exchange for electoral success (Hussein 2002).

That domination of religious framing—involving: (1) the Islamization of Malaysia, (2) Islam as a way of life (*adeem*), (3) *sharia* law and *hudud* law (criminal code), (4) religious dress code (*hijab* veil or *purdah*) and religious persecution, and (5) the promotion of the Islamic economy and state—was to remain a central theme, albeit modified, in Malaysian politics and society in every subsequent election. This framing could not be easily washed away (Noor 2003a).

Because religion involves complex issues, there are rational and irrational processes in place. Regarding opportunity and threat frame analysis, this study

will be tracking only the issues that amplified religious framing for media attention. We shall see whether the shifts in religious framing in news media coverage caused a shift of opportunities or threats to both PAS and UMNO created during the time of the October 1990 general election.

PAS FRAMING OF RELIGION PRIOR TO 1990 ELECTION

Framing Islamization (Islamism)

One of the basics of any campaign that seeks to influence voters and win an election is the creation, articulation, formation of a slogan or motto that resonates with as many citizens as possible. Snow and Benford (1988) state that this cultural resonance is one of the key influencers of frame success and successful mobilization.

In 1986 PAS's election slogan was forceful: "PAS, Party of Allah," which was then softened to "progress with Islam," helping PAS to pick up additional local and parliament seats in Kelantan (see Table 4).

Table 4

Changes in Government of Kelantan from 1957-1999

Period	Party (Coalition) in Power	Comment
1957-59	UMNO (Alliance)	Based on 1955 Legislative Council
1959-74	PAS	Victory from post- independent election
1974-77	PAS (<i>Barisan Nasional</i>)	Ended after a PAS split abetted by UMNO
1977-78	State of Emergency	Rule by National Operations Council (NOC)
1990-96	PAS-S46	<i>Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah</i> (Coalition)
1996-Present	PAS	Semangat 46 was dissolved in 1996
1999-2004	PAS (<i>Barisan Alternatif</i>)	With KeADILan and DAP as a minor partner

Source: Boo Teik Khoo, September 2004, *Searching for Islam in Malaysia Politics: Confluences, Divisions and Governance*. Working Paper Series No.72.

PAS is based on the Tasawwur concept of an Islamic State document that emphasizes that “the understanding that Islam is a comprehensive way that

pertains to both its character as a religion and state *deen* and *daulah*. . . . A state that practices and provides security, welfare, and services to the entire citizenry, build based on the *sharia*” (Mutalib 1990:6; see also Appendix B).

While still faithful in its goal of becoming an Islamic state, PAS shifted slightly to amplify certain universal ideas in Islamic philosophy and to incorporate economic programs. This important shift in PAS’s religious framing created opportunities for PAS in the October 1990 general election. This shift was apparent in the presentation by party president Haji Fazil Noor at *muktamar* (the annual party convention) held on May 27, 1990, and in the Declaration adopted by the Congress. The Declaration sought to:

1. Uphold Islam as the *adeem*; that is, a system of living based on truth, justice, freedom, and strong values.
2. Create a united, strong, and progressive Malaysian nation.
3. Create a just and equal society.
4. Guarantee the practice of parliamentary democracy and the system of constitutional Monarchy.
5. Guarantee the sovereignty of the Malay rulers, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary.
6. Struggle to uphold all that is true and oppose all that is false and unjust. (*AM* June 1990:3-4).

PAS declared that in Islam, “the freedom of worship is a fundamental principle. Muslim rules in history have been known to defend this freedom with their lives” (*HK* June 7, 1990:4). Significant in the Declaration is PAS’s promise

to practice parliamentary democracy—basically, promising to preserve and perpetuate the existing political system. It can be reasonably assumed that, this helped other parties reach out to PAS.

Along with the six-point Declaration, PAS's Islamism agenda was included in its 1990 campaign strategy. The agenda proposed that all Muslim women wear veils at work, that unisex hair salons be banned, a ban on karaoke, a non-renewal of liquor licenses, closure of betting shops, and interest-free loans. PAS also intended to introduce gender segregation in public places such as bus stops, shopping areas (with separate counters for men and women in shopping, and closed night clubs (*HK* October 2, 1990).

PAS's prognostic frame included the introduction of *sharia* law such as *hudud*, the banning of "un-Islamic" practices such as shadow-puppet plays, and traditional forms of pre-Islamic culture, music, and dance. If PAS were to win in 1990, it would restrict the sale of alcohol for non-Muslims only (*Star* October 2, 1990:14). This frame is at the heart of PAS's attempts to move Malaysia toward becoming an Islamic state.

The analysis of the framing of religious issues in the media shows that the battle between UMNO and PAS comes down to UMNO's wish to resist change toward greater Islam and PAS's wish to accelerate such change and return to the "Golden Age of Islam" as under the Rashidum—the first four successors (*caliphs*) to Muhammad (Abu Bakar, Umar, Uthman, and Ali).

In the early 1980s, PAS leadership was taken over by a more Islamic core led by the late Fazil Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang, and Nik Aziz. To understand PAS

religious framing, it is worth noting that the three of them are *ulamas*—who engineered PAS's from the platform of Malay ethnonationalism to Islamism (Hussein 2002).

Framing Islam as a Way of Life (adeem)

Leading up to the 1990 election, PAS framed UMNO as anti-Islamic and accused it of running an anti-Islamic state marked by scandal and undemocratic practices (*HK* September 28, 1990). *Harakah* stated that if PAS were to come to power in the 1990 election, “the new government . . . will have to reflect the multicultural, multireligious realities of Malaysian society” (P. 12).

However, PAS made no direct mention of the establishment of an Islamic state; instead, it reiterated “upholding Islam as the *adeem*; that is, a system of living based upon truth, justice, freedom and other good values which also guarantees, protects, and defends the freedom of worship” (*AM* June 1990:3).

In an April 1990 article, *Aliran Monthly* framed PAS as follows:

Seeing Islam as a way of life which embodies universal spiritual values is different from seeking to establish an Islamic state [see Hussein 2002]. Such a view of Islam does not incorporate laws or rules which are integral to a state-system. *Adeem* does not suggest a new constitution or new ways of sharing power and defining rules between Muslims and non-Muslims. (P. 4)

PAS further distinguished its political ambitious goal for an Islamic state by changing the focus from Islamic law to the promotion of democracy and transparency within a framework of Islam. PAS indicated a willingness to work with anyone in the struggle “against oppression, sectarianism, and wrongdoing. PAS is committed to Islam as a way of life and not a formal-legal Islamic state. This is even stronger than what is contained in the present Federal Constitution”

(*HK* June 7, 1990:4). As Noor (2003b) observes, PAS softened its attitude and rhetoric regarding religion:

They no longer discussed whether an Islamic state was necessary for Malaysia but focused on the type of Islamic state to be established. Dismissing Malaysia's parliamentary democracy as a relic of Western colonialism and secularism, the PAS leadership pronounced that in their proposed Islamic state, the elected Parliament would have limited authority, and the assembly of clerics would supersede the legislature. (P. 7)

Before the 1990 election, PAS's Nik Aziz Nik Mat quoted the Qur'an as an indisputable reply to critics:

“O mankind! We created you from a single soul, male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, so that you may come to know one another. Truly, the most honored of you in God's sight is the greatest of you in piety. God is All-Knowing, All Aware.” (49:13, trans. *AM* October 1990, Issue 10:23-25)

Nik Aziz Nik Mat—also known as *Tok Guru* (respected teacher)—was the PAS candidate in the 1990 election chosen to turn Kelantan into a model Islamic state and to introduce reforms such as the punitive *hudud* laws, should the Muslim party win Kelantan. Nik Aziz positioned himself and PAS as the agent of change: “We are not averse to development. What we are against is the form of development being promoted by UMNO which leads to nepotism and cronyism” (*NST* September 28, 1990:6).

PAS Framing sharia and hudud Laws

Part of the controversial debate and framing regarding PAS's *sharia* and *hudud* proposals in Kelantan stemmed from *Harakah*'s own steadfast opinion regarding the *akhirat* (afterworld) as opposed to *dunia* (the world). *Hudud* is part of *sharia* Islamic law and includes punishments ordained by the Qur'an and the Sunnah (practices of Prophet Muhammad). The law covers drinking liquor and the accusation of the unlawful carnal intercourse *zina*—which must be proved by four witnesses—plus theft, robbery, or apostasy (*HK* August 31, 1990).

At a thanksgiving feast in Kelantan, Nik Aziz stated, "The proposed enforcement of *hudud* law will be carried out with great care and not by indiscriminately chopping robbers' hands without proof" (*HK* September 14, 1990:12). He reiterated that "their [UMNO's] manmade laws are changing all the time whereas we [PAS] advocate laws from the Qur'an" (*HK* September 28, 1990:2). *Harakah* also argued that "in principle, all manmade laws are subordinate to God's Law" (September 28, 1990:2). PAS vice president Hadi agreed that "since non-Muslims accepted capitalism, socialism, and other Western ideologies, there was no reason why they could not accept the country to be governed by Islamic laws" (*NST* October 15, 1990:18).

Religious Freedom and Religious Persecution

Freedom of religion and Islamic dress code are a frame amplified by PAS to gain support from Malay society. Snow et al. (1997) called it "an amplification of antagonists" and technique for encouraging individuals to "take a stand" on the issue (P. 215). Kelantan PAS leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat (1990) asserted that any Islamic analysis begins with the Qur'an. *Hijab*, according to his interpretation, is a code of behavior and dress that governs both men and women (Qur'an 24:30-31). He justifies the *hijab* by interpreting the Quaranic verse 24:31:

It goes beyond clothing and the avoidance of unnecessary mingling of the sexes. *Hijab* relates to privacy, safety from slander and false accusation, and prohibition of sexual exploitation. It expresses the dignity of both women and men as servants of the most high: "and turn to Allah together, O believers, in order that you may succeed." (Quran 24:31; Wan Kamal Wan Napi, trans., from tape-recorded speech)

UMNO passed specific laws that interfered with women's clothing, laws that PAS framed as the government's efforts to control PAS influences over

Muslim society (*HK* May 2, 1990). As an example, UMNO forbade wearing of the *niqab* (face veil) by government employees, and it also experimented with forbidding schoolgirls to wear scarves in the school science laboratory unless they brought written permission from their parents (*NST* May 10, 1990).

The wearing of headscarves by schoolgirls was first banned in the late 1970s in Malaysia. It was later ruled to be “not compatible with secular norms,” and individual schools were allowed to decide whether or not to allow it (*HK* May 20, 1990). Malaysian Sports Minister and high-ranking UMNO member Najib Razak denounced scarves as a symbol that women were seen as inferior, adding that the scarves made it difficult for women to participate in sports (*NST* July 22, 1990:17). Children who wore scarves faced bullying such as having their scarves pulled off by males in front of classmates (*HK* May 20, 1990).

While UMNO’s federal law allows for freedom of religion, in practice, people are discriminated against for wearing Islamic attire. In general, only the most fundamentalist Muslims do so. PAS feels that this discourages the Muslim community to the point where women stay at home, choosing to avoid workplace discrimination. In one arena, there is an ongoing shortage of Muslim females among medical personnel and, in general, the opportunities for women to contribute their talents to public life are severely limited (*HK* July 13, 1990).

It should be noted that in Malaysia, women are ostensibly given equal status with men. Muslim women are professors, ministers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, business entrepreneurs, police officers, movie stars, and engineers. However, those who dress *purdah* are labeled as “fundamentalists” and framed

by government officials as belonging to the PAS Islamic movement (*HK* May 20, 1990). As suspected members of PAS, they are deprived of rights that other citizens enjoy. The deprivation occurs as general repression and tends to be linked to racism or prejudice against Muslim women minorities; however, it also relates to anxieties about proper gender roles in society (Ahmad 2005).

A *Harakah* editorial on July 13, 1990, argued that as Islam is the religion of the Federation, the *sharia* is based on the Qur'an, and Sunnah must be enforced in the Federation. In addition, it should be provided that any law inconsistent with the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency. The Privy Council ruled that for a law to be valid, it must conform to the fundamental rules laid down by the English Common Law. This view seems to be acceptable to some in Malaysia, but as Islam is the religion of the Federation, surely the fundamental principles of the laws should be based in Malaysia, not on the English Common Law but on the *sharia* (see Ibrahim 1985).

The *Harakah* editorial further argued that one of the practical outcomes of the "Islam is religion of the Federation" clause in the Constitution resulted in more federal control of Islam in the States. The rulers are not *de facto* heads of Islam in the States. Thus, the UMNO ruling party in the federal government in effect has control over State Islamic judicial appointments, control of mosque committees, and Islamic doctrines. This situation creates tension when the Mahathir government at the federal center is different from the state government (see Ibrahim 1985).

PAS'S ISLAMIC ECONOMIC FRAMING

Behind the scenes of the spiritual and ideological debate, socioeconomic factors also became hot topics prior to the 1990 election. The election debates spotlighted the questions of state socioeconomic responsibility for the poor, the Islamic economic system, and economic justice and inequality.

Framing Socioeconomics for the Poor

In 1978, Kessler stated that PAS should be seen as a religiously informed movement that defended the best interests of peasants rather than as a group of religious fanatics who espouse Malay racialism and peasant traditionalism (P. 35). Seen in this way, PAS religious frame sentiments about the *akhirat* (afterworld/afterlife) as opposed to the *dunia* (world/lifetime) were popular in the heartland states because a religious life is not about satisfying personal wants but about living a life in accordance with a transcendent idea (see figure 2). The heartland people such as the Kelantanese were not as interested in the country's economic well-being as they were in spiritual well-being, so it was easier for PAS to overcome UMNO's economic framing. Over that decade, PAS was implanted in the minds of the conservative rural Malays as the party concerned with the afterworld instead of the world. Keller (1978), in fact, observed that with PAS in power neither social restoration nor political radicalization had come to pass (P. 167). Because PAS had ceased to be an opposition, there was no push for federal support.




Figure 2 Theoretical Model of Religious Motivation (See McVeigh, 1999)

However, prior to the 1990 election, many Kelantanese began observing that certain individuals and groups were unfairly benefiting from the federal government. As stated earlier, the UMNO government, as a gesture of concern for the “collective good,” sent thousands of young Malay students to educational institutions at home and abroad, and created employment and business opportunities for other Malays. The question for those who were *not* getting such perks was, “Who gets what—and how?”

This favoritism became an issue in the 1990 election, as PAS argued that their followers were excluded from the country’s wealth and economic benefits. The very definition of “collective good” is that individuals cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of the collective effort, even if they did not participate in providing the collective good; that is, a citizen may choose not to participate in paying any of the costs but still enjoy the benefits of a collective effort (see Olson 1971). However, PAS argued that UMNO was excluding citizens for not being

members of UMNO. As described in a *Harakah* editorial, if the UMNO-run government suspected a person—or even that person’s parent—of being a PAS member or supporter, that person would be deprived of his or her supposed “equal right” to any government scholarship, even if academic qualifications exceeded government requirements (October 7, 1990).

The PAS economy frame was generally convincing: UMNO had transferred wealth and privilege to a small pool of lobbyists and government supporters, discriminating against the rest. PAS pointed to its own organization as the only way to improve this situation, for Malays and non-Malays alike (see *HK* October 7, 1990:2-3). For PAS, “modernization involves the fight against corruption and the push for justice and democracy for the masses” (*HK* August 22, 1990).

Framing the Islamic Economic System

PAS leader Nik Aziz felt that Islam provided the essential ingredients for a functioning economic system. Aziz and PAS’s economic frame contended that UMNO economics—including the exclusion of others—did not follow the example of Muhammad, based on the direction of the *ummah*. The Islamic economic concept of *adil* (justice, right, equality) encompasses all human life, especially a concern for the poor, including the annual *zakat* (almsgiving) to redistribute wealth within the society (*HK* October 14, 1990:8).

PAS leaders thereby denounced UMNO, its members, and its policies of capitalist development as being un-Islamic (*HK* October 14, 1999:8). An additional illustration of this was land schemes in which citizens were forced into

the religiously forbidden system of usury (*riba*) with payment of interest on their loans. Likewise, PAS argued that other government practices provided a forbidden (*haram*) income because Islam forbids a follower from depriving others of their labor, which is a possibility under the work system used by UMNO (Salleh 1992:116).

Framing Economic Justice (al-adl)

While criticizing UMNO, PAS did not make its own economic plans entirely clear, so there was doubt over what kind of economic policy PAS would favor.

However, PAS vice president Abdul Hadi stated that “PAS would not reject a free market economy. It wants a free economic system which would benefit humanity, as required by Islam. It is not true that only UMNO will be able to attract foreign investments and ensure economic growth” (*HK* August 17, 1990:3).

The Kelantanese became increasingly unhappy with what they felt was deliberate neglect of Kelantan by the government (*HK* August 17, 1990). The shift to a nationalist-capitalist nation—beginning with the NEP and continuing through Mahathir—altered the entire social structure of the country. While 20 years of economic growth produced enormous wealth, it also produced inequality—within rural society, between rural and urban communities, and between UMNO’s new political elites and the rest of society (Jomo and Ahmad 1992).

Kelantan, as the poorest state in Malaysia, was economically disadvantaged in comparison to the richest region, Klang Valley, and the

capitalistic environment of metropolitan Kuala Lumpur was worlds apart from the communitarian environments of rural Kelantan (Salleh 1981). The heartland state of Kelantan—as well as Kedah and Perlis—came into strong opposition to the government and was often denied federal government assistance in the form of rural development aid. As PAS deputy president Abdul Hadi commented:

We have to realize that the money for development does not come from the ruling UMNO's pocket. It comes from the fruit of the land and sweat of its people—from taxes, assessments, duties, levies and tolls which ordinary Malaysians have to pay to the government—whether it is UMNO or PAS government. Remember, the money for development comes from us, the ordinary citizens of Malaysia. (*HK* October 12, 1990:8)

UMNO'S RESPONSE TO PAS

Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) posited, "It is interactions between movements and countermovements, including both discrete events and ongoing relationships that shape state responses" (P. 1630). Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad included this pronouncement in his speech to the Harvard Club of Malaysia on August 22, 1990: "The government will not allow any radical changes to take place that will destroy all that it has carefully planned and achieved" (*NST* August 24, 1990:3). The *New Straits Times* later underscored his comment, reiterating that Mahathir's view was one that "Islam is a progressive religion and could be embedded into notions of modernity, economic development, and knowledge economy" (October 13, 1990:13). Confusing the issue, we might ask ourselves that if PAS is Islam and UMNO is also Islam, just what sort of Islam do the people of Malaysia want?

In the abstract, UMNO and PAS were both justified in adopting the motto of "progress," but PAS based its view of progress on the Islamic state concept,

while UMNO took the side of Western progressive values. This divergence became central to the two parties' campaign strategies.

Three days after nomination day, as the campaign increased in momentum, even UMNO felt that it may lose its two-thirds majority in Parliament (AM October 1990). The pro-opposition mood was that UMNO would lose a large number of seats in heartland Kelantan and Trengganu, because UMNO supporters were finding it difficult to permeate PAS strongholds, especially in Kelantan. It was at this point that UMNO and Mahathir realized they could not rule without the Malay support yet insisted that "PAS Malays, to destroy Malay supremacy" (AM October 1990:2).

However, within a couple of days, the government-supported media and Mahathir's own scare tactics managed to spread anxiety among a large segment of Malay society (AM October 1990:2). Just as in prior general elections, whenever UMNO faced the threat of losing seats in Parliament, Mahathir and UMNO manipulated the voters with fear tactics. In one instance, Mahathir asserted that "in a multi-religious and multiracial community, we should treat the *sharia* as legal code with its good and bad points. Our stance should be one of supporting the good and rejecting the bad" (Star October 15, 1990:11). Mahathir left out the details of what would be considered "good" or "bad," further arguing:

Our goal should be toward the building of bridges. We should strive towards the removal of the walls of prejudice and bias. The stance taken in this campaign against the imposition of *sharia* law has done little for the building of bridges; it has served to further enhance the biases and prejudices of non-Muslims against Muslims. (Star October 15, 1990:11)

Even where frame efforts are not successful, counterframing strategies represent a paradigm shift. Counterframing requires strategic thinking and,

perhaps, as Benford and Snow (2000) argue, the interaction between social movements and counterframing is a key effect of movement framing. UMNO's Abdul Hamid had studied Islamic Law at a prestigious Cairo university, Al Azhar, and was religious advisor to Mahathir. His background gave him credibility as he argued that, for UMNO, "Islam is the objective of our struggle. . . . Islam has to deal with both aspects by providing for the materials well being of Malaysians and promoting Islam, while PAS only focuses on the second part" (*NST* October 16, 1990:3). He further accused PAS of using religion for its own agenda, promising voters benefits in the next life while neglecting the world's economic development. His criticisms included Islamic law, saying that "*hudud* is a political gimmick of PAS. . . . Its strategy is just using mosques, and its goal is the hereafter" (as cited in *NST* September 22, 1990:4).

While keeping an eye on the PAS campaign rhetoric, UMNO began tightening its control over religious affairs to exclude any PAS influence. As an example, many UMNO members suspected that the mosque committees had been infiltrated by PAS, so UMNO declared that the committees would now be appointed by state governments rather than chosen locally. The move was explained as a way to "ensure that mosque activities are run well and do not contribute to unhealthy activities which can cause a rift among Muslims" (*NST* September 12, 1990:4). UMNO also created two new organizations: the National Islamic Action Council—run by several ministries and coordinating the activities of explaining Islam to the people—and the Malaysian Islamic Welfare council, about 80 non-government groups involved in Muslim activities (see table 5).

Table 5

Comparison between Islamization Proposals of PAS and UMNO in the 1990 Elections.^a

PAS	UMNO
Proposal that all Muslim women at work wear veils	Creation the Malaysia Islamic Welfare Council
Proposed ban on unisex hair salons, ban on karaoke	Compulsory religious classes for government employees
Proposed <i>Sharia</i> Penal Code (<i>hudud</i> , <i>Qisas</i> , and <i>Ta'zir</i>)	Introduction of new <i>sharia</i> law covering such as offenses as prostitution, premarital sex, and lesbianism
Non-renewal of liquor licenses	Only state governments to be allowed to appoint mosque committees
Closure of betting shops	
Interest-free loans	
Separate Counter for men and Women	

Note: a *These religious issues comparisons are chosen from the various newspaper articles as a result of debate in the public domain over them.*

The 1990 religion and economy frame was UMNO's last push to defeat PAS on religious issues and, indirectly, became an analytic strategy for its counterattack (see Iberra and Kitsuse 1993). However, in the end, the use of the UMNO master frame—that of being the party to unite society across cultures,

across party lines, and across issues—failed because the frame and counterframe efforts did not hit home with the deeply held values and beliefs of all voters.

POST-ELECTION UMNO

Despite the best efforts, framing efforts are not always successful; “frame resonance,” or how the message strikes a responsive chord with the audience, is always problematic (Snow and Benford 1988:198-199). This analysis shows that UMNO’s loss to PAS in the Malay Muslims stronghold of Kelantan was a major blow to Mahathir and the party (Funston 2000). Despite the loss, it is also significant that UMNO and its coalition were able to retain a two-thirds majority in Parliament. According to *The Star*, “A feeling of security is enhanced by the knowledge that Malay culture and Islam have strong and sturdy roots in Kelantanese people. Kelantanese sometimes refer to their state as ‘the veranda of Mecca’ (*Serambi Mekkah*)” (October 2, 1990; see also Abdul Nik Aziz Nik Mat 1995:42).

After the election, in a counterframing effort, UMNO published articles to show the efficacy of the UMNO action frame by discussing such projects as subsidizing pilgrimages to Mecca and helping set up the International Islamic University and the think-tank Institute of Islamic Thought (Noor 2003a). UMNO continued to claim that it could serve the vast Muslim majority better than PAS. The frame stressed that, even though UMNO had lost Kelantan to PAS, the government would continue to create an infrastructure for rural development—

including roads, schools, and health centers—as well as provide rural Malays the opportunity to progress economically (*NST* November 14, 1990).

Although PAS's platform does not specifically mention an Islamic state, it is important to note that PAS's entire reason for formation was the pursuit of an Islamic state (*HK* October 18, 2003). PAS's insistence on an Islamic state—along with other revivalist movements' frames—forced UMNO to respond with countermovement strategies. On the surface, UMNO's prognostic and motivation frame and implementation of several government policies was aimed at regulating religious activities by giving increased attention to Islam and the subsequent adoption of the government's own Islamization strategy. But, under framing threats, UMNO reframed the passage of religious issue with hopes of negating PAS influence. This can be seen, for instance, in a speech delivered by the Malaysian Prime Minister on November 17, 1990, at an UMNO convention:

Islam is a simple religion; it requires of its followers two basic things: One, a belief in the unity of God and, two, a belief in the messenger of God (the prophet Muhammad) as a Muslim's only prophet. As long as a person abides by and is loyal to these two basic principles, no one can say rightly or wrongly about his/her Islamic faith even though his/her interpretations of the law or the sacred text of the Qur'an are believed erroneous. (*NST* November 17, 1990:13)

Although UMNO's president is the state authority who governs, he also realized that as a Muslim moderate he must govern a multicultural society without alienating most Muslims. Having Anwar Ibrahim at his side was his hope for providing credibility for UMNO's Islamic religious credentials in the public's eyes. When asked about democracy, Mahathir responds by saying that

“authoritarian rule can at least produce a stable strong government but it works”
(*AM* November 1990, Issue 11:2).

PAS leader Nik Aziz, now Kelantan Chief Minister, created a huge stir by quickly proposing to introduce *sharia* punishments such as amputations for theft (*hudud*). Such a proposal was not left unchallenged by Mahathir, who sarcastically asked the general assembly on November 17, 1990:

What if your wife got raped and four Muslims male witnesses of good character could not be found? . . . That is not because of the structure of the laws, though, is it? It is because the system is not functioning properly, wouldn't you agree? Now if *hudud* functions according to its laws, almost all rapists would escape legal punishment for rape, whereas the women complainants would be automatically guilty of *zina* and could be stoned, if it were adulterous, n'est-ce pas? I don't see why that should cause you think PAS's *hudud* laws wouldn't be at least as bad, if not quite possibly much worse. (*NST* November 17, 1990:7)

Not surprisingly, Mahathir has always been careful about adopting laws that would not sit well with the country's multiethnic society, as he comments on aspects of the *hudud* law that “the Federal Constitution would need to be amended before Kelantan could have its way [which is true], and a lot of research needed to be done [questionable]” (*NST* November 29, 1990; bracketed comments mine). *Hudud* is controversial in nature due to its many punishments—including stoning to death, whipping, and amputations—which, to non-Muslims, are considered cruel and in violation of human rights principles.

Despite having Anwar as Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs, Mahathir was not willing to coerce non-Muslims from casinos. Carefully addressing gambling issues at the UMNO assembly after the election, he explained that Muslims should treat these practices as a test of their faith. In addition, he stated:

The government was not agreeable to calls for a ban on gambling and drinking, and the imposition of stricter Islamic law. A better way of convincing non-Muslims, of the virtues of Islam . . . was not by banning these activities but by being exemplary in all fields. (AM December 1990, Issue 12:6)

Speaking to lawmakers in the Malaysian Parliament a month after the election, Dr. Yusof Noor, a minister in the Prime Minister's department, stated regarding aspects of the *hijab*:

The Islamic PAS movement needs to affirm that *hijab* is not a shelter for the privileged. *Hijab* needs to be considered in the social and political context of justice and dignity, and needs to be understood as something which sets limit on the behavior of both men and women. Rather than retreating in the face of anti-*hijab* prejudice, and rationalizing this cowardice with claims that women belong at home anyway, it is vital to stand for the rights of women to study, work and use public space. (NST November 29, 1990:22)

In reviewing the circumstances surrounding the 1990 election's frame issues debate, results suggest that, prior to the election, UMNO master frames—such as Islamization of race and economic development, which have enjoyed long-term success—were unpopular and dramatically lost support among the Malay voters, especially in the Malay heartland states. Chandra Muzaffar, *Aliran Monthly's* editor, commented after the election: “There is a lot more that UMNO should do in order to evolve into a more rational, humane and enlightened Islamic country. But small yet significant steps have been taken. Let's hope that UMNO keeps on moving in that direction” (December 1990, Issue 12:14).

POST-ELECTION PAS

After winning Kelantan from UMNO, a Kelantan PAS government official announced on November 29, 1990, that all Muslim women—in both the private and public sectors of Kelantan—would be required to wear *tudung* (veils). New Kelantan Chief Minister Nik Aziz is quoted as saying that “this up to individual

motivation” and “no legislation would be required” (*NST* November 29, 1990).

Ironically, less than a month later, Fauzi Ismail, an hotelier at a state-owned resort, reported that his female staff had received orders to wear veils. His resort had also been ordered to stop serving alcohol. The Chinese owner also complained that business had already dropped by 50% to 60% because all women have to wear veils (*Star* December 17, 1990).

Nik Aziz is a charismatic leader, who had a partisan religious message to deliver and implement in Kelantan. Despite the fact that the majority of Malaysia’s people are Malay Muslims, he knew that many others are Chinese and Indian. And yet Nik Aziz did not waste any time showing how a multiethnic and multi-religious Malaysia would be built upon the administration of Islam governed by Islamic law. As Chief Minister of Kelantan and, more importantly, as spiritual leader of Malaysia’s Islamic Party, Nik Aziz’s voice is impossible to ignore: “Islam is for everybody,” he preaches. “I don’t see any alternative to Islam” (*HK* November 18, 1990:13).

Decidedly, UMNO’s religious Islamization programs had little impact in Kelantan, where Malays constitute more than 90% of the population and enjoy overwhelming political power (see Salleh 1999). Malays in Kelantan feel politically and psychologically secure living under PAS Islamic rule. If anything, Nik Aziz will be more determined to remove what he believes are impediments toward Islamism. For example, PAS would ban karaoke, as Islamic fundamentalism does not allow entertainment, which it believes ruins character. PAS proposes segregating men and women in public places such as shopping

malls and supermarkets, along with not allowing unmarried men and woman who are not related by blood to be sitting together in the movie theater (*NST* January 18, 1991). Among the penalties under *hudud* is cutting off a hand for the first offense of stealing. Alcohol, dancing, movies and gambling would be forbidden in Kelantan, and most women would cover their heads in compliance with local government directives (*HK* February 8, 1991). Obviously, the wide ideological gap that separates PAS from UMNO cannot but become a serious political challenge for Mahathir and UMNO in the future.

Nik Aziz acknowledges some obstacles that PAS will also be facing. It will not be easy to implement the *hudud* law in Kelantan as it requires the Parliamentary majority approval in order to amend the Federal Constitution. But this would not stop him from addressing the issue and doing the things he has proposed to the Kelantanese. The PAS victory in Kelantan is a chance to implement the *hudud* Islamic code in Kelantan's practices. Interestingly, on a billboard advertising shampoos in the state capital, Kota Bharu, a row of seven smiling women hide their hair under Muslim headscarves (*Star* December 2, 1990:18).

Of course, the November 17, 1990, Mahathir speech regarding gambling was severely criticized by PAS, *ulama*, and other factions in the country that accused Mahathir of encouraging the growth of vice (*Star* November 17, 1991). There is anecdotal evidence that the beneficiaries of gambling licenses were people like Vincent Tan, a close friend of Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin (*HK*

January 7, 1991). It is more than a coincidence that Daim and Mahathir were good friends before both entered politics.

PAS has had limited experience in government; however, its rhetoric at times refutes that:

As the language of PAS's politics began to alter, so did the political and ideological frontiers that were drawn up within this increasingly Islamized discursive space . . . PAS [is] now projecting an image of Islam that was couched in terms of politics of authenticity and purity. (Noor 2003b:16)

In the last few years, there have accumulated mounting grievances from the Kelantanese regarding lack of economic development in their state. Despite UMNO's claim that it is meeting the country's objectives, UMNO's plan—in economic terms—has failed due to the culture of corruption within UMNO, according to PAS leaders:

UMNO has outlined its developmentalist visions in ways meant to counter the Islamic resurgence among the Malays. Specifically, it has engaged new institutes and think tanks that paint Islam as enterprising and the Malays as self-reliant, an effort to cast the revivalism of the opposition PAS, and *Dakwah* [missionary] groups into anachronistic relief. The party has taken care to supplement its appeals with steady flows of patronage, usually in the form of state contacts, licenses, and development grants. (Case 1994:917)

UMNO economic frames also failed to attract Malay Muslim voters in Kelantan. An *Aliran Monthly's* article, published on December 2, 1990, addressed economic issues and explained why the Kelantanese rejected UMNO in 1990:

Many Kelantanese have also been unhappy with what they perceive as deliberate neglect of the state by the federal government. The uneven development within Kelantan itself—certain sectors and certain groups benefiting much more from development than others—has become an issue of sorts.” (Issue 12:15)

CONCLUSION

PAS's amplified religious and economic frames in the 1990 election played a crucial role in strengthening PAS's electoral position and are, perhaps, responsible for creating and producing opportunities for PAS, especially their frames aimed directly at UMNO leaders, elite allies, and fellow Malay Muslims, who were portrayed as disregarding the instructions of the Islamic way of life—including engaging in un-Islamic behavior such as drinking alcohol, gambling, mixing with girls in public places, or allowing their women to go into the street unveiled. PAS had to adopt a strong religious frame against UMNO and the government. As a result, the 1990 election was favorable and victorious to PAS as it sought greater opportunity with the religious issues frame that resonated with the heartland's Malay Muslim voters. Frame resonating (or frame resonance disputes) does not refer to maximizing mobilization efforts; rather, it refers to the contents of the frames as they resonate with commonly held cultural myths (Benford 1993; Snow and Benford 1992).

UMNO's dismal failure to deliver a truly effective, persuasive, attractive alternative counterframing has since put it on the defensive, forcing it to try to prove its own Islamic credentials. In doing so, UMNO has become hostage to the PAS agenda and framework of Islam, engaging in an Islamic discourse on PAS's terms and allowing PAS to define the political parameters of Islam. As a result, UMNO is playing a catch-up game that it is unlikely to win, including economic development programs, such as increasing education, increasing life expectancy, improving lifestyle, rapid urbanization, and so forth.

On the surface, this sounds interesting to society because these programs could create a better lifestyle. From a PAS leader frame standpoint, this phenomenon causes them worry as they assume that the population is becoming less religious and they see members stop attending mosque. As the secularization thesis argues, religion must inevitably decline as science and technology advance, and people inevitably become less religious as they acquire more education (Iannaccone 1998). For that reason, PAS has decided to change course and tactics, especially as the PAS religion frame was aimed at those who had experienced poverty, either directly or indirectly, particularly those in the Malay heartland. The perspective offered by PAS frames—focused on the afterworld or afterlife as opposed to the present world—may hold more persuasive power with this constituency. Those in the heartland directly experience the debilitating and demoralizing effects of poverty. Under such circumstances, the PAS frame appeals to religious and ethnic sentiments: “We are Muslims, and as Muslims, we have to believe that the afterlife is a better life than the world in which we are living in our lifetime” (*HK* October 19, 1990:1).

On the other hand, for groups outside of the Malays heartland who identify with the Malay elites, professionals, businessmen, and middle class, and those whose personal identity is tied to modernization and development, UMNO’s world capitalist system frame resonates more clearly. After the 1990 election, the UMNO master frame is no longer routinely accepted. Perhaps this has become a threat to UMNO, simply because the government is losing its credibility, as it does not practice what it preaches. As PAS framed it, the

government claimed to respect Islam but did, in fact—according to this frame—deviate from the teachings of religion.

This question of religion especially an Islamic measures of the Islamization of Malaysia by UMNO is, again, the result of being in power for so long and not being aware of what is acceptable or unacceptable reflected a shift among Muslim Malays voters that seems to have hurt UMNO and its coalitions. Put simply, as Babb (1996) argues, collective action frames must have some empirical credibility. What has now become acceptable in Malaysia is the new version of UMNO's frame "*Malaysia Boleh*" or "*Malaysia Can*," the can-do attitude of the ambitious Vision 2020 plan that Mahathir has tried to create. This is the new image to a Malaysian multiethnic society and to the world, the plan that Malaysia can expect to achieve by 2020. An important aspect of this analysis was that UMNO and their leaders, even after losing Kelantan to PAS, conscientiously engaged in frame manipulation as part of a reminder, offering a new perspective for a new interpretation to shape the public's opinion that religion is still alive and well.

The rhetoric analysis reveals that PAS's six-point proposal and a Islamic measure by PAS to the Malaysian people, presented prior to the eighth general elections on October 20 and 21, 1990, ran parallel to the views espoused by the majority of the Malay heartland's people. The struggle to introduce Islamic principles and values—their entire way of life—was threatened under UMNO political hegemony. After reviewing rhetorical analysis surrounding the frame issues debate in the 1990 election, it is suggested that the 1990 election

religious issues constructed and contested by UMNO had shifted to produce threat to UMNO while they produced opportunities to PAS. In sum, this shift influence by religious issues framing caused PAS to gain its political opportunities after 22 years of UMNO rule.

CHAPTER 4

EVENT 2: OPPORTUNITY AND THREATS, FRAMING, AND COUNTERFRAMING IN THE ANWAR IBRAHIM SAGA 1998

This chapter explores the backdrop of religious framing that involved questionable sexual practices of a high-ranking government official but also accusations regarding the lack of religious values on the part of the Malaysian president himself. All these accusations and, eventually, an arrest and public disgrace, were positioned as religious issues and heavily framed by both parties.

The second-most powerful man in Malaysian politics, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO vice president Anwar Ibrahim, was dismissed on September 2, 1998, when he refused to resign from his government positions after being accused of “inappropriate behavior.” The alleged inappropriate behavior was detailed in a book entitled *50 Dalil Kenapa Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM* (*50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister*) in May of that year (MK September 10, 1998). The account contains graphic sexual allegations as well as accusations of corruption regarding Anwar (see Appendix C). On April 15, 1999, following a controversial trial, Anwar was found guilty and sentenced to more than nine years in prison (see Appendix D).

This chapter deals with the September 1998 protests that followed Deputy Prime Minister Anwar’s arrest under the Internal Security Act (ISA), providing an opportunity to PAS and presenting a serious threat to UMNO. The goal of this discussion is not to understand the rise and fall of Anwar Ibrahim in his official position as Deputy Prime Minister but rather to examine the religious framing

fostered by the historical pattern of opportunities and threats in the wake of protests that followed Anwar's dismissal from UMNO and the federation. As is true in many controversial issues, the question regards how the conflict was understood by the public, as each side attempted to frame the debate to its own advantage. Anwar's saga not only received wide media attention, but the issues themselves were controversial and complex in nature. In the wake of the controversy, PAS amplified religious values to facilitate its political goals and respond to shifting opportunities. This chapter offers an understanding of religious frame construction and key shifts through in-depth analysis of the news coverage across the timeframe of the events. It is important to note that this chapter tracks multiple frames through news coverage but focuses especially on two general positions: either support for or opposition to Anwar Ibrahim. In other words, this chapter is intended to draw attention to the problems and issues surrounding the Anwar drama.

First, I examine specific characteristics of the actor; in this case, Anwar's religious background. This chapter is not about the individual level of analysis but rather an explanation of why Anwar Ibrahim's religious background mattered in the public realm. The chapter is divided into five sections:

1. Exploring why Anwar Ibrahim's case is so important to mainstream Malaysian society and how religion had a bearing on public reaction.
2. Examining how pro-UMNO media developed and constructed Anwar Ibrahim's image.
3. Quoting Anwar's own words and responses to allegations against him.

4. Analyzing how social movements such as PAS took advantage of the Anwar episode with amplified religious beliefs and values for their own political advantage, seeking to influence public opinion.
5. Finally, I examine how Mahathir and his UMNO political group used a counterframing strategy to respond to the opposition and public scrutiny.

This study introduces PAS's success at obtaining agreement and working together with the non-Muslim political party, Democratic Action Party (DAP), which was formed by Anwar's wife, KeADILan, and how PAS formed a coalition as *Barisan Alternatif*.

Prime Minister Mahathir and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim had traded barbs in the past—mostly through aides or supporters—but their remarks after Anwar's 1998 dismissal escalated into direct attacks. The escalation of rhetoric marked a sharp decline in Malaysia's political stability and stoked the tension between the two leaders' followers, threatening to tear the country apart and split it into two camps. Thus, this analysis pays particular attention to language used by the media; the media's role in the development of social movements has been a subject of much discussion among movement scholars, as members of social movements target the media to gain publicity.

This chapter uses data first from *New Straits Times* (NST), which is published and controlled by the government. The second source is the PAS bimonthly newspaper *Harakah* (HK) or *Muslimedia* (MM). As explained earlier, *Harakah* was suspended during the Anwar episode because its Internet edition

had been updated beyond the limit stipulated in its print edition (*MK* April 26, 2000). The remaining sources were three Malaysian newspapers generally considered to be independent: *MalaysiaKini* (*MK*), *The Star* (*Star*), and *Asian Times* (*AT*). The data were collected for at least one month from September 2, 1998 (the date of Anwar's sacking) to August 1999 (when Anwar was found guilty of sodomy). Additional materials studied here include court affidavits, newsletters, journals, magazines, taped religious and political speeches, books, protest announcements, and press releases, as well as translated tape recordings. These additional materials allow for comparing and contrasting the coverage of events in a pro-government mainstream weekly such as *New Straits Times*.

This chapter will investigate both frames—one supporting Anwar (namely, *Reformasi*) and one opposing him (Mahathir and UMNO)—and explore how the controversy led to PAS political gain by producing opportunity for PAS and a threat for UMNO. The *Reformasi* movement, started by Anwar and his supporters after his dismissal, had grown and became a regular and visible presence in the capital as evidenced by passive demonstrations. Two other loose instrumental coalitions appeared: *Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat* and *Gagasan demokarsi*. Both coalitions were made up of approximately the same number of political parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). *Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat* was led by PAS and had a larger following among Islamically oriented movements and organizations (*MK* November 23, 1998).

Gagasan demokarsi was dominated by the NGO *Suara Rakyat Malaysia* (SUARAM) and additional secular-oriented NGOs. Both movements were basically driven by the long-term objective of struggling for social justice, rule of law, and abolishment of the ISA. As a result of the Anwar saga, the PAS Islamic movement and the non-Muslim DAP—as well as other Islamic groups—formed a coalition called *Barisan Alternatif*. By incorporating the coalition's agenda into its framing, PAS bettered its position to promote an Islamic agenda and gain wider support among both Malay and non-Malay (MK November 23, 1998).

Based on an analysis of these news outlets, I identified four phases in the print media's framing of the Anwar story:

1. Anwar's background and the relationship between Anwar and Islam (Anwar as a religious Islamic symbol).
2. Naming the event.
3. Anwar's and his supporters' responses.
4. PAS's amplified religious beliefs and values and UMNO's responses.

In the following section, I describe these phases and the symbolic processes they entail.

ANWAR AS A RELIGIOUS ISLAMIC SYMBOL

To begin, I will briefly discuss Anwar's characteristics, religious credentials, background, and his relationship with Islam. The Muslim Youth movement (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* or ABIM) was founded by Anwar Ibrahim and a group of university graduates in 1971. Its purpose was to encourage the Islamization of race in Malaysia. ABIM advanced a vision of an Islamic society

that combined scientific and technological efficacy with Islamic values. The group attracted many educated Muslim Malaysians who were eager to develop themselves, their country, and their community without sacrificing their Islamic identity (Hussein 2002). Between 1971 and 1981, ABIM grew rapidly to become a power to be reckoned with, partially due to the charismatic and dynamic character of Anwar Ibrahim, who served as its president from 1972 to 1982. Estimates show that its membership grew from 9,000 in 1972 to 30,000 by 1980. Anwar's 1982 decision to resign from ABIM to run for public office under the banner of UMNO—rather than PAS—threw the movement into disarray and practically put an end to its rapid growth (Hussein 2002).

It should be noted that ABIM had been nonpolitical only in the sense of not contesting for public office; in practice, it exercised tremendous political influence and was able, under the leadership of Anwar, to place great pressure on the government, influencing public policy to some extent (McAmis 2002). ABIM's commitment to the Islamic principle of unity (*tawhid*), justice (*al-adl*), and fighting evil and corruption led to a head-on collision with UMNO (Hussein 2002). As Siddiq Fazil, an ABIM leader, most aptly expresses it:

We were impatient and angry about the plight of the Malays, their education, rural development, rural health. . . . We were very angry, disgusted and critical of the government. There seemed to be no moral foundation and no spiritual guidance. We turned to Islam to fill this vacuum and to look for guidance. (Nasr 2001:88).

For this reason, the Islamic movement became an essential force in the process of identifying or diagnosing the problem that led to the Islamization of race in Malaysian society. PAS, ABIM, and other Islamic organizations had been actively involved in diagnostic and prognosis framing by molding social values

and attitudes and in shaping public institutions and policies (Hussein 2002).

Certainly, Anwar had a success story with ABIM. However, Anwar—known as "the liberator of the poor"—changed when he accepted Mahathir's 1981 invitation to join the administration.

ANWAR'S CHARACTER AND REPUTATION

After joining the administration in 1981—but prior to becoming Deputy Prime Minister in 1993—Anwar Ibrahim occupied several ministerial posts in Mahathir's cabinet and was perceived as a brilliant strategist, guaranteed to appease the Islamic revivalist movement in an UMNO electoral bonanza (Von der Mehden, as cited in Esposito 1987). Indeed, Hussein (2002) dubbed it "the Anwar Ibrahim factor," recruited to bolster the Islamic credentials of the Mahathir administration (P. 88). Former Deputy Finance Minister Derichs, a member of UMNO's Supreme Council, commented on some aspects of Anwar Ibrahim during an interview with *New Straits Times*:

UMNO has, since the founding of PAS [1951], been able to survive the appeal of PAS. Whenever there was a threat from PAS, UMNO utilized the rural *ulama* of the *pondok* institution to secure the support of the Muslims. When the *pondok* system disappeared, UMNO co-opted Anwar Ibrahim, and Anwar brought with him all the Islamic scholars and followers of ABIM, who substituted for the *ulama* between 1980 and 1995. PAS had no significant inroads because of Anwar. (September 29, 1999:39)

Subsequently, in early 1983 and as a result of Anwar's efforts, the Mahathir government successfully introduced more than 15 Islamic programs to the Malaysian community, including the founding of the international Islamic University, an Islamic bank, the *sharia* courts, Malaysian subsidized schools for religious training (Funston 2000; Hussein 2002).

What part did religion play in Anwar's contribution to the recognition of Islamic society? The answer, of course, is that Islam played a crucial role in the Anwar story and the story between UMNO and the opposition—especially the PAS Islamic movement. Anwar's alliance with UMNO created a new political atmosphere in Malaysia, reducing the tension between UMNO and PAS (McAmis 2002). The new atmosphere invigorated Islamic programs and activities, turning the government into an active participant intending to bring Islamic values to bear on public policy (Hussein 2002).

MalaysiaKini wrote a special column about Anwar Ibrahim, stating that Anwar enjoyed a “unique position,” his charismatic leadership appealing to people from all walks of life both here and abroad:

When he speaks, people listen and the international community from the Middle East to Washington are sympathetic towards him. This is his unique position. He is accepted widely by Arab countries but at the same time Washington, London, and Paris are also very much sympathetic to him, too. So, this is unique. (June 2001)

Reputation is related to character. It reflects how we are perceived by others. Likewise, the events that followed Anwar's September 1998 dismissal reflected the level of respect that Anwar had enjoyed both at home and abroad as more foreign governments sided with his sentiments.

NAMING AND FRAMING THE EVENT

This section examines how Anwar's story was framed in initial news reports and analyzes how that framing functioned rhetorically. Before examining PAS's amplified religious beliefs and values in the wake of the Anwar saga, it is important to understand how the public made sense of and then responded to

the Anwar story. One must study the underlying symbolism surrounding the story.

As stated, leader of an Islamic youth movement, Anwar Ibrahim, affiliated with the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and then was co-opted by the ruling party UMNO in the late 1980s. Before long, Anwar had risen to deputy premier and was seen as Mahathir's presumed successor. In 1998, however, Mahathir savagely turned on his deputy (*NST* September 2, 1998). Against the background of Mahathir's and Anwar Ibrahim's differences over economic policies, Anwar was abruptly sacked—accused of corruption and sexual misconduct (*Star* and *NST* September 21, 1998). After a controversial trial, Anwar was found guilty and sentenced to more than nine years in prison (*HK* April 14, 1999).

How the Anwar story *began* is crucial to how the story *developed*. The underlying form of the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister's story attracted mass media coverage as the media framed the news event as a public trauma (see Appendix D).

In analyzing discursive forms, this study draws from a sociological perspective, especially frame analysis. Frame analysis deals with how people perceive and respond to a particular event. An important aspect of frame analysis is looking at how a situation or event is named, defined, and how associated processes shape public opinion. At the end of this chapter is a chronology of events from the time of Anwar Ibrahim's dismissal until the

suspension of the second trial on November 15, 1999, due to Malaysia's 10th general elections being held on November 29, 1999.

Two dramatic elements quickly drew the attention of national press and the press abroad: After weeks of rumors about Anwar's departure, his sacking—followed by emphatic denials of the allegations—was immediate fodder for reporters. One intense article in *MalaysiaKini* on September 2, 1998, reported that armed police were stationed around Anwar's home, an angry crowd of supporters had gathered, and there were unconfirmed reports that preparations were underway to arrest Anwar under the Internal Security Act (see also *NST* September 9, 1998). Immediately after being sacked, Anwar launched a counterstrike in his speeches by exposing the government's massive corruption and abuse of power. It is noteworthy that the ensuing *Reformasi* movement—launched by Anwar during the few precious days of freedom before his arrest on September 20—was not confined to fighting corruption but included also the restoration of justice and democracy, which Anwar claimed had been almost totally destroyed by Mahathir through creeping legislation and usurpation of independent institutions (*MK* October 15, 1998).

Police threatened to arrest Anwar on September 15 if he continued to address public meetings without a permit, although growing popular support was the true concern: As example, a September 12 meeting in Northern Malaysia drew more than 40,000 people. Finally, after some 35,000 supporters marched to Prime Minister Mahathir's house demanding his resignation, police armed with

assault rifles and tear gas arrested Anwar at his home on the evening of September 20 (*NST* September 13, 1998).

The government media, *New Straits Times*, was devoted to drama, virtually ensuring a sensationalistic description of alleged sexual impropriety in the book *50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister* (see Appendix C), which was distributed free to party delegates at the UMNO General Assembly in June 1998. According to a March 3, 1998, *MalaysiaKini* report, the book accused Anwar of being a womanizer and sodomist but also a murderer who had abused power and was, at the same time, a CIA agent and a traitor to the nation. A high court judge described the book as “one long poison pen letter” and granted an injunction restraining the circulation of the book or its contents (*MK* September 28, 1998). However, in spite of the injunction, *50 Reasons* was easily available and appeared in various forms.

According to a *MalaysiaKini* editorial columnist, even before Anwar’s arrest, “[he became] a national icon and Islamic symbol for the campaign against the government corruption and support for economic injustice to the poor” (Funston 2000:9). In the June 1999 closing statement in his own defense, Anwar forcefully stated that “the Prime Minister was a maestro in the orchestration of the scheme. . . . There were adequate motives to get me dismissed and charged and convicted” (*MK* June 17, 1999). That testimony reflected the sentiment of the bulk of the population and of Western diplomats in Malaysia who believed that Anwar had been framed by Mahathir to get rid of the most prominent challenge to Mahathir’s political position. Anwar not only

rejected Mahathir's charges of immorality against him but countered, calling the allegations "the law of the jungle." The day after his removal, Anwar held a press conference and made allegations that the government machinery was being used against him through the government print media without right of rebuttal.

On September 8, a *MalaysiaKini* editorial stated, "The reform movement launched by Anwar Ibrahim has assumed a life of its own, releasing the pent-up masses against Mahathir's authoritarian rule." That same day, Anwar told the crowd outside his private residence, "I have repeatedly explained to the prime minister that the allegations against me are a series of fabricated lies and deceptions. I will absolutely not accept it." By evening, an estimated 15,000 people—multiethnic adults and children, as usual—appeared to hear him, at which point he unveiled a plan of reform with a badge that declared "We Support Reform." By November 1998, foreign officials became more outspoken, publicly criticizing Mahathir, expressing support for reform in Malaysia. The West's eager embrace of Anwar and his reform movement highlights an aspect that had hitherto been neglected. This was evident when U.S. Vice President Al Gore spoke on November 16 in Kuala Lumpur in favor of the reform movement (*MK* November 17, 1998).

The lack of transparency in this episode reflects what Anwar and his supporters (such as *Reformasi*) argued was nothing more than camouflage (*MK* September 29, 1999). Anwar supporters framed questions concerning the motive behind Anwar's sacking: "If indeed he were guilty of serious crimes that warranted his dismissal from the top government post, he should have been

charged in open court and given a fair and independent hearing” (*MK* September 29, 1999:2). Supporters argued that the *real* reason behind Mahathir’s denigration of Anwar was more personal: Once Mahathir stepped down as Prime Minister and Anwar took over, as the heir apparent, Islamization efforts could prove wobbly to Mahathir family business interests (*MK* September 29, 1999). The bailout of Mahathir’s son’s shipping company was a frame questioned in the opposition and independent media, stating that Anwar was not prepared to salvage the Mahathir family (*HK* October 2, 1998).

Indeed, the more Mahathir used the media, the more sympathy people had for Anwar. This sympathy did not come from a judgment as to whether Anwar was innocent or guilty of the charges; it arose from a sense of the grave injustice being done to Anwar. Considerable sector of the Malaysian public clearly did not accept the shrill government frames against Anwar; this was evident in Anwar’s massive rally in Merdeka Square in the heart of Kuala Lumpur on September 20. *Muslimedia* reported that an estimated 50,000 people—others estimated the crowd at 200,000—participated in the rally as a challenge to the Mahathir regime (October 1-14, 1998). Indeed, the somewhat abrasive and clumsy manner in which Anwar was arrested, detained, allegedly injured while in police custody, and the public humiliation actually won him the sympathy of a broad section of Malaysian society. Movements and organizations comprised of professionals—lawyers, doctors, businessmen, students, and academics—came out in support of Anwar in the name of justice, defending the integrity of the Malaysian Constitution and its legal system (*MK* October 13, 1998).

Inadvertently, Anwar's reputation and character managed to bring together this disparate assembly of groups into a loose political coalition where there had not been one before. Anwar's saga actually attracted the support of a diversity of ethnic/religious groups. The saga had struck a chord. It had electrified Malaysian society and community—regardless of ethnicity, age, political background, or creed—who supported Anwar (*MK* October 7, 1998).

As McAdam (1982) points out, the basic function of participants in social movement is to overcome the political impotence within the existing political structures, accomplished through alternative channels of influence to gain new leverage around their set of grievances. By taking a public stand in opposition to the State, or other authorities and groups, protest participation provides an encouraging environment for collective action (Tarrow 1994), regardless of an individual's ethnic background. The Anwar religious factor contributed to public riots and unruly crowd violence, and its associated symbolism generated threats to Mahathir and UMNO.

ANWAR'S RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS

From the moment of his arrest, Anwar was denied access to the official media. The only newspaper that gave him a hearing was *Harakah*, the official organ of the Islamic party PAS. Chiefly for that reason, PAS's twice-weekly *Harakah*—which increased in circulation from 65,000 to 300,000 immediately after Anwar's sacking—became the main newspaper for opposition views and, in many cases, was more widely believed than the mainstream press (*MK* September 16, 1999). *Harakah* reported that during the trial, Anwar explained:

Charges were trumped up against me because I worked against corruption, power abuse, cronyism and nepotism in government. And the judge has declared, "Let the whole country be corrupt; it still has nothing to do with this case." But corruption is precisely the issue; it was because I opposed corruption that I was expelled and it is because of corruption that this case cannot be tried fairly.

A *Harakah* staff writer noted Anwar as saying:

I have no hope of justice. The charges are part of a political conspiracy to destroy me and ensure Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's continued hold on power at whatever cost, even if it means sacrificing whatever little is left of the judiciary's integrity. "You resign or I charge you." That was the ultimatum the Prime Minister gave on the morning of September 2. (January 24, 1999:1-13)

In his press conference, Anwar made the following statement:

I am shocked with the use of government machinery to frame me. In the past with ABIM, I was harassed but never to this extent. The entire process . . . they questioned everybody, all my friends, even members of the judiciary. If he is a man, he is transferred out; if a woman, she is asked whether she is for PM or DPM or she has some private, private dealings with me. (MK November 9, 1998)

ANWAR AND THE PROTESTS

From the standpoint of the opposition's frame (that is, PAS, NJP, DAP) and Anwar supporters *Reformasi* group, action on the part of UMNO once again raised fears that oppressive laws, such the ISA, would be used to ensure political survival of Mahathir and his cronies (MK September 21, 1999). In fact, the events surrounding Anwar's dismissal strongly indicated that there was a political conspiracy to remove him from all positions of power. As Nik Aziz argued on September 29, 1999:

Failure to provide a full and reasonable explanation of the events leading to the dismissal of Anwar, and the reasons for it, will only lead the people to believe that they have been deliberately misled all this while, giving rise to wild speculation and eroding the last vestiges of credibility that this government has. (MK:7)

The popular opposition, such as PAS and *Reformasi*, drew inspiration from the charismatic, uncompromising leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, and the groups gathered momentum and strength as the year progressed. As a result of the 1998 political instability within UMNO's organization, PAS members had been working in alliance with *Jemaah Islah Malaysia* (JIM) and Malaysia National Justice Party (NJP) with a plan to work as a team against UMNO.

When movement actors identify the targets of their actions, they position themselves in opposition to the target (Gamson 1992a). As the literature notes, social movement organizations seek to draw attention to the issues as a direct means of communicating with target audiences, with the aim of attracting mass media coverage. For this reason, the frame issues of justice, cronyism, nepotism, and corruption were articulated as a priority by "free Anwar" campaign groups against UMNO and Mahathir Mohammad. The Anwar arrest under ISA generated a significant political backlash for UMNO and the government. Rallying around *Reformasi*, groups and individuals drawn from all social classes began to demonstrate violently against Mahathir's autocratic rule. Much of the population allied itself with Anwar, claiming that he was the victim of a high-level conspiracy.

The "Free Anwar" campaign was met with police brutality in Malaysia. Staggengborg's (1995) proposal of measuring social movement in terms of cultural, political/policy, and mobilization outcomes seems particularly well suited to PAS and its alternative opposition groups. This type of culture can be "the activation of a pool of people who can be drawn in subsequent movements" (P.

341). In this respect, the activities of the state not only provided opportunities that allowed PAS members to develop a public image but also helped distinguish and highlight the differences between them and UMNO. Bernstein (1997) maintained that the recreation of differences in political debate depends on the evolution of the structure of political opportunities. The political opportunities here refer to the issues surrounding Anwar's arrest that resonated structurally, facilitating not only PAS and non-Muslim group and individual mobilization efforts but, at the same time, secured PAS's broader political gain.

Anwar was arrested in mid-1998 on the corruption charge and, later, on a somewhat specious charge of homosexual behavior. Anwar's detention and maltreatment at the hands of the police—coupled with Anwar's popularity with well-respected leaders and his commitment to Islam (Hussein 2002)—sparked street demonstrations. Mass protests sparked by Mahathir's actions continued for several months. In January 1999, Inspector General Abdul Rahim Noor resigned, following condemnation of police brutality against Anwar, who had appeared in court with a black eye and bruises on his neck and arms (*NST* January 16, 1999). The news caused an uproar among human rights activists, and Anwar's supporters even within UMNO as well as with the wider public, badly damaging the image of Mahathir's government in Malaysia and internationally.

The human rights frame highlighted the extent to which “the precipitous and subsequent degrading treatment of former deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim would have certainly further discredited the political judgment and

credibility of Mahathir Mohamad and the senior UMNO leadership” (Funston 2000:9). No doubt when Mahathir dismissed Anwar in 1998 on charges of sexual misconduct, the Anwar debacle and its associated symbolism worked against UMNO, leading to public outcry over Anwar’s mistreatment in prison.

Never in the past had there been such strong anti-Mahathir feelings among ordinary Malaysians citizens. It was reported by *Harakah* on September 12, 1998, that tens of thousands were attending Anwar rallies around the world, calling for reform. On September 12, Anwar left Kuala Lumpur and headed for Permatang Pauh, his parliamentary constituency in Penang-North Malaysia, where—before a crowd of 80,000—he launched the Permatang Pauh Declaration for reform (*MK* September 16, 1998). The media also stated that Anwar led a convoy of supporters to Malacca and was greeted by 30,000 people chanting “Death to Mahathir.”

The underlying form of the Anwar saga may have had resonance with the news media’s framing of other public traumas. The episodic frame and thematic news frame used by the opposition and independent media played an important role, making a good case for the fact that, generally, news affects public debate. Although the government-controlled media had been told not to give any coverage to the Anwar story, the public—in particular the Malay community—was divided over the actions taken against Anwar: dismissal from office and UMNO, bashing by the head of the police, sensational allegations, and court cases. Tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands, demonstrated against the government—often in defiance of police firing tear gas and chemically laced

water. Police reports, affidavits, and expensive lawsuits became normal elements of political life. The Internet suddenly emerged as a new political weapon, wielded predominantly by the *Reformasi*. Mahathir came under unprecedented personal attack by Anwar supporters and was dubbed with a host of unflattering names including *Mahafiraun* (the Great Pharaoh) and *Mahazalim* (the Great Oppressor). Within Malay culture, *Great Pharaoh* refers to a person who is likely to act immorally or show bad character that reflects the negative image of Satan or evil, one who strays from Islamic teaching (see Funston 2000).

The fact that the Mahathir government was so deeply involved with cronyism, nepotism, and corruption only exacerbated the situation. Not only had Mahathir's government become more authoritarian, Mahathir had shifted his attention more and more toward the political and economic favoring of his political elite's network. The factors all combined to give Anwar's supporters major strength. As a charismatic leader, Anwar managed to build a massive support base. As he turned on the old upper and middle classes, Anwar sought to improve the life and justice of the Malaysian people. By framing the needs of those called *Reformasi* (reform), he managed to build a large and committed constituency, even while he was sitting in jail. In this way, Anwar was able to remain a charismatic leader with a mass constituency—unlike Mahathir, whose political leadership style favored nepotism and corruption.

Amnesty International declared Anwar Ibrahim a prisoner of conscience. Various international bodies that examined the Malaysian judicial system

concluded that it was not independent and that Anwar's trial was unfair. In April 1999, Anwar was convicted on four counts of corruption and sentenced to six years in prison (*MK* April 14, 1999). In reaction to his conviction, Anwar was reported as saying:

I have been convicted, but the people know my conviction was according to the script written by the conspirators. It is not the court but the conspirators who are sending me to jail. But remember that man is made of body and soul. My body may be outwardly free, but their spirits remain forever shackled, imprisoned by their rank and status. Indeed their souls can be bought and sold. (*MK* April 14, 1999:2)

Anwar unveiled a plan of reform with a badge that declared, "We Support Reform" (*MM* September 16-30, 1998). As a Free Anwar campaign staff writer commented, "They may imprison Anwar's physical self, but his soul and ideas will remain free through these efforts" (*MK* July 27, 2000).

PAS-AMPLIFIED RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND VALUES

Traditionally quiet and respectful of authority, the Malay people were provoked by the Anwar saga and showed strong anti-Mahathir sentiments. PAS saw this trend and capitalized on it, with PAS president Fadzil stating that the humiliation of Anwar and his family led many to dislike Mahathir (*HK* September 28, 1999).

As graphic details of alleged sodomy and corruption splashed across the headlines, most readers were offended by this campaign. Of course, PAS framed Anwar's removal and charges as an injustice, blaming the environment of growing restlessness on Anwar's mistreatment by Mahathir (*MK* November 1, 1998).

UMNO feared Anwar's religious influence in society (Funston 2000), a fear PAS seized upon, continually bringing religious issues into the debate,

especially taking the opportunity to attack Mahathir Mohamad's own Islamic principles. It is important to note that Islamic issues were in discussion from the time of Anwar's sacking (Fungston 2000), and PAS took the opportunity to exploit Anwar's fate by playing religious cards such as *sharia* law, the issue of sodomy, and the Internal Security Act (ISA). The sodomy issues in particular, especially the technicality of the ISA proceedings, need to be analyzed as potential sources of PAS opportunity.

Anwar chastised the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its ideas for turning around Malaysia's economic woes. Mahathir pointed to this as one reason for Anwar's sacking; the other, of course, being allegedly scandalous sexual pursuits. However, PAS felt all along that Anwar's removal had nothing to do with either of these reasons; PAS saw them as mere excuses to get rid of Anwar. Mahathir could not argue the economic reasons because the general public would not be able to make sense out of the policies (*HK* September 28, 1999). Therefore, a reason *other* than finance was given for the UMNO Supreme Council's decision to sack Anwar, one UMNO knew would be met with great alarm by the Muslim and non-Muslim population alike: Just prior to Anwar's dismissal, the pro-government press headlined the allegations that Anwar was involved in all types of sexual misconduct, including sodomy and affairs with several women—including the wife of his private secretary (*HK* September 28, 1999).

In general—in other countries and even in Malaysia—political leaders' sexual dalliances are overlooked, and the politicians go unpunished. However,

in Malay society, it is scandalous to practice sodomy and have affairs with another's wife, especially by a politician who has always been regarded as being deeply committed to religious values (*HK* November 28, 1998).

However, since the charge was that of a breach of religious law, PAS and many Muslims believed that the sodomy charges should have been tried under Islamic law. PAS's Nik Aziz commented that "any person accused of *liwat* or sodomy must be proven by the testimony of four adult Muslim witnesses who have not committed any major sins nor continue to commit minor sins" (*HK* September 1, 1999:1). PAS vice president Hadi Awang noted that it is the Islamic Sharia Criminal Code (laws of *hudud* and *Qisas*) that deals with such offenses and punishments, not the government. *Hudud* literally means "limit" and *Qisa* is "the law of retaliation," and they are laws interpreted by Muslim jurists as derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah (of the Prophet). Under *hudud* law, offenses such as theft, robbery, illicit sex, alcohol consumption and apostasy are dealt with by corporal punishment such as death by stoning or amputation of limbs. *Qisa* laws deal with offenses involving bodily injury or loss of life, with punishment being death or imprisonment; however, money, payment or poverty (*diyat* and *irsy*) can be accepted if the victim or guardian forgives the offender (*HK* November 13, 1999).

Islam and Islamic civilization have a long history of dealing with matters of sexuality. Since Islam has never presented sexuality as a sin or as something essentially corrupting and evil, it is not surprising that Islam can deal with

questions of sexuality with no problem. Indeed, as Musallam explains to the uninitiated:

Marriage is strongly urged upon men in all Islamic treatises, classical and modern, not only for procreation but also for its sheer sexual pleasure. Unsatisfied male sexuality has always been considered a social danger in both Islamic and popular culture, and unshed semen has been regarded in both as medically harmful. Although some jurists tolerated masturbation in certain circumstances, it was generally regarded with contempt (except—according to Shafi'i—when practiced by the woman on her man). Sodomy and homosexuality were also generally condemned. (Musallam 1983:31-34, quoted inside Ayubi 1991:37)

Sodomy in particular is considered despicable in Islam and by the Malay culture (it is *haram*, prohibited, and reflects the nature of a major sinner).

Thinking that sodomy was a powerful allegation able to destroy Anwar politically, Mahathir and UMNO felt confident in their accusations. But, as it turned out, this tactic did not succeed. Even segments of Malay community who might have believed the allegations initially, after reading *50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister*, were offended and thereafter disbelieved what the book said, including graphic sexual allegations and accusations of corruption. Instead, they took pity on Anwar as a victim of government lies (*fitnah*).

Seeing an opportunity, PAS chose not to speculate on whatever might have been the true reasons behind Mahathir's action against Anwar but instead focused on the sodomy allegation. As the *Harakah* editorial on November 1, 1998, argued, PAS framed the entire Anwar sodomy drama on one crucial question: Did he do it or not? UMNO's images and description of Anwar's sodomy were not only traumatic for Anwar but traumatizing for the Malay people (MK March 15, 1999).

UMNO'S RESOLUTE ALLEGATION

Since UMNO did not foresee the backlash, it made elaborate plans to bolster the sexual allegations: Two weeks prior to Anwar's arrest, Anwar's adopted brother, Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja, was arrested for alleged involvement in acts of sodomy with Anwar. Additionally, on September 14—also prior to Anwar's arrest—similar charges were leveled against Pakistani national Munawar Anees, in Malaysia on permanent resident status, and he also was detained under ISA. Anees, editor of the now-defunct *Periodica Islamica*—an English language quarterly published by a division of the *New Straits Times*—had reportedly written speeches for Anwar. Both Madja and Anees were convicted after they pled guilty on September 19, 1998, to “allowing themselves to be sodomized by Anwar Ibrahim.” They were each sentenced to six months in jail (*NST* September 19, 1998).

Sodomy Accusations a Threat to Mahathir

Anwar's case will continue to threaten Mahathir as PAS's attention—and framing—has again been focused on an issue of Islamic morality in politics, a position they are comfortable with and good at defending. Meanwhile, the prosecutor's decision to amend charges against Anwar will make it even more difficult to prove allegations of sexual misconduct against Anwar.

Harakah reports that in Anwar's trial, the defense attempted to shift responsibility for the beating back to the victim, claiming that Anwar's homosexuality had evoked fear and panic in society and that his actions made him unfit for the UMNO party membership. The majority of Malaysian citizens

believed that the sexual charges were politically motivated by Mahathir to diminish Anwar's popularity and tarnish Anwar's religious credentials. An exhausted Anwar first appeared in court in September 1998 and, in April 1999, was sentenced to six years imprisonment (*HK* April 14, 1999).

A *MalaysiaKini* editor stated that the trial began to cast a shadow over Mahathir's claim that he was correct to dismiss his deputy on moral grounds (March 16, 2001): "After sacking Anwar, the Prime Minister claimed that he possessed conclusive evidence that Anwar was a sodomist and had committed the crime of unnatural sexual acts. . . . It is suddenly unsettling for me to realize that Anwar's case may not be about morality, the Prime Minister's prerogative, or the national interest," and that it may be as rumored, a conspiracy to protect vested interests which don't represent the best interests of the ordinary Malaysian.

Anwar Ibrahim filed an affidavit that Prime Minister Mahathir's evidence at the sodomy trial would prove without doubt that Anwar is "a victim of political conspiracy" aimed at shaming and tarnishing his reputation, and toppling him from power. The 10-page affidavit stated that the defense would procure evidence as well as detailed facts to shed light on issues crucial to the defense case. Anwar said, "I am confident and believe Dr. Mahathir has enough information and proof to show I am innocent of the charges framed against me" (*MK* April 17, 2001).

The *MalaysiaKini* editorial concluded that there was not enough proof—or no proof at all—regarding the alleged sodomy. The writer stated that the whole

debacle could have been a high-level conspiracy. It further stated that significant resources were required to stage evidence of sodomy, adultery, and power abuse to remove the country's second-in-command (June 14, 2001).

Because of this, it was difficult for Mahathir to use any kind of religious framing against Anwar's alleged homosexuality, given that Anwar was seen as a charismatic leader with solid Islamic credentials. PAS vice president Hadi Awang pointed out:

Character ultimately always reveals itself. Our quirks, habits, and practices all evolve over a period of time. Our greatness, goodness as well as our flaws are all there to be seen. It is not in the nature of character for anyone to become good or bad overnight. (*HK* April 15, 1999:2)

Indeed, both in Malaysia and in international circles, Mahathir's charges were widely believed to have been manufactured to derail Anwar's popularity and influence. Not only had Mahathir lost touch with his own Malay constituency, he had shifted his attention more and more to combating Islam (*MK* December 2, 1999).

Mahathir's Responses to Threat

In explaining movement and countermovement relations, it is significant that Mahathir's political assignation attacks were made on Anwar's personal character—some humiliating even by Mahathir's standards. Some observers questioned Mahathir's sense of judgment in that regard, while others questioned whether Anwar's dismissal from the party was even constitutional. Apart from the allegations—some too crude to repeat in this paper—Anwar has still not been officially charged.

When publicly asked why Anwar was sacked from the party, Mahathir brushed aside the question by saying, “We don’t have to give any reason for his expulsion. He was unsuitable for the party” (*NST* September 29, 1998:14). However, Mahathir told leaders and key members of UMNO that it was for moral reasons. He likened Anwar to U.S. President Bill Clinton and his adulterous affair with Monica Lewinsky. Political observers felt that Mahathir hardly helped Malaysia’s economy with such tactics. In fact, he may have undermined it. As reported in *New Straits Times*, Mahathir said he “had to act swiftly against [his] former deputy to ensure that the country is not led by an immoral leader” (September 29, 1998:11).

As a counterframing tactic, discrediting the opposition’s religious values and beliefs can be effective. Social movement scholars indicate that attacks on personal norms, beliefs, and values are crucial in boosting public support for the issues (Schwarz 1977). One of UMNO’s senior ministers agreed with Mahathir’s decision, stating that the Prime Minister “must have had good reasons” (*NST* October 11, 1999).

This analysis also finds that, while it is acceptable for some UMNO leaders to validate Mahathir’s decision, such attempts could undermine and neutralize public or group myths as counterframing strategy efforts (see Benford 1987). Indeed, as Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argue, “When movements effectively create or exploit events, they are likely to encourage countermovement mobilization at the same time that they advance their own agenda” (P. 1638). An important aspect of this counterframing analysis is that

Mahathir and UMNO supporters conscientiously engaged in frame manipulation to achieve a premeditated end. As Klandermans (1988) points out, sustained interest is created only through the consensus of common meanings and value systems. Indeed, it was reported that both sides conducted special prayers asking God to reveal the truth (*sembahyang hajab*). Mahathir and close friends went on the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) at the end of March 2000—perceived, at least in part, as an attempt to polish the government’s Islamic credentials (March 28, 2000).

From the beginning of the Anwar drama, PAS leaders were at the center stage of anti-UMNO and anti-Mahathir sentiments, while Mahathir continued to express views that caused controversy in the past, including being critical of religious leaders (*ulama*) for getting involved in politics (both as members of PAS and by discussing political issues in the mosques) and criticizing aspects of Islamic law (particularly *hudud*). When asked about Islamic law regarding sodomy that requires four adult male Muslim witnesses who have not committed major sins, Mahathir said, “Don’t get me wrong, I am Muslim, I believe in God, but the world we are living in now it is impossible to find group of individuals who have not committed any major sin” (*NST* October 7, 1999:16).

He repeatedly accused Anwar and PAS of telling lies (*fitnah*), a serious offense under Islamic law. However, he rejected the claim that he is “secular” (which he said is a Western term) and claimed that Malaysia is an Islamic state. It has been reported that an UMNO member attacked PAS’s *ulama* as being good at using the opportunities and that many PAS leaders were involved in sex

scandals worse than Anwar Ibrahim's: "PAS is a party of foolish religious teachers" (*NST* November 27, 2001:3).

After analyzing the news media's framing of the Anwar saga—framed functionally and rhetorically to absolve the public of guilt associated with motives of the Anwar cabinet dismissal—one thing is clear: The media coverage of negative framing toward Anwar was highly criticized by the Free Anwar campaign and the political opposition. The government media played a role in creating a negative image of Anwar Ibrahim, especially focusing on the issues of sodomy and sexuality—framed as a sexual deviant who destroyed Islamic values, ridiculing Anwar as "a freak of nature" (*NST* December 15, 1998).

Further analysis of media coverage reveals that depictions of Anwar's alleged sexuality, sodomy, and corruption were constructed within the framework of secularism and Islamic ideology. The pro-government media were used by Mahathir and UMNO as propaganda machines to influence the general public.

As part of that propaganda, a *New Straits Times* editorial published on October 1, 2004, stated that Anwar Ibrahim's trial was not politically motivated. It stated that Anwar was incarcerated solely for the corrupt practices he had committed—not for criticizing the Malaysian government's policies, for speaking out against corruption, or for advocating political and social reforms. It further stated that Anwar was given all rights to a fair trial available in an adversary system of justice, based on the British judicial system. Furthermore, the Federal Court on September 2, 2004, allowed Anwar's appeal against his conviction and sentence for sodomy charges and was acquitted.

It is true that Anwar was initially arrested under the Internal Security Act as a result of involvement in illegal rallies and riots to instigate people against the government—acts considered unconstitutional and against public order in the country. Due process of law had been followed in all aspects in regard to Anwar's case. There was no personal interest involved, and Anwar's accusations that those involved in the trial were rewarded were baseless.

CONCLUSION

This analysis has shown that, despite the rhetoric and drama surrounding Anwar's case, the event produced a threat to UMNO and its leadership, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. This is symbolized by the fact that when Anwar was dismissed by Mahathir from UMNO and the government, the case was seen in the eyes of the Malaysian people as competition for leadership. It is especially difficult for Mahathir to discredit Anwar, who has a charismatic quality derived from his Islamic background that ties him to Islamic values and beliefs. The *Reformasi* frame developed by Anwar was marked by unhappy Malaysian citizens behaving as the very embodiment of Anwar's genuinely Islamic charismatic personality. In other words, the concern of religion with God might indicate that religious beliefs often gather power by defining situations in terms of their relationship to God. For example, the majority of the Malaysian people have resonated greatly with Anwar's character for doing "good deeds" for the poor people in line with religious definitions.

Anwar's Islamic credentials make Mahathir's counterframing rhetoric extremely difficult. This is symbolized by the fact that Anwar is so closely

associated with Islamic ideology and practice, each word, each action. Even the language framing his participation in religious services, giving the sermon during Friday prayer, stands for far more than Mahathir's Islamic credentials—which are thin, according to political observers. “Symbols tie together belief systems that structure our response to other persons, the group, nature, and the cultural system itself. They involve cognitive, expressive, and evaluative factors” (Hargrove 1979:53). Symbols are vehicles for mobilizing beliefs, attitudes and values.

Despite the substantial media hype surrounding the Anwar episode, much of the effort to gain support for Anwar and much PAS rhetoric concerning Anwar was an effort to exploit longstanding social justice issues and sodomy issues in religious terms. The trumped up sodomy and ISA charges had generated solidarity within Malaysian society across ethnicity and religion. A sense of solidarity that is needed for mobilizing social movements was evident in the agreement made by PAS, KeADILan, and non-Muslim political parties to form *Barisan Alternatif*.

At the diagnostic and prognostic levels, members of the free Anwar campaign, KeADILan, and PAS developed coherent formulations concerning the nature of the underlying problematic relationships in society. Most importantly, however, the key shift in PAS's religious framing, especially PAS repeatedly argue that the sodomy charges against Anwar, should be tried under Islamic law has been debated in the public domain especially among Muslims scholars and within the Malaysian community. Muslim and non-Muslims seemed in favor of

PAS statements that the Anwar sodomy case should be tried under Islamic law (see *HK* November 28, 1999). For mainstream society, Mahathir and the state were the oppressors, and the opposition groups were the oppressed.

Although sexual misbehavior has been common among some government or political leaders, they were not usually punished for their amorous activities. However, practicing sodomy in addition to having affairs with another's wife, especially by one always regarded as religious, is most scandalous. Sodomy issues produced shifts in preferences, and PAS was able to capitalize on the issues in Islamic religious terms.

PAS argued that sodomy is something considered despicable in Islam and Malay culture. So, it was certainly the best allegation to make to completely destroy Anwar politically. However while this allegation was intended to convince the public and as it turned unsuccessful. Most Malays did not believe these allegations and tended to take pity on Anwar as a victim of lies (*fitnah*). Perhaps this sexual deviancy allegation against Anwar is the key to understanding PAS's success, producing PAS opportunities and causing threats to UMNO. In fact, the popular perception is that the government, or more specifically Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, orchestrated the events.

It may be said that since Anwar's dismissal from the government and UMNO, the face of politics and repression has changed quickly in Malaysia. The state has become more authoritarian, with power held increasingly by one person. The opposition coalition has become multiethnic, more united, and stronger. PAS will emerge as the strongest Malay political party that people can

trust. UMNO and Mahathir appear to feel the threat of possible defeat in future elections.

Although Mahathir and his UMNO colleagues used powerful counterframing tactics to attack Anwar's character—ostensibly to diminish Anwar's public standing on his relationship with Islam—the attempt failed. Instead of alienating the broader population, the message caused a backlash against Mahathir and UMNO, a backlash intimately connected to Anwar's Islamic religious background. In turn, Anwar's reform mobilization message produced political leverage for opposition groups to unite for the sake of justice, regardless of their ideological or political differences.

It must be stressed that one important result of the Anwar saga was the founding of the NJP (KeADILan), currently led by Wan Azizah Ismail, Anwar's wife. The NJP represents a drastic shift from the communal politics that dominated the Malaysian landscape since independence, bringing the major ethnic groups—Malays, Chinese, and Indians—together in political unity.

Once again, analysis of frame rhetoric shows that those supporting Anwar contributed to PAS opportunity, and the events—as controversial as they were in the face of Anwar's Islamic ideological background, reputation, character—were the factors that produced opportunity to PAS and threat to UMNO. Therefore, it is fair to conclude from this analysis that religious culture matters.

In the next chapter, I will discuss in detail how the Anwar saga turned PAS into a strong opposition predicted to win the non-Muslim vote. For now, the study has revealed that the Anwar saga became a potential strategic advantage

for PAS, but PAS repeatedly failed to articulate a model for religious cooperation in the context of the multireligious and multicultural Malaysian society.

Nevertheless, this strategy would place UMNO at a political disadvantage for the election that was set to take place in December 1999.

CHAPTER 5

EVENT 3: OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS, FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING LEADING TO THE 1999 MALAYSIA GENERAL ELECTION

This chapter addresses how UMNO and PAS constructed religious issues to be used as opportunities to mobilize potential constituents, attract support from the general public, and attract the media's attention. In the 1999 general election, PAS not only increased its parliamentary presence from seven to 27 seats but also removed UMNO's 40-year hold on the Terengganu State Assembly. I analyzed important key shifts in religious framing of PAS opportunities and threats to UMNO as follows:

1. First, I investigate PAS and UMNO framing of religious issues prior to and after the 1999 election, a key shift attributed to the Anwar factor, the firing of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim from UMNO and the government.
2. Second, I examine religious framing regarding the PAS's alliance with other *Reformasi* opposition parties in the *Barisan Alternatif* (BA) coalition—comprised of the Chinese-dominated party Democratic Action Party (DAP), Malaysia National Justice Party (KeADILan), and the Socialist Party Rakyat Malaysia (PRM).
3. Third, I analyze how UMNO used its religious issues framing in prior and post 1999 election.

4. Lastly, I evaluate how UMNO used counterframing strategies in response to a threat in order to win back the support of Malaysian mainstream society.

This chapter uses the literature on Malaysia's history and its political parties' historical manifestos, as well as the relevant newspapers such as the pro-government *New Straits Times* (NST), the Islamic PAS newspapers *Harakah* (HK) and *Muslimedia* (MM), independent *The Star* (Star) and *Aliran Monthly* (AM). The research strategy was to identify, categorize, and track multiple frames of the UMNO and PAS Islamic movements. In this context, the term *multiple frames* refers to processes of competing frames—that is, frame alignment, frame dispute, and counterframing—influenced by shifts in patterns of opportunities and threats in religious framing and social issues framing.

The time span for the third key event is from September 1999 to the date of the election—November 29 and 31—and to two months after the election, giving PAS the states of Kelantan and Terengganu. Although the time span for the third key event covers only two months before and two months after the election, it is important to note that I did not restrict my analysis to news stories in that exact time span; I considered some prior to or after that period as I estimated their importance for this analysis.

One important issue that attracted media attention was the widespread fear of UMNO leaders regarding the influence of the PAS newspaper, *Harakah*, on the Anwar case. Originally published twice a month and not twice a week, the paper's right to publish was suspended by the government because the

government believed that the PAS had violated its permit by uploading online more often than twice a week (*MK* April 26, 2000); thus, references to *Muslimedia* are also references to *Harakah*. The Mahathir government acted to restrict sales of the PAS newspaper to members only, which prevented it from competing for wider support. This reflects Mahathir's concern that both the Anwar issue and the rising popularity of the pro-Islamic PAS were threatening his grip on power (*MM* April 16-30, 2000).

This analysis is intended to provide an understanding of the UMNO and PAS frame disputes regarding religion and to determine how their rhetorics led to another surprise victory by PAS in 1999 that produced opportunity for PAS and a threat for UMNO. Within this context, the study examines how these two movements framed religious and social issues prior to the 1999 Malaysia general election and how UMNO, with its secularist attitudes, had to respond to the PAS religious framing to win the voters of the Malaysian people.

Thus, to understand the organizational frame disputes between UMNO and PAS and to see how these disputes led to PAS's surprise victory in 1999, the review begins by examining several relationships: (1) PAS religious issues framing, (2) PAS and "the Anwar factor," (3) PAS and *Barisan Alternatif*, (4) UMNO's religious issues framing response, along with (5) UMNO's post-election threat reaction, (6) PAS post-election, and (7) PAS and *Barisan Alternatif* post-election.

PAS'S RELIGIOUS ISSUES FRAMING

PRIOR TO THE 1999 ELECTION

As it looked forward toward the 1999 election, PAS's framing of religious issues largely corresponded to its rhetoric for the Kelantan Islamic model that it had controlled since 1990; that is, its framing amplified the positive aspects of the institution of *sharia* and *hudud* laws. Because the election took place on November 29, 1999, just one year after Anwar Ibrahim was removed from his government position for alleged inappropriate behavior, PAS also amplified the un-Islamic treatment of Anwar by providing religious justification for a coalition with non-Muslim political parties. The new coalition was comprised of the opposition the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the KeADILan Party (led by Anwar's wife). The UMNO and *Barisan Nasional* (comprised of UMNO, MIC, and MCA) ran against PAS and *Barisan Alternatif* (PAS, DAP, KeADILan, and the Malaysian People Party [PRM]). Thus, UMNO's coalition and PAS's coalition were involved in a religious frame dispute during the 1999 election (see table 6).

In addition to PAS's Kelantan state model rhetoric, this paper will examine the other religious issues and particular references to Islamic governance and moral economy, PAS adoption of its Islamization proposal, *sharia* and *hudud* law, and relation between democracy and Islam. These areas were chosen for this study as a result of news media religious issues framing and debate in the public domain prior to the 1999 election.

Table 6

Barisan Nasional Coalition and Barisan Alternatif in the 1999 Election

<i>Barisan Nasional</i>	<i>Barisan Alternatif</i>
UMNO (<i>United Malays National Organization</i>)	PAS (<i>Parti Islam Se-Malaysia</i>)
MCA (<i>Malaysian Chinese Association</i>)	KeADILan (National Justice Party)
MIC (<i>Malaysia Indian Congress</i>)	DAP (Democratic Action Party)
PBB (<i>Partai Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu</i>)	PRM (The Socialist Party Rakyat Malaysia)
SUPP (<i>Sarawak United People's Party</i>)	
SNAP (<i>Sarawak National Party</i>)	
PBDS (<i>Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak</i>)	

The Kelantan State Model—Serambi Mekah (The Verandah of Mecca)

At first, in order to mobilize the Malaysian people for the November 29, 1999, election, the PAS bi-monthly newspaper *Harakah* offered its version and valuable insight into the 1990 PAS success story, especially in the state of Kelantan (*HK* October 14, 1999). Kelantan—also known among the Kelantanese as “the verandah of Mecca”—has been Malaysia’s experiment with a PAS-controlled Islamic government, an anomaly in a country that is seen as an exemplar of modern, moderate Islam. Kelantan Chief Minister Nik Aziz tried to maintain a popular government, staying close to the people by “stressing social collectivism, civil justice and redistribution through Islamic practices” (Hilley 2001:194). By and large, Kelantan was open to PAS changes. Nik Aziz encouraged people to come and see with their own eyes, to experience what

Kelantan had to offer and, perhaps, that “the issue of implementing *sharia* law is not foremost in our campaign. Kelantan is our model. It is all in place here in Kelantan. People can come in and observe, and if they are fearful, they can see what is going on” (*NST* September 29, 1990:3).

Rhetorical analysis began with the PAS success story of how it took over the State of Kelantan in 1990: how PAS leaders succeeded in advancing concrete and sufficiently detailed proposals for a realization of Islamic ideas, their emphasis on understanding Islamic values and Islamic teachings, as well as educating the Muslim community about their Islamic programs. For example, as a result of the 1990 election, PAS transformed its religious rhetoric into action by pursuing many feel-good Islamic strategies. For almost 10 years, those feel-good initiatives in Kelantan increased PAS’s popularity and public support for the party.

After PAS won Kelantan in 1990, PAS amplified the positive aspect of the state institution under its control. As such, since taking over the State of Kelantan from UMNO, every Friday morning Nik Aziz began offering a *kulliyah* (lecture) in the street just outside Kelantan PAS headquarters. These *kulliyah* stemmed partly from the fact that, unlike any other state in Malaysia, PAS instituted a Friday-Saturday weekend in Kelantan: Friday for prayer and Saturday for family. Because the *kulliyah* were held on Friday mornings, everyone, including working-class families, could attend without difficulty. In addition, these *kulliyah* were recorded on audiotapes and videotapes and distributed across the country. PAS’s experimentations by amplified the positive aspects of the

institutions based upon Islam as way of life, as Roger Mitton, journalist with *Asiaweek*, observed:

By 10 a.m., the streets around the four-story, somewhat shabby PAS headquarters are a sea of people. The devout greet friends, enjoy a snack and a smoke, read the newspaper *Harakah* and peruse stalls selling the Koran and other Islamic items. The wives sit apart. A back lane is transformed by ranks of women in their colorful Friday best and pristine white headscarves. But there is no oppressive mood of doctrinal solemnity. And nobody looks askance if, as often happens, a Chinese family—casually dressed in shorts and T-shirts—walks by with groceries. Beginning at 10:30, a sermon is broadcast into the streets over megaphones; it is Nik Aziz speaking from somewhere inside the building. The voice is deceptively soft, devoid of the stridency often associated with radical Islamists. He talks about the proper behavior for good Muslims, how others—both Western and Malaysian, Muslim and non-Muslim—have lost their way and become seduced by money and earthly pleasures. At times, he is serious; at other times droll—especially when referring to UMNO or the West, which seem equally misguided to him. (*Asiaweek* July 28, 2006:2-3)

The lectures proved to be an edifying and effective way to amplify the positive aspects of the religion as a moral society obligation toward understanding the basic of *sharia* for the service of the oneness of God [*tawhid*] (see Ayubi 1991). As Husam PAS member explains, “The basic credo is to transform Kelantan into a place where Muslims live by the Qur’an; side by side with non-Muslims who may, discreetly, live as they please” (Husam quoted in *Asiaweek* July 28, 2006:3). Unlike any other UMNO-controlled states, these religious activities beyond UMNO’s state religious control are tested and serve to reinforce a clear message clarifying how PAS amplified religious beliefs and values of a moral society where it was considered essential in a PAS pre-election strategy.

As an example, a *New Straits Times* commentator wrote that as part of the battle for crucial Chinese votes in the general election due the next year, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was sending its representatives from

Kelantan to tell the Chinese across the country about life under PAS (*NST* November 27, 1998). The move was aimed at countering a plan by MCA to stop the Chinese from supporting the Muslim party by portraying a negative picture of life under PAS. This made sense because MCA is a component of the *Barisan Nasional* (BN) coalition, and PAS was hitting back by organizing a Charismas holiday tour to Kelantan and Trengganu for Chinese people in Kedah (Mahathir's parliamentary seat), a state PAS hoped to capture in the 1999 election. In organizing trips to Kelantan as part of a pre-election strategy, local PAS leader Mahful Omar told the *New Straits Times*, "It's just an opportunity for the Chinese to see the truth about PAS rule in Kelantan" (*NST* November 27, 1998). UMNO Kedah Chief Minister Razak Zain described the PAS tour as a desperate ploy to win votes. An organizer told the *New Straits Times* that the aim of the tour was to show the Chinese that the PAS government in Kelantan practices religious tolerance and did not interfere with the culture and lifestyle of the non-Muslim community (*NST* November 27, 1998).

With the important tactic of institutionalizing the Friday-Saturday weekend in Kelantan (*MK* March 14, 1999), PAS was simultaneously maintaining membership solidarity among PAS group members and providing a forum for recruiting new members. Listeners were encouraged to become involved through the question-and-answer sessions on Islamic-related activities that followed each lecture (*HK* October 7, 1999).

Friday *kuliyah* employed a popular open format and functioned as unofficial religious learning events under the PAS Islamic program for the truly

disadvantaged working and lower classes, who did not fit into the rigid worship of Friday prayers during office hours and Qur'an study on Sunday that required a couple of hours off from a busy work schedule. These *kuliyyah* meetings tended to be more open to the participation of PAS non-member, including non-Muslims. One might argue that the spiritually charged atmosphere of Friday *kuliyyah* may have provided a refreshing alternative to Kelantanese Muslims compared to UMNO's Saturday for family and Sunday for religious service (Qur'an study classes).

Thus, it is reasonable to say that the working family, the students and the poor—alienated from both the rapid economic development and the political process controlled by the UMNO—needed sources of comfort, support, and a hopeful outlook under the PAS rule. In any case, the open format of religious functions and sociopolitical conditions under PAS, combined with PAS's religious rhetoric, had provided PAS political opportunities for the 1999 elections. Islam revitalized for the adherence of *adeen* (way of life) must operate under conditions that demand not just religious rhetoric or religious framing but also doctrinal reinvention by PAS leaders. After all, the lectures were at once religious and political. One might liken Nik Aziz's Friday *kuliyyah* to University Politics Terbuka (Open University of Politics), as the right place to obtain insightful analysis of Nik Aziz's *tafsir* (interpretation), normally from the Qur'an verses and collection of Hadish (Noor 2003). The lectures made no distinction between Kelantan as "the Verandah of Mecca" and the "university of politics." Nik Aziz stated:

This “university of politics” which we’ve begun to open in Kelantan now is not covetous of certificates, is not covetous of any kind of qualification. It is only desirous of consciousness, desirous of understanding that is so deep as to reach the next world. (1995:42)

Like a regular university, Nik Aziz’s lectures are not just for Islamic discourse but also aim to establish shared understanding of a problem or issue that can be used to mobilize society in pursuit of electoral success (see *Asiaweek* July 28, 2006). As applied to social movements, framing involves both the construction of interpretative frames and their representation to others (Goffman 1974; Snow and Benford 1992). Therefore, Nik Aziz’s lectures may be viewed as a framing not only as an aid to Islamic political discourse and interpreting events but also to promote strategic advantage in the 1999 elections.

Islamic Governance and Moral Economy

Nik Aziz not only invited people to come and observe but also to have a dialogue with the State Government. Under PAS, the Kelantan administrative system is ruled through *hisbah* or ombudsmen. In accordance with *sharia* law, non-Muslims must pay *kharaj* as a land tax. *Kharaj* is the land tax paid by non-Muslims, just like a *zakat* is contributed by Muslims (*MK* November 22, 1998). Nik Aziz Nik Mat, widely respected spiritual and traditional leader (*ulama*), PAS vice president Haji Hadi (also a PAS *ulama*), and other PAS officials complained that pro-UMNO media portrayed *kharaj* as something antagonistic to non-Muslims, while PAS argued that *kharaj* is preferable to the federal taxation system, stating, “If we were given the chance to implement an Islamic state, I think non-Muslims will find that sort of administration is better than that of the federal level” (*HK* June 14, 1997). The *hisbah* is also tasked to look into

complaints made by the people and probe any abuse of power by the State Government (*MK* November 22, 1998).

More importantly, PAS's use of religion as a vehicle for recruitment plays a critical role in the expansion and maintenance of the membership rolls. When Nik Aziz was asked, "Was UMNO correct in saying PAS used religion to oppose progress?" he replied:

If I don't want progress, what is the point of my being head of the government? . . . It would be better if I were a leader of prayers teaching the Quran to children. When I am tired, I sleep, and whatever happens outside the prayer room, let it be. . . . But I am head of the government, I search for funds, I prepare the budget. My offices work, my friends in government think of way to carry out progress. The only difference between us [PAS] and them [UMNO] is that the progress we bring is progress that saves the people from this world. I wouldn't have anything to do with progress that can be brought by money if, with the money, comes God's wrath. (1995:102-103)

Under PAS rule, Kelantan is an example of the right path in understanding Islamic governance and the moral economy that envisions an acceptance of a lower standard of material existence. As *MalaysiaKini* has observed, Nik Aziz lived modestly in his own house, close to and accessible to his community. He reduced his salary and official allowances, and limited the use of his official car. Other members of the State Executive Council took a 10% salary reduction and contributed to various funds (*MK* August 10, 1999). Nik Aziz also exhorted civil servants to adopt "the spirit of contract, not a spirit of salaried work" (1995:13). Faced with the state's continued poor condition—framed by PAS as federal neglect due to Kelantan's opposition status—Nik Aziz comments:

Praise be to God, we can develop by *muafakat jimat cermat* [thrift by consensus] and *gotong royong* [mutual aid]. . . . That's why I've always maintained that Kelantan's being short of money doesn't really matter as long as the people support [the government]. The people's support is like money. We are prepared to carry out *gotong royong*, to establish *wakaf* [organizations for public benefit] . . . build small roads . . . build small mosques . . . build small prayer rooms. The

gotong royong practiced by the people of Kelantan is clear proof that they love the present government. (1995:48)

This is the consistent framing of the religious system that Nik Aziz and other PAS leaders created. From the above quote—simple and yet politically loaded at the same time—one concludes that PAS’s Islamic policies brought a balance of materiality and spirituality to its governance. From the 1999 news media shift, one would also conclude that PAS’s rule had been free of corruption. Therefore, it is no surprise Nik Aziz would elevate Kelantan as a model state: “We Muslims, particularly we Malays, more particularly we Kelantanese, and even more so we who live in a state whose government is based upon Islam as way of life” (1995:10). This construction is positive from a frame resonance perspective, as Benford (1993) point outs:

The factors that affect the mobilizing potency of frame include the extent to which the framing is congruent with the audiences’ observations, experiences, and cultural knowledge. The focus here is on how a movement’s diagnoses and prognoses should be presented so as to strike a responsive chord and mobilize people to take action of the movement. (P. 669)

PAS claims that guided by the basic norms of god’s *sharia* (divine law) for the service of the oneness of God (*tawhid*) based on Islamic beliefs and values (see Ayubi 1991), its leaders are untouched by corruption. As Abdul Hamid (2003a) argues, “PAS’s fierce assaults against government policies criticized injustices of the New Economic Policy and oppressive legislation, shed [cast] doubts on cosmetic Islamization and raised concern at the lack of initiatives to tackle rising problems of corruption and more decadence” (pp. 81-82). Similarly, Syed Husin Ali, president of the Malaysia people party (PRM) and *Barisan Alternatif* member, added:

Let us not forget one thing. There is equal need to be concerned about the common people at large, especially the socioeconomically, disadvantaged, exploited, and discriminated who come from the lower and middle classes of various groups that cut across race and religion. (November 22, 1999:15)

PAS newspaper *Harakah* argued that since federal funding for large-scale infrastructure projects lay beyond PAS's control, the federal government should not say that it is the champion in the economic race and then place the Kelantan state government under restrictive conditions (*HK* September 17, 1998). Away from economic issues, governance meant demonstrating the quality of an Islamic leadership that did not separate religion from politics. As PAS vice president Abdul Hadi Awang argued:

It is our conviction and commitment that Islam offers justice and equality to all, irrespective of race, beliefs and culture, it is also our conviction that Islam, as much as possible, be the basis of governance and government in the Kelantan states that we are administering. (*NST* October 28, 1999:4)

The candid and accessible lifestyle of PAS leaders was widely recognized and had an undeniable influence on public opinion (Liow 2004). As PAS member *ustab* Abdul Aziz Abbas said, "What we want is a balanced development between the physical and the spiritual" (*NST* October 28, 1999:4). Chandra Muzaffar, KeADILan vice president, agreed that "PAS's attitude is, needless to say, in harmony with Islamic teaching" and points out that "it is a fundamental tenet of the Islamic faith that the rights of non-Muslims living in the midst of a Muslim community should be protected" (*Aliran* November 1999, Issue 11:23).

However, the question remained: How long could Kelantan remain an open, tolerant place? (*Aliran* November 1999, Issue 11: 24).

Sharia Success in Kelantan and Islam as *adeen* in Progress

There is one simple fact: Since taking over the State of Kelantan in 1990, PAS had followed its election platform and, step by step, implemented its Islamism proposal. From the PAS administration based on concept of Islam as *adeen* would come regulations, restrictions and prohibitions. For example, PAS introduced a list of regulations that it says will help the northern Malaysia state enhance its Islamic image. From posters at cinema halls to dress codes for women, the rules have to be strictly adhered to at all times (*MK* September 13, 1999). PAS banned gambling and casinos, forbade the sale of alcohol to Muslims and restricted it for non-Muslims. Theater shows, dances, beauty contests, and song festivals required permission from the state. Disco, karaoke lounges, and unisex hair salons were curtailed. For women, the wearing of *tudung* or headscarf was strongly encouraged (*HK* June 7, 1995). One of the newest directives also required all pictures of women displayed on advertisements and billboards to be in headscarves. Pictures of unscarfed women—even ethnic Chinese—were covered up on billboards. PAS also mandated gender-based checkout counters in supermarkets. So if anyone has a chance to visit Kelantan, do not be surprised that all supermarkets in Kelantan have two payment counters to separate male and female customers (*MK* October 5, 1999).

PAS's Islamization proposals from the 1990 election have gradually been implemented with some still in progress. The bottom line is that as a *MalaysiaKini* editorial argued on October 1, 1999, PAS has raised the stakes of

the Islamization race to a level where it thinks UMNO cannot respond. In an interview with *MalaysiaKini*, Abdul Hadi explained:

In Islam, certain aspects of the teachings remain unchanged, such as the concept of *haram* (forbidden) and *halal* (allow). There are, of course, things which can change according to time. But if we were to say all teachings are subject to changes, the religion will go adrift. So the rivalry between UMNO and PAS revolves around the differences over the implementation of *sharia*? Yes. But UMNO is only doing what has inherited from the British colonial government, seeing Islam the way it was interpreted by the British. UMNO has helped strengthen this and did not make many changes. (*MK* November 22, 1999:21)

UMNO's failure to take up PAS's challenge to introduce and enforce Islamic law nationally was, in turn, exploited by PAS: On October 1 1999, *Harakah* claims this as "proof" that UMNO cannot match PAS's Islamic ambitions. All in all, according to *The Star* newspaper commentator M. G. Pilai:

Religious tolerance is excellent. There are many Buddhist temples in Kelantan, and a lesser number of churches and Hindu temples. I have never heard of any undue local authority obstruction to construction of non-Muslim places of worship or demolition of non-Muslim temples (for violating planning regulations), which definitely happens in UMNO-controlled states. PAS state government is actually relatively clean and straightforward to deal with. You may not like some of their regulations, but they are open about what they are about. There is much less of the under-the-table monkey business you find when dealing with UMNO types. (*Star* November 13, 1999:6)

But in the midst of this, the complexities of *sharia* and the finer points of *sharia*'s economic, administrative, and cultural political concerns have been eclipsed by sensational rhetoric talk about *hudud* punishments instead.

Sharia and hudud Law

As the 1999 election approached, the religious themes of an Islamic state, *sharia* and *hudud* law, prominent in the 1990 election issues, once again took center stage and dominated newspaper coverage in the 1999 election debates between PAS and UMNO. PAS leaders argued:

Islam is not only a religion but also a way of life (*adeen*), based on an elaborate framework of concepts; specifically, it is belief and law (*akidah wa shariah*), religion and state (*din wa daulah*), and a system of values which bring spiritual and temporal affairs together (*din wa dunia*). (HK October 7, 1999:5; see also Islamic State Documents)

As mentioned earlier, it would be technically difficult for PAS to establish *hudud* law in Kelantan. After PAS won in 1990, the party presented the Kelantan parliament with draft proposals for the introduction of *hudud* criminal law. Each time, however, PAS's motions were defeated on technical grounds: Kelantan laws are subordinate to the federal constitution; therefore, *hudud* legislation could not be implemented without federal amendments, which require a two-thirds majority vote. Of course, as long as UMNO is in legislative control, such amendments will never pass (Liow 2004). A similar platform was put forward by PAS leaders during the 1999 election. By that time, *hudud* and apostasy Islamic *sharia* law were not new concepts; nevertheless, they were perplexing for non-Muslims and moderate Muslims. In general, as PAS Member of Parliament Dr. Syed Azman Syed Ahmad told the *New Straits Times*:

We are debating the bill with expected opposition from UMNO, it can be passed after three days. But the critics are harping on the technicalities, which we have been willing to listen and amend. For us, implementing the *hudud* is our obligation as a Muslim political party and it is enshrined in our constitution. (NST July 7, 1999:5)

As a result, PAS has never implemented *hudud* law, knowing it would face threats and a legal action by the federal government (NST October 5, 1996). To further push the issue of *hudud* and the hope for implementation on Malaysian soil, Nik Aziz was quoted as saying, "There is no hurry. If you cannot carry a sack of rice because it is too heavy, you do not give up and leave it. You carry it bit by bit" (NST October 5, 1996:17). Another PAS leader, Husam Hussein,

vowed to push ahead with *hudud*: “We have come to a red light, but that doesn’t mean we turn off the engine” (*NST* October 12, 1999:3).

In fear of the possibility of *hudud* law enactment, the large Chinese and Indian minorities in Kelantan rallied behind UMNO to preserve their multiethnic coalition and oppose PAS’s idea of an Islamic state. In response to mounting criticism, Nik Aziz Nik Mat pronounced during a party news conference in *Kota Bharu*, the state capital, “Such religious laws are meant only for Muslims, and the non-Muslims in the state need not fear because the laws are not applicable to them. They can choose to be bound by civil law” (*Star* September 27, 1999:18). Despite strong opposition from UMNO, PAS vice president Abdul Hadi reframed the issues at the party’s 36th Congress: “Non-Muslims who fear the implementation of *hudud* have been misled by our political enemies” (*MM* September 1-14, 1999:2). Knowing that *sharia* law is difficult for non-Muslims to understand—particularly the *hudud* and apostasy—Nik Aziz took pains to reiterate the distinction for all Malaysian voters as the election drew even closer:

If we become the federal government, we would enact *hudud* law for the Muslims, as they would understand that this law comes from Allah. The non-Muslim would be free to choose between the civil law or the Islamic law. (*Star* November 17, 1999:4)

PAS reiterated that it takes a truly Islamic party to implement *hudud* law and the Islamic state, which they would do when democratically elected to any state legislature or when they formed the majority in Parliament (*HK* September 12, 1999). Nik Muhammad Zawawi Salleh (PAS State Legislature) contended, “If you want God’s law, it won’t be through UMNO. We keep hearing we can’t have *hudud* laws because we live in a multiethnic country and that we must

separate religion from politics; but a Muslim politician is bound to uphold all aspects of Islam” (*NST* September 17, 1999:7). PAS member of parliament Dr Syed Ahmad told the *New Straits Times* that “*sharia* criminal law is intended more at educating society with the greatness of the law to invoke fear on criminals so that they would stop and repent and to deter would-be criminals from becoming criminals” (*NST* September 24, 1999:4).

For Nik Aziz, it is simply unthinkable not to have such punishments on the books. Quoted in *The Star*, he said, “An Islamic state must be guided by Qur’an and the Hadith. If we do not have *hudud*, what kind of an Islamic state are we?” (*Star* April 21, 1999:2). Western horror, he thinks, is misplaced. “On drugs, we are very tough: We have the death penalty, and you don’t mind at all. But when we propose the cutting off of hands, you get very upset. Yet chopping hands isn’t as serious as taking someone life” (*Star* April 21, 1999:2).

BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM

In an interview with *MalaysiaKini* one week before the election, PAS Deputy President Abdul Hadi Awang spoke his mind on democracy, elections, and the party vision of an Islamic state. In this same interview with *MalaysiaKini*, he explained that even in an Islamic state, there are individual rights that ought to be respected:

People are free to practice their religion, culture, and lifestyle as long as these do not affect other communities. Muslims cannot disrupt the rights of the non-Muslims. This is a democratic space advocated in the religion. PAS should have been given the opportunity in Kelantan to realize the Islamic state. But we were denied the opportunity. To date, non-Muslims have been satisfied with the PAS state governments, including our decision to ban gaming outlets. A majority of the non-Muslims find it acceptable in their own religions for such a decision. People can come here to have a look for themselves or have dialogue with the state government. (*MK* November 22, 1999:21)

This is the beauty of Islam: It imposes Islamic laws only after the people are fully informed, as Saliha Yahya, independent newspaper writer for

MalaysiaKini, stated on November 7, 1999:

Malaysia is a democracy. If the people choose to vote for PAS and choose *hudud*, whether you approve of it or not does not really matter, and should not matter. They won't be if they can raped with impunity, though I have to say I really would be very shocked if rape skyrocketed in Trengganu. I don't think that the only reason a place is safe is fear of arrest. This always comes up-the old "raped with impunity" speech. The idea behind *hudud* is to give more severe punishment to try to keep crime down. If it works, then I'm all for it. If it doesn't work, surely the problem is in the implementation, and not the Qur'an? (P. 8)

By the same token, on an earlier occasion, PAS vice president Abdul Hadi assured individual states that, should PAS come to power, they could exercise their prerogative on matters concerning an Islamic state. In reframing the PAS message, PAS party president Hadi Awang gave a speech to express his belief that the tenets and practices of Islam are fundamentally compatible with democracy (*HK* September 14, 1999:23). As a matter of fact, he asserted that PAS was the larger opposition political party with a long record of peace and active participation in Malaysia's quasi-democratic system.

While Hadi Awang's comments seem sincere, one must look at the some aspects of what Islamism means by "democracy." The concept of the Islamic state has roots with Islamic political philosophies such as al-Banna, Syed Quth, and Maulana Maududi—all meant as a "cure" for the influences and damage done by Western society. Central to the concept of an Islamic state is strict implementation of *sharia* governance (including *hudud* criminal law) (Liow 2004; Esposito 1983).

Fundamental disagreements remain among Muslim political thinkers regarding the question of divine versus popular sovereignty (Abootalebi 1999). Sayyid Qutb believes that “the Islamic state must be based on the Quranic principle of consultation of *surah* [on the interpretation of *sharia*] and that the Islamic law of *sharia* is complete as a legal and moral system so that no further legislation is possible or necessary” (Esposito 1983:436). As Hussein (2002) explains, “The consensus among Islamic that preponderantly been toward the compatibility thesis,” which emphasizes the Islamic concept of *shura* (consultation), *ijma* (consensus), *iljihad* (interpretation) and *maslaha* (public interest) (P. 78). Thus, Hadi (2002) states that:

Although democracy is a creation of the West, not of Islam, and is full of pronounced weaknesses and deviations, Islam accepts the liberties and rights conferred by democracy and profit from them in order to express the teachings of Islam, conduct *dakwah*, enjoin righteousness, and prohibit sin. (P. 23)

It becomes clear that PAS cannot rule Malaysia without the support of non-Muslims; this delicate situation means that an Islamic social movement has to work with a non-Muslim political party without abandoning its Islam state objective. PAS acknowledges that the rights of minorities would not be ignored within an Islamic state (*HK* October 7, 1999). Given that pronouncement—that PAS framed itself as a reformist party that represents all ethnic groups, Muslim and non-Muslim alike—the issue mobilized the non-Muslim community to vote in the 1999 election. For instance, Martinez, a non-Muslim, praised PAS:

It is perhaps significant that in their fidelity to the concept of an Islamic state, PAS is the party that represents political Islam in Malaysia that has given non-Muslims more rights in fundamental issues, even as it has taken away others such as drinking alcohol in public and closing down unisex hair salons. (Liow 2004:188; see also Martinez 2002)

Specifically, in the 1999 election, PAS makes it clear that the party guarantees four kinds of rights to non-Muslims: “The right of religion; they will never be forced to embrace Islam. [They will have] the freedom to speak their mother tongue. They are entitled to their own customs and dress. And they can do business without any interference” (*Star* October 12, 1990:12). So, according to PAS, there is no contradiction between democracy and Islam.

PAS AND THE IMPACT OF ANWAR IBRAHIM SAGA

Frames are important to social movement participation; for an issue to have mobilizing potential, the frame must succeed in characterizing such a social problem as injustice (Snow and Benford 1992). A major contributing factor in PAS’s religious frame in the 1999 election came about as they took advantage of a scandal caused by UMNO’s handling of the Anwar case. The PAS Islamic framing was clear in Anwar’s sacking: Apart from mobilizing its group members for political gain, PAS believed that the sodomy charges against Anwar should have been tried under Islamic law. Mahathir, who is considered Muslim himself, rejected PAS’s requests to try Anwar under Islamic law (see “UMNO Response” later in this chapter). In response, PAS President Tuan Guru Hadi Awang stated in November 1999, “PAS would define the UMNO government’s Islamization as cosmetic, long on symbolism but short on substance” (*MK* November 12, 1999:2).

PAS took advantage of the Anwar issue to increase its membership by broadening the range of attitudes and amplifying the concerns encompassed in its frame. PAS leaders who condemned the UMNO persecution of Anwar

Ibrahim recognized the need to promote a sense of solidarity within Muslims and non-Muslims, and they were willing to construct new group boundaries to mobilize society. One of the most important measures taken by PAS was its alignment with other opposition groups that shared their attitudes about Anwar Ibrahim's case. PAS gained a new alliance with the Chinese through the introduction of the *Reformasi* reform movement by Anwar Ibrahim and, later, the Malaysian National Justice Party (KeADILan) headed by Anwar's wife.

In the previous election, UMNO was the only party that was winning the hearts and minds not only of the majority Malay-Muslim electorate but also the non-Muslim voters of Malaysia. However, all that was about to change. On July 2, 1999, at meetings held in attendance by a new coalition of PAS, KeADILan, DAP, and the socialist party *Rakyat Malaysia* (PRM), concerns about social justice in Malaysia were agreed upon, and these four groups combined to conduct a campaign under a common *Barisan Alternatif* (BA) manifesto. Their first order of business was to nominate Anwar as leader (*MK* July 5, 1999:11-12).

PAS AND BARISAN ALTERNATIF RELIGIOUS FRAMING

For the first time in Malaysian political history, PAS identified fault lines in society without bias of race, gender, or religion (*MK* August 12, 1999). This suggests that, because of the Anwar case, PAS had become an essential force in the development of Malaysian society and perhaps was able to retain its membership support base—even expand it—by involving new members from multi-religious and multicultural Malaysia society.

Mahathir's approach to governance became more authoritarian and was surrounded by a "culture of corruption" (nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, and big spending), so PAS and its BA political coalition began identifying sources of the problems facing the country and society. Personal criticism of Mahathir was accompanied by the labeling of most major Malaysian public institutions—the judiciary, the police, the anticorruption agency, the bureaucracy in general, including the media—as corrupt in their business dealings. For example, the resignation of Chief Justice Yahya Saled was crucial to PAS and BA, as they claimed the action was orchestrated simply because the chief justice refused to dance to Mahathir's political tune (*MK* September 11, 1999). Since the state failed to respond by solving these real political problems, the movement's members were emboldened to press their challenges publicly and actively (see della Porta and Diani 1999).

However, neither PAS nor any factions of the BA proposed solutions to these problems; instead, they established a pattern of antigovernment activity and rhetoric by undermining and attacking the government institutions. PAS and BA saw no justice in the current Malaysian political system. They presented the Chief Justice's resignation as evidence of how corrupt the government had become in its unconstitutional policies and practices (*HK* September 19, 1999). This is one example of instances in which individuals or groups perceived injustice either to themselves or others with whom they were sympathetic (McAdam 1982; Gamson 1992).

PAS and BA claimed that the Malaysian economic crisis of 1997 was directly linked to Mahathir's emphasis on mega-projects, privatization, "bailouts" of selected private firms, awarding of government projects without public tender, and partnerships between the government and favored companies. Most of these issues were labeled "government weaknesses" to demonstrate the claim of the country's failure to be more supportive of democracy (*MK* September 27, 1999), PAS and BA called for immediate attention to and solutions for the problems.

With the active participation of opposition and independent newspapers such as *Harakah/Muslimedia*, *MalaysiaKini*, and *Aliran Monthly*, and through the Internet, issues of government corruption received much broader attention and public scrutiny. It seemed that everyone in the country had a story to tell about the Mahathir government. On October 25 and as part of its proposed solution to the problem, the coalition launched BA's manifesto frame titled "Toward a Just Malaysia" (*MK* October 26, 1999). The group promised the public that, if PAS and BA won the coming election, they would implement broad areas of their manifesto frame:

1. A more equitable, transparent and efficient economy.
2. Reorganization of the privatization program.
3. Improvement of the environment.
4. More assistance for education, health, and social welfare.
5. Rehabilitation of Malaysia's international image.
6. Enhanced democracy and political transparency.

Additionally, the BA coalition promised free and independent inquiry into the media, independence for bodies such as the Anti-Corruption Agency and the Election Commission, strengthened election institutions, an annual public declaration of assets by elected representatives, and limited tenure for the prime minister and *menteri besar* (Chief Ministers) to two terms (*MK* October 26, 1990:1-2). The BA manifesto stressed a fair distribution of wealth in Malaysian society in the following manner:

It is more important to build houses, hospitals, schools, and universities than to waste on unproductive mega-projects. It is more fitting to help rubber and palm oil stakeholders as well as workers rather than bailing out corporate cronies and their big corporations. It is more important to concentrate on reducing prices of low- and medium-cost houses, hospital charges, and university fees rather than enriching relatives and friends of the UMNO leaders through big contracts and allocation of shares. (*MK* October 28, 1999:3)

On the surface, the BA manifesto was impressive, but it raised some serious questions so far unanswered. What about the PAS framework concept of “belief and law” (*akidah wa sharia*)? What about “religion and state” (*din wa dunia*)? Would PAS abandon those ideas that they had been trying to implement in Malaysia for some time? Failure to answer these questions might jeopardize PAS’s chances in the election. Nik Aziz Nik Mat reframed the issues:

The idea of creating an Islamic state in Malaysia is very much alive even if it is not mentioned specifically in the common manifestos of the opposition alliance, *Barisan Alternatif*. . . . There are areas in the manifestos which allow the promotion of Islamic values and way of life that are acceptable to all. (*NST* November 22, 1999:21)

Regarding the 1999 election, decisions made by PAS leaders to align with BA in regard to the relationships between PAS religious framing and its support bases proved to be a critical element in the trajectory of the Islamic movement. In this context, Nik Aziz reframed the PAS commitment to Islamic values:

If PAS successfully retains power in Kelantan, he [Nik Aziz], *like in the 1990 election, once again is very determined* to turn Kelantan into a model Islamic state and pledges to introduce more reforms, the *hudud* laws that spell out punishment for certain criminal offenses, and laws on apostasy. He stresses to non-Muslim that “such religious laws are only meant for Muslims. The non-Muslim in the state need not fear because the laws are not applicable to them. They can choose to be bound by the civil law.” (MK November 22, 1999:21; emphasis added)

To support his claims and restore public confidence in Islamic rule, Nik Aziz framed the example by quoting a Chinese businessman in Kelantan who praised the PAS-led state government in a November 17, 1999, article in the *Asian Times*:

There is no problem for the Chinese non-Muslim doing business under the PAS rules. I have been staying here selling alcohol for many years and have not encountered any problem. Rules like an alcohol ban are imposed on Muslims but not non-Muslims. (MM November 14-28, 1999:3)

At other times, Nik Aziz was quoted as saying, “Everyone knows we are an Islamic party. Our policy is based on Islam. But in order to get closer to the non-Muslims and to topple a cruel government, we agree to drop our demand for Islamic state” (NST November 17, 1999:15). Now, suddenly, it was Nik Aziz—the charismatic, resolute, “never give in” leader when it came to Islamic issues—who found himself explaining how he could reject a position one moment and embrace it the next. The most effective frames are usually located from those who are inside the movement’s constructed boundaries (Snow and Benford 1988). In fact, most politicians, regardless of their religious background, change positions from time to time, although none would characterize it as “flip-flop,” as opponents would label it. In Nik Aziz’s case, he sometime openly acknowledged a shift, such as his position on Islamic state issues, attributing the shift to evolving conditions at the time.

For political gain, it may sometimes be judicious to adjust or abandon a certain frame to influence people from outside one's boundaries. What Nik Aziz did here seems reasonable for two reasons: First, as a PAS leader, he was willing to advance the PAS agenda to win the hearts and minds of non-Muslims, even though he had to temporarily disregard PAS organizational objectives. Despite tactical verbal renunciation, PAS has never abandoned its strategic objective for an Islamic state or the positions and issues where they stand (*MM* November 1-14, 1999). Second, Nik Aziz was attempting to bring unconnected groups into the PAS structure in a way that would be more conducive to collective action. After all, the most important component of boundary construction may be an individual who is open to new ideas, facing a movement message, accepting the movement ideology, and then being ready for value changes.

UMNO'S RESPONSE TO ANWAR ISSUES

This discussion examines UMNO's rhetoric responding to the PAS/BA attack rhetoric prior to November 29 election. Clearly, the key issue in the national elections in 1999 was the persecution of Anwar Ibrahim in his 1998 ouster, as he was expelled from UMNO and then jailed when he began to campaign against the Mahathir government. As Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argue, "A countermovement may shape organizational inertia by creating urgent needs for tactical responses and, hence, structural changes" (P. 1649).

In response to support among the Malay community, Mahathir and his government needed to frame Anwar Ibrahim's personal character as part of the

political assassination of Anwar. It has been reported that, because of the Anwar issue, the erosion of UMNO's support among Malays threatened UMNO's dominant position in the National Front coalition, which thereby weakened Mahathir's grip on the party and a backlash against his leadership.

As the head of UMNO and the federation, Mahathir had enough media support to attack Anwar. In speech after speech, he was not reticent in his counterframing attack. First, using the pro-government *New Straits Times*, Mahathir accused Anwar of being "a puppet of foreign power and institutions such as the Monetary Fund, out to re-colonize Malaysia" (September 26, 1998:1-2). Furthermore, he claimed that Anwar and his supporters—and only they—were guilty of corruption and cronyism. He portrayed Anwar as a liar and an agitator who had been detained in 1974 for these same reasons and was now returning to his old ways. The 1974 reference was long before Anwar joined UMNO in 1982. Anwar had been arrested under ISA for participating in political protests against the government. Mahathir counterframed by discrediting how Anwar had managed the country's economy, accusing him of being a puppet of the IMF and failing to have in impact on the public. Mahathir's attack was an obvious attempt to shift attention from the claims against himself and instead focus on the charges against Anwar's Islamic values.

Mahathir argued that there was evidence to suggest that Anwar was homosexual and an adulterer. Clearly, the state-controlled media were effective in presenting negative images of Anwar in a light favorable to the Mahathir government's political interests. Speaking to members of the women's wing of

UMNO, Mahathir said, “I had to act swiftly against his former deputy to ensure that the country is not led by an immoral leader” (*NST* September 26, 1998:5).

Mahathir warned voters not to vote based on emotion. “We hold elections not to let out steam or anger” (*NST* November 28, 1999:2). He seemed to overlook that identities have an emotional component in politics or in social movement activism (Berezin 2000; see also Benford 1997).

UMNO’S RESPONSE TO PAS

PAS tried to turn Kelantan into a viable model of theocratic rule, while UMNO had been actively promoting itself as the defender of Islam. At the federal level, part of UMNO’s strategy was to influence the Malay population toward progressive Islam. The Mahathir administration introduced the Islamic Research Institute, finance system, and also create an Islamic department—JAKIM (*Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia* or Department for Advancement of Islam), managed through the Prime Minister’s office and equipped with its own minister and secretariat. These initiatives clearly had one goal: countering PAS’s influences (Liow 2004).

What UMNO has done is nothing new; it has been part of the practice throughout the Muslims’ secular control. Ayubi (1991) offers an insight into this kind of trend:

The point to be emphasized here is that rulers did not become authoritarian because their ruler was inspired by certain essential tenets of Islam; rather, the Islamic theory of politics was developed gradually and piecemeal (and mainly in response to social and ideological opposition from the various protest movements) by jurists who played the role of the ideologues of rulers. The rulers were in control of the producers and of the economic surplus in their society and looking increasingly for an ideological rationale to legitimise their control of people and resources. (P. 17)

Mahathir asserts that the need is for Islamic issues to be separated from politics. In his comments on Islamic law, such as the law that requires adult men to wear a beard, Mahathir joked that the Prophet did not shave because there were no Gillette razors at the time (*NST* September 30, 1999). Earlier, in his remarks to the UMNO Youth assembly at Putra World center in Kuala Lumpur from July 11 to 13 1999, Mahathir offered three positive invocations:

1. "Islam can survive on earth only if Muslims are economically and military robust." Here, he refers to Islam as a source of motivation for economic striving.
2. "Islam can survive on earth only if Muslims are obedient to God's command." Here, he refers to Islam as the antidote to the temptations of Western-style materialism and the erosion of political obedience that would occur precisely if Malaysia achieved rapid economic growth and socioeconomic transformation of Malays.
3. "Islam as a basis for a public service ethic in the bureaucracy, and social responsibility in society generally." In the meantime, Mahathir condemns deviationist teachings. (*NST* July 11, 1999:11)

Later, when asked what constitutes deviationist teachings, Mahathir explained, "If someone says voting for PAS is an Islamic vote and you will go to heaven, this is certainly contrary to Islamic teaching" (*NST* October 17, 1999:18). According to Mutalib (1994), "In 1991, 70 groups were declared by the government to be 'deviating from Islamic teaching'" (P. 169). Of course, PAS denied making that claim; the closest PAS came to such a claim was during a

dinner speech by Nik Aziz, who told the audience, “In heaven, you need *pahala* [reward from God for good deeds], so you should vote for the party that bring you *pahala*” (*HK* September 22, 1999). On another occasion, PAS vice president Hadi had warned voters, “People who choose this kind of government [UMNO] are responsible to Allah in the next world” (*NST* October 3, 1999:2).

For Mahathir, a fundamentalist Islamic state did not mean that the Malaysian Constitution had to change to become more Islamic or that PAS-inspired criminal laws had to be adopted. He urged voters to turn away from unjust laws proposed by PAS in the name of the religion. He argued that the debate on Malaysia as a Muslim country need not continue, stating firmly, “There is no necessity to amend the Constitution to make Malaysia a Muslim country. We already are a Muslim country” (*NST* November 22, 1999:1-3).

As a secularist albeit Muslim country, Mahathir declared that he would not allow Kelantan to implement *hudud* laws. He also repudiated the Qur’an in a 1999 UMNO Youth convention speech when he told the assembly, “Muslims who had their limbs chopped off for theft would not be able to compete with the rest of the world” (*NST* July 11, 1999:10).

Moreover, a month later, *New Straits Times* quoted Mahathir Mohamad at the opening of the Masja complex at Medan Jaya: “This is not Allah’s law but a law created by man. Man can make amendments to laws introduced by man, but man cannot amend the law of God.” He also urged voters to turn away from unjust laws proposed by PAS in the name of the religion (*NST* August 15, 1999).

On other occasions, such as post-1990 election, Mahathir's comments about the Islamic *hudud* law included: "If the victim of an alleged rape fails to produce 'four just witnesses,' she stands to be punished. If a woman was raped, surely there would be sign of force being used or grounds that she has been forced into it." Mahathir framed the question, "Are we to ignore all these pieces of evidence simply because the procedure cannot be followed?" Mahathir went deeper in his counterframing attacks against PAS *hudud* law, stating that if *hudud* law were introduced, "There would be many handicapped people as their hands would have been chopped" and "There would be no more stones in the country to build roads as they would all have been used for *rejam* [death by stoning]" (*NST* November 20, 1999:1-3).

Mahathir reiterated that as a Muslim country, Malaysia was fair to all, including non-Muslims (*NST* November 20, 1999). Perhaps UMNO's counterframing tactic was to attack the collective character of a movement group, a reaction to the insecurity UMNO felt because of PAS's political threat. Before the 1999 election, Mahathir maintained that "Malaysia will not become an Islamic state because any attempts to enforce Islamic laws where non-Muslims are the majority would create a problem" (Liow 2004).

UMNO'S RESPONSE TO *BARISAN ALTERNATIF*

On November 14, four days after Mahathir had called for snap elections for parliament and state assemblies, he attacked PAS and its coalition by saying that "they sleep together, but we have a different dream" (*NST* November 14, 1990).

On November 21, 1999, as the election loomed, Mahathir and UMNO's ruling coalition initiated its campaign with full-page advertisements in major newspapers that raised the specter of violence and unrest if the opposition did well in this bitterly fought election. Depicting violence, the advertisements included photographs of small groups—ostensibly *Reformasi* supporters aligned with jailed Anwar Ibrahim—engaging in acts of hooliganism. Like the BA manifestos, UMNO issued its own manifestos. The first was titled “Malaysia—Free, United, and Successful” (*NST* November 22, 1999:1). Many pro-government media ads contained slogans such as “No to Violence” or “Don't Let Anarchy Rule. Vote for Peace and Stability. Vote *Barisan Nasional*” (*NST* November 27, 1999:1-2). *The Star* headline, one day before the election, read, “Vote Opposition and You Vote the Country into Chaos” (November 28, 1999:1). Mahathir, in response to BA opposition to the formation of new political coalitions, argued:

Trust is the element lacking within the *Barisan Alternatif* because parties like PAS and DAP are telling their supporters contradictory stories from what was discussed in their camps. In fact, PAS tells members in Kelantan that it will form as Islamic government once it wins the election, despite the different grounds the oppositions parties stand on. (*NST* October 28, 1999:2)

Moreover, former *Semangat 46* leader Tengku Razaleigh—who allied himself with APU (included PAS and DAP) and helped PAS defeat UMNO in Kelantan in 1990—had rejoined UMNO and was running on the government ticket for the 1999 elections. While campaigning, he commented on some aspects of the upcoming election in an interview with *Asiaweek*:

UMNO may be split, and *Barisan* may appear weak. But it is [actually] strong because it is backed by the government machinery. . . . The police and other agencies are with the government, whether you like it or not. The arm of the

government reaches out right to the grassroots. It's everywhere, ever-present. It's formidable. "You want water? We'll give you water." If the road needs mending, we get it mended within the week. *Barisan* has the money, the organization, and the bodies. I know, because I was in the opposition. (November 12, 1999:33)

At the same time, reflecting on the scale and complexity of the challenges not just from PAS but also from *Barisan Alternatif*, UMNO also attempted to stop PAS's influence to non-Muslim by engaging in *dakwah*, or proselytizing, to non-Muslims. This was accomplished through the establishment the *Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia* (PERKIM), the Muslim welfare organization. PERKIM aired Islamic programs over public radio and television, instituted harsh legislation controlling the construction of non-Muslim religious buildings, and limited the number of plots for non-Muslim burials (Liow 2004).

POST-ELECTION UMNO

Immediately after the 1999 election, a smiling Mahathir dismissed the losses in Terengganu and Kelantan, saying, "We lose some, we win some" (*NST* December 1, 1999). The situation was complicated by Mahathir, as head of state, refusing to accept that any reforms or policy changes were necessary. The initial post-election reaction of most senior UMNO leaders and pro-government analysts was that UMNO *did* need to reform and listen to its constituents' voice (*Star* December 3, 1999). However, Mahathir rejected this analysis, attributing any problems to "Malay ingratitude, lies—spread by Anwar, other BA leaders, the *ulama*, *Harakah* and the Internet—factionalism in UMNO caused by Anwar, and PAS's bribery in promising heaven to their supporters" (*NST* December 12, 1999:13).

Measures to shore up Mahathir's position were many:

1. Install a no-change cabinet.
2. Purge mosque officials.
3. Implement new measures to separate religion and politics.
4. Crack down on all pro-BA publications.
5. Invoke the Sedition Act against three top opposition leaders and the official Secret Act against another.
6. Seek a “no contest” for the top posts within UMNO for the May 2000 primary elections. (*NST* December 12, 1999)

There was considerable disquiet within UMNO over Mahathir’s action frame, with several party veterans speaking against the “no contest” proposal and the media reporting strong opposition. Whether this can be translated into a challenge to either Mahathir or his deputy remains uncertain.

Quite interestingly, after the 1999 election, the MCA still accused PAS of unfair treatment and religious extremism in its plans to introduce Islamic law, which included *hudud* principles prescribing amputation as a form of punishment for theft (*NST* December 11, 1999). As Wong Meng Fong, a Malaysia Chinese Association member and Trengganu politician, comments:

First gambling, then alcohol, then what next? The way we dress? We see nothing wrong having a beer or going to unisex salons and night club. They are imposing their beliefs on us. (*NST* April 3, 1999)

At the same time, after PAS retained Kelantan and ended UMNO’s 40-year hold on Terengganu (see table 7), Mahathir warned PAS and its leaders that they were bound to face hell in the hereafter if they persisted in their threat to implement *hudud* or Islamic code in those two states now controlled by PAS. He added that Islam’s laws are fair, but the version of the *hudud* that PAS

wanted to impose was unfair. “They insult Islam by creating a set of laws that is supposedly Islamic but has no justice. It is clear their laws are unfair” (NST December 16, 1999:26). Responding to PAS’s *hudud* frames, Mahathir idealistically and defensively lectured party delegates at the UMNO general assembly:

If any law formulated by human beings, however learned or pious they might be, resulted in injustice for the people, then such laws were not Islamic. Hence, Muslims must reject such laws drawn up by people with vested interests, which will surely lead to injustice, no matter what they give to such laws. (NST May 11, 2000:10-13)

Table 7

Changes in Government at State Level in Trengganu 1957-1999

Period	Party (Coalition) in Power	Comment
1957-1959	UMNO (Alliance)	Based on 1955 Legislative Council Election
1959-1961	PAS	Victory in first post-Merdeka/ independent election
1962-1964	UMNO (Alliance)	Defections caused fall of PAS government
1964-1999	UMNO (Alliance/BN)	Long UMNO Rule
1999	PAS (<i>Barisan Alternatif</i>)	PAS return on <i>Reformasi</i> wave

Source: Boo Teik Khoo, September 2004. *Searching for Islam in Malaysia politics: Confluences, Divisions and Governance*. Working Paper Series.

Blasting PAS

Much of Mahathir Mohamad's speech that day was spent blasting PAS. He accused all PAS leaders, even the late Fadzil Noor, of having interpreted Islam for their own political interests. Among his remarks:

If the people could see the reality and make appropriate assessments of our performance, obviously they will continue to support us. But today the opposition parties are taking the opportunity from this democracy to spread lies, to incite hatred against our party, and to prevent the people from seeing the truth. If the majority of the people reject the truth, the opposition is convinced that all benefits and development will no longer be appreciated, and the National Front will not be chosen again as the government of this beloved country. . . .

Since PAS was created, its strategies have been focused on inciting hatred for UMNO because they claim UMNO is not Islamic. Even early on, PAS had considered UMNO members as infidels. Even though there are people who were influenced by such falsehood by PAS, until today PAS has not been able to obtain enough votes to rule this country. True, PAS succeeded in capturing Kelantan and Terengganu, but state government is different from federal government. The objective of PAS is to run the federal government. For this, PAS is willing to do anything. If PAS is required to embrace its arch enemy, the DAP, if PAS members have to campaign for the DAP, or to hold up the rocket [a rocket is DAP's party symbol] while chanting "Allah is great," PAS is willing to do so.

Certainly if making allegations that are contrary to the teaching of Islam, such as that God uses four languages, PAS is Islam and Islam is PAS, then other matters are trivial to PAS. The important thing for PAS is to win the general elections. (MK May 12, 2000)

Mahathir spent another section of his speech discussing the Anwar case.

He argued vehemently:

The misfortune of Anwar Ibrahim is a blessing to PAS. Although the PAS leadership knew earlier of the immorality of Anwar, and they used to insinuate this when Anwar was an UMNO leader, yet when he was removed from government for the same reason, PAS closed one eye and pretended to rally for Anwar. The removal and charges against Anwar are claimed to be injustices. To use Anwar's supporters, PAS immediately collaborated with the KeADILan party and willingly joined with people who once ran down or were against PAS's alleged objective, which was to set up an Islamic state. (MK May 12, 2000)

PAS took advantage of the Anwar situation by pointing out the injustice of UMNO's government. PAS accused the government of assault as it posted photos of Anwar with a black eye—though the injury was not the direct fault of

the government. PAS was not particularly sympathetic to Anwar or his being found guilty and imprisoned; it was strictly an opportunity to exploit Anwar's fate in exchange for votes. As Zald and Ash (1996) explain, collective behavior is especially likely to occur under conditions of situational stress. The supporters of Anwar's *Reformasi* appreciated the ways in which structural differentiation contributed to political alienation and collective action. The Anwar case can be understood by considering that collective action framing is a key process that "translates vaguely felt dissatisfaction into well-defined grievances and compels to join the movement to do something about it" (Buechler 2000:41).

PAS accused UMNO of removing Anwar from his position as part of a conspiracy. To clear the air, Mahathir used the same speech to frame questions to the audience:

Is it possible that this conspiracy involved numerous people, involved the victim himself—Anwar Ibrahim—many police officials, public persecutor and their officials, a judge, driver and many others? Is it possible for a conspiracy that involves numerous people [to be kept] from the public for that long? [That] a conspiracy by the prime minister who supposedly did it to destroy Anwar, to charge him in court and later find guilty, was not known to everybody? The accusation of conspiracy is only to pull the wool over the people's eyes as to his wrongdoings. If there is proof of conspiracy, a police report could be made and those who conspired could be changed. (MK May 12, 2000)

Further, Mahathir contended that Anwar's removal was not due to conspiracy. He was sacked not for political reasons but rather for his low morals, which allegedly made him unsuitable to be Prime Minister. Mahathir insisted, "Can I remain silent and allow this kind of person to become the prime minister of this country?" (MK May 12, 2000).

“Malaysia is an Islamic State”

After the 1999 election, Mahathir shifted his religious framing. He retreated from the language of “Malaysia cannot be an Islamic state” to “Malaysia already *is* an Islamic state” (Liow 2004). This change of framing was prompted by PAS’s rise to power in the State of Terengganu as well as Kelantan. The PAS government had again raised the issue of an Islamic state after it won Terengganu. It was then that Mahathir pronounced Malaysia as already being an Islamic state. The power struggle between the state and federal levels increased, as did the tug-of-war between PAS and UMNO for control of Malay politics. Mahathir’s announcement created uneasiness and created renewed interest in the meaning of “Islam as religion of the Federation” (AM March 2002, Issue 3).

Ayubi (1991) wrote about state religion:

Opposition to the State in such circumstances is difficult to communicate in purely oppositional terms. Opposition may therefore take the form of trying to remove the ruling group and to replace it altogether, usually militarily; that is, to take over the “control keys” of the society. Opposition may also take the form of social and ideological protest. Since the State has claimed for itself a religious *raison d’être*, protest movements may also feel tempted to express their opposition in religious terms. . . . The State claims (and often appears) to be the guardian or order against chaos and disintegration, of reason against rationality and stupidity. (P. 29)

The reasons UMNO and BN lost both Kelantan and Trengganu to PAS are not hard to understand. The dramatic loss of Malay support in the 1999 election, as the *New Straits Times* commentator wrote post-election, happened because Anwar was gone. For more than 16 years, UMNO depended largely on Anwar and the machinery of the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) to deliver the Islamic constituency to UMNO. With Anwar gone, this support base turned against the government and became the core of KeADILan (NST

December 13, 1999). UMNO engaged in an Islamic discourse on PAS's terms and allowed PAS to define the political parameters of Islam, while it played a catch-up game that it could never win. Some believe that UMNO, in touting its own Islamic credentials, became hostage to the PAS agenda and framework of Islam because of its own dismal failure to deliver a truly progressive alternative (NST December 8, 1999).

Where does this leave UMNO? Mahathir reiterated that the assumption in many non-Islamic countries that Malays and Malaysia were actually moderate in the exercise of their Islamic faith was altogether unfounded. "We are not moderate Muslims. We are Muslim fundamentalists . . . that is, we are steadfastly holding to the fundamental Islamic teachings" (NST June 20, 2002:2).

The debate on the Islamic state was ongoing, even after the election. As Mahathir described:

What is important is that we know and we are convinced that Malaysia is an Islamic State. If because we are accused of not implementing the *hudud* laws according to their definition, therefore our country is not an Islamic country, this should not reduce our conviction as to the Islamic status of our country. If their conditions have to be met, then today there is no Islamic state in the world. This is because there is not a single country in the world which implements the *hudud* laws according to the definition of this party. We do not reject the true *hudud* laws. We accept them just as we accept all the teachings of Islam. But we know the teachings of Islam are not rigid and so tight that we must carry them out without taking into consideration the surroundings and the consequences. We know under certain conditions we are allowed leeway so that the religion will not be a burden and would hurt us.

If we are ill, if we cannot stand, if we are far from home, in places that are inconvenient we can pray without following the usual physical movements, and we can join two prayers together and shorten them. And this is so also for fasting, giving the tithes and the *Hajj*, all of them according to the conditions which prevail. Even in the declaration of faith, if we are forced by torture we can voice our rejection of the faith as long as in our heart we reject what we had to say. In our heart we remain witness that there is but one God, Allah whom we worship and that the Prophet Muhammad is His Messenger. (NST May 22, 2000:7).

POST-ELECTION PAS AND BA

How can the PAS/BA victory be explained? Three simple answers:

1. PAS's religious framing, especially the exemplar of Kelantan as an Islamic model.
2. The Anwar religious factor that resonated with the public at large.
3. PAS's wise decision to form coalitions with non-Muslims political parties.

The combination of the religious and Anwar factors allowed the opposition to mount a serious challenge to UMNO and its *Barisan Nasional*, creating opportunities to PAS and threats to UMNO.

Prominent in the powerful framing was that no Malaysian-born leader had ever been publicly shamed as had Anwar, contravening not only deeply entrenched Malay values but also Islamic beliefs and values regarding such behavior. While UMNO frames pictured PAS as extreme, fanatical, and backward in its ideology, PAS showed that its political party was flexible in its approach, recognizing that their future depended on working with a wide range of Muslim and non-Muslim interests. Prior to the election, Nik Aziz Nik Mat defended the Islamic state:

There is no compulsion in religion. The life and property of all citizens in an Islamic state are considered sacred whether a person is Muslim or not. Islam is a religion for all people from whatever race or background they might be. The sense of brotherhood and sisterhood is so much emphasized that it overcomes all local attachments to a particular tribe, race, or language. All of which become subservient to the universal brotherhood and sisterhood of Islam. (Translated by AM October 1999:32)

This alliance with Muslim and non-Muslim factions contributed greatly to PAS's cohesion and inspired its members to furthering the Islamic agenda

across multiethnic groups. After the election, the idea of creating an Islamic state in Malaysia was still very much alive for PAS leaders. PAS group members likewise believed that, by cooperating with non-Muslims, Malaysia would very soon become an Islamic state. PAS argued that, unlike UMNO's secularism, PAS gestures were based on the model of the first Islamic state, established in the multicultural society of Medina by the prophet during the *hijrah*, where non-Muslims were accorded freedom of worship and cultural practices, living in harmony with Muslims (Liow 2004).

Analysis of election results indicates that PAS succeeded in winning the 1999 election by distinguishing itself from UMNO by advancing concrete and sufficiently detailed proposals for its realization of Islamic ideas: empowering religious education, Islamic programs that include non-Muslims, and vigilance against political corruption (*NST* December 17, 1999). Also, the PAS strategy of allying itself with the BA may have been successful in part because PAS group members were forced to expand their political influence. PAS Secretary General Nasaruddin Mat Isa framed the issues after the elections in an interview with *MalaysiaKini*:

After November 1999, it was clear that a new political structure came up. PAS has been selected as the alternative. For the first time in history, these elections have proved that ethnic background is not the base of election any more—PAS and [Chinese dominated] DAP sit together in one coalition. PAS is looking for good governance, good government in the sense of justice for all and just distribution of wealth. UMNO spent too much money for itself; it could have given the money for scholarships, for example, and exercised a multiracial distribution, but it didn't. (January 15, 2000:10-20)

A *MalaysiaKini* editorial columnist wrote:

The exact political formula of BA and how it will provide representation to the different interests both for class and ethnic is not clear. But from the available

evidence, there is strong indication that this coalition, given the electoral support, will be able to transcend the narrow ethnic parameter of the present ancient regime. (January 5, 2000:10-12)

The opposition made important gains in the 1999 elections, particularly among Malays and youth, and member parties continued to work as a coalition rather than going their separate ways. The combination of the Anwar issue, the coalition frame construction, and information available from sources such as the Internet likely contributed significantly to BA's success. As the *New Straits Times* wrote on December 8, 1999:

A strong victory would amount to a vindication of all Dr. Mahathir has done, including the dismissal of his former protégé Anwar Ibrahim and the imposition of capital controls in September 1998. Such a scenario would decimate Malaysia's fledgling opposition alliance and reinforce Mahathir's campaign contention that Malaysians want stability. (P. 28)

In fact, the high voter turnout in the 1999 elections can be attributed to BA collective action frames resonating with the critical mass of society. As a *New Straits Times* article on November 28 1999, observed, "As Malaysian go to the polls Sunday, the question isn't whether Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's ruling coalition will win but whether it will hold onto its two-thirds majority in parliament."

In response to Mahathir's earlier claim that Malaysia was already an Islamic state, PAS party Senior Political Advisor Mustapha Ali reported, "The only thing Islamic state about the state of Malaysia now is there are mosques, and there are Moslems here. . . . That does not qualify us to call ourselves an Islamic state" (*MM* October 1-14, 2002; see also Liow 2004).

Not surprisingly, PAS leaders reject that, saying the country's laws fall short of the true teaching of Islam. A PAS legal expert says that "Malaysia is a

Muslim country at best and will not be an Islamic state as long as its constitution remains secular” (*NST* June 2, 2002). A Muslim country refers to one with a majority of Muslims while an Islamic state is a country that implements religious law at all levels of government and society (*NST* June 2, 2002).

The Malays, especially PAS, accused Mahathir of abandoning his Muslim principles (*MK* September 27, 1999). Critics of Mahathir argued that after 46 years of independence, there was not much sign of the teachings of Islam being applied in Malaysia. They claimed that Mahathir began what was known as the *Islamization process* in an effort to ward off the challenge of PAS (*MK* September 27, 1999). KeADILan member Raja Petra Kamarudin comments about the Islamic state issue:

I fully agree with what my Chinese friends tell me. If you Malays yourselves are opposed to Islamic law, how then can you expect we Chinese to accept it? Correct. If the Muslims themselves are divided and opposed to Islamic law, how can you expect the non-Muslims to be comfortable with it? And we should not fault the Chinese for opposing Islamic law, or regard them as enemies of Islam? The fault here falls upon the Muslims, in this case the UMNO Muslims. (*NST* October 28, 2003:11)

On the other hand, some argued that although PAS declared victory in December 1999, it was a victory that involved diluting or even abandoning its *own* religious themes—the same religious themes that helped the movement recruit members in the first place and had been so effective in attracting heartland states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis. There is anecdotal evidence that since PAS began its rule in Kelantan, the Kelantanese Muslims and non-Muslims seemed to be living side by side in harmony. PAS had given non-Muslims more rights in fundamental issues, even though it had taken away other rights such as drinking. Kelantan is still considered the poorest state

in Malaysia. However, Kelantan's socioeconomic achievement must be considered as both a state and federal responsibility since Kelantan remains a unit of the federation. If Kelantan is still backward, it is a failure of federation as well (Ismail 1999).

One year after the 1999 election, *MalaysiaKini* published an exclusive interview with PAS president Fadzil Noor. The interviewer asked whether PAS mellowed when it formed the BA coalition with KeADILan, PRM and DAP—the concern of many, including PAS members. In answer, Noor stated:

The question . . . does not exist in this case. We have stated in the BA manifesto that our ideologies do not change by entering BA. It is just that PAS has always been perceived as an extremist party. If we try to shed the perceived “extremist” image by ourselves, it would be quite difficult. With us joining BA, this perception of us being an extremist is being shed slowly, especially among the non-Muslims. Despite our different ideologies, we work on the same platform of justice and democracy. (*MK* December 15, 2000)

Fadzil Noor reasoned that since UMNO was also faced with internal quarrels, PAS needed to work to attract those who were changing parties. He agreed that the concept of an Islamic state is unclear to Muslims and non-Muslims, acknowledging that it is not a state concept that can be achieved quickly. “The real definition and practice of an Islamic state has been left far behind by the Muslims,” he said. Noor further allowed that Malaysia is composed of many races and religions:

Malaysia cannot be compared to Iran, where a whole new state concept by the government was formed through a revolution. Here, we practice democracy where the government is elected in an electoral process. Only when the *rakyat* [people] agree to the changes can we introduce the concept. . . . Our main concern is more on the question of substance, of living in moderation, basic rights, and justice. (*MK* December 15, 2000)

Also, PAS Secretary General Nasaruddin Mat Isa gave an interview to *MalaysiaKini* that appeared on July 6, 2002, in which he stated:

This idea of an Islamic movement has been an idea accepted and inculcated in the members of the party. We consider ourselves to be an Islamic movement that is actively involved in politics as one of its mediums to achieve its goal. We have huge networking with many Islamic movements throughout the world—and, yes, we consider PAS to be one of the chains of Islamic movements that is functioning in this part of the world. We participate in the process of democracy in Malaysia. We consider the process of democracy that is practice in Malaysia to be one of the means that enables us to function as an Islamic movement and political organization. (P. 7)

Moreover, when asked what kind of relationship PAS has with Anwar Ibrahim, Nasaruddin Mat Isa said:

It's a friendship in the sense that we supported him during his imprisonment, in spite of his being in the government for 17 years, when he was a big enemy to PAS. But when it comes to ill-treatment of a person without fair trail, we put aside those 17 years, and in upholding justice we helped him, and supported him during his six years in prison. That's the nature of the true relationship of Islamic teaching. (P. 7)

Earlier, on April 15, 2001, *MalaysiaKini* also gained an exclusive interview with Fadzil Noor, one of the leaders in the Free Anwar campaign for the sake of justice and humanity. On the accusation that PAS used opportunity in the Anwar issue, Noor stated:

Although Anwar did say a lot of things against PAS when he was in UMNO, we still stand up for him as we do not practice revengeful politics. I agree that it is the Prime Minister's right to sack his deputy, but the way he went about it was wrong. Maybe the BN plays revenge politics and they never thought that PAS would actually side with a man who used to criticize PAS. (PP. 5-18)

Many will be surprised to learn that Noor and Anwar go back a long way.

Noor explained:

We were in ABIM together in the early '70s. When he was the president, I was the deputy and when he was taken into custody in Kamunting in 1974, I became the acting president. . . . In the 1978 general elections, PAS was kicked out of BN. Anwar was then asked to join UMNO. We discussed this, and I objected strongly. But Anwar said he wanted to introduce Islam into UMNO. We stayed as close friends despite our political differences. . . . When he was sacked and

shamed in such a manner in 1998, it is natural for PAS to stand up against such injustice. . . . Even though he had attacked PAS, we should not hold grudges . . . stressing that this was the Muslim way. (PP. 5-18)

Finally, it is reasonable to assume, based on this study, that the PAS experiment in Kelantan was somewhat successful and acceptable to Muslims and non-Muslims alike as an exemplar of a modern and moderate Islamic state (*HK* August 11, 1999). This rings true, since PAS retained Kelantan and additionally captured Terengganu in the 1999 election. As PAS chief Fadzil Noor told hundreds of party faithful “we struggle for the sake of Allah (God)” (*NST* June 2, 2002).

CONCLUSION

It may be said that religious rhetoric and slogans are important in Malaysian politics; in PAS’s case, they both work together to produce opportunity.

Based on this study and after reviewing the circumstances surrounding the 1999 election media debate, it is reasonable to assert that religious themes caused key, significant shifts that produced opportunity for PAS. Equally significant was the news about PAS, KeADILan, and DAP (non-Muslim) factions joining to form the coalition *Barisan Alternatif* to demand better governance of all citizens, free from a culture of corruption. PAS’s strategy of framing eight years of its transparent government in Kelantan paid off.

Even the Anwar issue was framed and defined by PAS in Islamic terms. Such Islamic terms are not a matter of private conscience; instead, they can be found in public documents, speeches and campaigns, and political symbols referred to by the opposition groups as they promote their agendas.

Islamization has been increasing in Malaysia over the past three decades (Funston 2000). Nevertheless, according to Funston (2000), Islamization or religious themes were not major election issues. It is important to note that PAS made political gains not because it represented Islamic fundamentalism but because it fused the call for Islamic reform with that for a better society.

At first glance, PAS was the beneficiary of, rather the main contributor to, *Reformasi* (Funston 2000). Prior to the November 29, 1999, election, PAS projected itself as an indispensable component of *Reformasi*. Being the largest opposition party, PAS emerged as the *Reformasi* leader and pacesetter, at least as far as the masses were concerned. PAS was depicted as supporting social and political reform (MK December 11, 1999).

The increase in PAS seats from seven in 1990 to 27 in 1999 was due chiefly to the PAS political strategy of constructing its organization's boundaries along ethnic, and religious lines while condemning UMNO's narrow ethnic chauvinism. As a practical matter, PAS had transformed Islamic terms and ideas to non-Muslim terms so that non-Muslims would not just understand the PAS stance on religious issues but also its stance on social justice issues and fundamental rights for the individual versus the state. By incorporating social justice and the Anwar issue into its framing, PAS generated solidarity between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

PAS successfully incorporated religion and race into its diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. PAS leaders' belief in religion and state did not prevent them from uniting with Muslims and non-Muslims alike to form

BA. Hence, PAS leaders became evermore confident that Malaysia was on the way to becoming an Islamic state (*MM* December 14-28, 1999). The decisions made by PAS leaders in the 1999 election in response to the relationships between PAS's framing and the BA proved a critical element in the trajectory of the PAS/BA movement.

This study has revealed that repeated rhetoric of reform generated a sense among the public that something was wrong and needed to be fixed, and BA groups did not hesitate to seize the opportunity. PAS and BA took great effort to take issue with the government during the Anwar case. With the increase in media attention, the social reputation of the PAS coalition skyrocketed as they were viewed as reform experts.

Certainly, Nik Aziz, as PAS leader and Chief Minister of Kelantan, carried several advantages into the 1999 election. First, he was a genuinely charismatic personality. Second, he held legitimate religious credentials. Third, he had never been accused of personal corruption; he led a simple, Spartan life. This appealed to his popular constituency, which viewed him as a leader of, for, and from the people—a view in direct contrast to the public's view of Mahathir.

These factors all combined to allow the leaders and their religious groups to participate effectively and take advantage of the opportunities created by the Anwar issue. The coalition facilitated its entry into the political system, enabling it to capture Kelantan and Terengganu in 1999. These successes directly contributed to weakening UMNO and posing a threat to that organization.

CHAPTER 6

EVENT 6: SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, changed the political environment in Malaysia, creating an opportunity for UMNO and a threat to the PAS fundamentalist Islamic movement. The focus of this chapter is to first examine UMNO's framing of religious issues that strengthened its political opportunities after September 11 and, second, examine PAS's own framing of the attacks that served as a threat to PAS.

This chapter undertakes a detailed construction of religious issues framing through an analysis of print media coverage of September 11, 2001, in Malaysia's government-supported newspapers such as *New Straits Times*, the opposition newspaper *Harakah (Muslimedia)*, and the independent newspaper, *MalaysiaKini*. The focus of this discussion is not to account for the events behind September 11 but rather to examine how UMNO and PAS amplified religious issues after the terrorist attacks and then the subsequent impact of news media's framing of public opinion. We will follow the rhetoric of both groups through religious framing and counterframing. This will show in detail how UMNO and PAS, through the print media—pro-government, opposition, and independent—played a pivotal role in shaping the Malaysian reactions to these global events.

Based on this analysis of news outlets, the study identified four phases of UMNO religious issues framing in the print media:

1. Terror attacks are contrary to Islam.

2. PAS is connected directly to the September 11 terrorists.
3. PAS wants a Taliban-like state, but we already have a Muslim state.
4. Islam supports the repression of misguided religion.

UMNO AMPLIFIES RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND VALUES

After the terrorist attacks, the general Malaysian point of view was that the U.S. “war on terror” was not as a direct response to terrorism so much as a way to claim authority and confront the Islamic movement worldwide, especially any Islamic fundamentalist group that could be framed as terrorist. Mahathir first reacted cautiously to the political situation; however, he and his administration also saw a great political opportunity to create a frame that would resonate with *all* groups, and Mahathir needed to shore up his shaky political position in Malaysia. Mahathir seized the chance and was one of the first heads of state to express his condolences to President Bush following September 11, indicating that his UMNO government was prepared to cooperate in tracking down those responsible (*NST* September 12, 2001).

For Mahathir Mohamad, it was a win-win situation: This study argues that, in doing so, UMNO and Mahathir regained the trust of the Bush administration until this time -a tenuous relationship at best—and also received approval from the majority of Malaysian citizens, all without having to alter UMNO’s political agenda. In fact, it freed up UMNO to divert attention from Anwar and the associated human rights violations to the alleged threat of the Islamic “terrorists.”

MalaysiaKini writes:

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack proved to be a godsend for the [UMNO] Mahathir government. It allowed the Prime Minister to repair relations with

Washington, damaged by his refusal to implement the IMF's economic restructuring demands. Mahathir publicly denounced the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which were deeply resented in Malaysia, but he cooperated behind the scenes with the Bush administration's war on terror. In return, the White House shelved its criticism of Anwar's jailing. (September 15, 2002:2; see also World Socialist, September 2004: 3)

Upon releasing Mahathir's statements of support to the White House, Malaysia immediately, officially, and actively became involved in the so-called "anti-terrorist coalition" (*NST*, September 14, 2001). In the case of September 11, UMNO's religious frames continued to be successful in portraying PAS as extremist and as the Southeast Asian offshoot of Al Qaeda. UMNO used September 11 to turn PAS's religion-based framing threat into opportunity for UMNO to strengthen the state religious *raison d'être*.

Terror Attacks are Contrary to Islam

After September 11, there was a misconception about the role Islam played in the promotion of terrorism and its general hostility to the Western world. It is often stressed that Islam encompasses more than just the Arab Middle East and should not be lumped together with the ideology of Osama bin Laden or his like-minded allies (*NST* August 11, 2002).

As president, Mahathir's response to the latest manifestation of terrorism was not only meant to speak to Malaysia's own potential terrorists but to define terrorism and terrorists for a worldwide audience from a Muslim point of view. When he spoke at the Asia Society in New York on February 4, 2002, his topics were Islam, terrorism, and Malaysia's response:

I must insist that terrorism is not an Islamic monopoly. In Malaysia, for 42 long years we fought Communist guerillas which employed terror tactics in Malaysia to force the acceptance of the ideology. . . . We defeated it not just through military action but more by winning the hearts and minds of the [ethnic Chinese]

people who supported them. . . . One can say the same of terrorists anywhere including those who are Muslim by religion. Islam does not promote terrorism. Islam is a religion of peace. But when Muslims feel they are being oppressed, they are not getting a fair deal, then Muslims react very much like the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia reacted. While we must condemn their acts of terror we must strive to understand the reasons for their anger and their reactions, irrational though they may be. We have to understand if we are going to tackle the problem. (NST February 5, 2002:1-18)

Mahathir skillfully aligned all his arguments behind his main contention, which is that, if anything, Islam is *more* tolerant than others. He told the audience:

The Jews chose to migrate to North Africa together with the defeated Muslims after Ferdinand and Isabella completed the reconquest of Spain. . . . When the early Muslims were persecuted by the heathen Arabs, they sought refuge in Abyssinia, a Christian country with a Christian king. They were well treated there because the Christians realised they worshipped the same God and recognised not only the prophets of the Christians but those of the Jews as well.

The Muslims venerate Musa or Moses, and Isa or Jesus as their prophets along with Adam, Abraham, Jacob and others. They differ from the Hebrews and the Christians because they believe that at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the Jews and the Christians had deviated from the true teachings. . . . Islam is capable of coexisting with Judaism and Christianity if they are not oppressed. Indeed Islam is capable of coexisting with other religions, too, including with those without any religion. (NST February 5, 2002:1-18)

UMNO vice president Abdullah Badawi added his own comments in a *New Straits Times* article in June 2002, again speaking against terrorism:

The world was shaken by the terrorist attacks. . . . The attacks demonstrated how extremism has influenced minds and inspired action. This has resulted in terror of the most evil proportions. The terrorists have justified their actions by saying that they are fighting terrorists. They ask that their evil acts be excused in the supposed quest for justice. Innocent lives mean nothing to them— misery is the only thing that they bring.” (NST June 18, 2002:3)

Former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim also had his say regarding the correct response of the *ummah* to the attacks. In an article that appeared in *MalaysiaKini* on October 10, 2001, Anwar devoted the first part of his article by explaining:

Islam has never condoned terrorism. When Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him) and early caliphs fought defensive wars to protect the freedom of religion of Muslims, they always enjoined and instructed Muslim soldiers not to harm innocent and unarmed children, women, elderly people and religious teachers of all faiths. Even fighting defensive wars, Muslim soldiers must never destroy hospitals, places of worship of all religions and orphanages. To fight a defensive war, it must first be declared by competent authorities who must first seek all peaceful means of negotiation with the other side. Before war is fought, civilians on the other side must be given enough notice and time to leave for more secure places to protect themselves. Muslim soldiers, like soldiers of other civilizations, can only fight among uniformed and armed soldiers on the other side.

Seen in this perspective, Osama bin Laden and his cohorts are desperate terrorists, pure and simple. They are not serving any good Islamic cause because by engaging in terrorism that killed and maimed innocent and unarmed people, which might include American Muslims, randomly without warning or notice given, they are merely despicable and irresponsible cowards. No Muslim should support them or sympathise with them. (P. 7)

As recent as 2005, Anwar again defended Islam in a special column in

MalaysiaKini:

Islam is not the religion of terrorists, who blow up buildings killing innocent women and children. Islam is not totalitarian. It is democratic. We know that the vast majority of Muslims in the world largely reject the doctrines of violence and hatred preached by extremist groups. It is a rejection borne out by a deep-seated aversion to the senseless slaughter of innocent lives, an aversion to any doctrine which claims that followers of other religions have a lesser right to the sanctity of life, an aversion borne out by the natural dignity of man. Terrorist attacks in the name of Islam therefore constitute the hijacking of Islam. It is an insidious usurpation of the legitimacy of religion. (March 17, 2005:12-15)

Therefore, UMNO put out an immediate and continuing religious frame that terrorism is contrary to Islamic beliefs and values. However, Mahathir soon added that justice should be done against terrorists, setting the stage for framing against PAS:

Through the centuries, deviations from the true teachings of Islam take place. And so Muslims kill despite the injunction of their religion against killing especially of innocent people. Whether people are fighting a noble cause or not, there are certain acts which they may not perpetrate. Exploding bombs in public places and killing innocent people cannot be accepted. Holding civilians to ransom or as hostages cannot be accepted. Poisoning food, medicine or water supply cannot be accepted. These are acts of terror and anyone committing these acts must be regarded as terrorist by everyone, irrespective of the cause

they are fighting for, irrespective of their religion, race or creed. And once they are defined as terrorists it is the duty of everyone, every country, to hunt them down and bring them to justice. (NST May 19, 2002)

Echoing these views, Ismail Noh (UMNO's Pasir Mas) told *New Straits Times* that those who carried out terrorist activities in the name of Islam were not practicing Islamic values. The key point to note according to Ismail Noh is that Allah says: "You Muslims must command the common good and forbid evil." He goes on:

Neither should Muslims support or be tempted to support any repressive regime that might camouflage themselves as an "Islamic state" or "Muslim country." Oppression is oppression, whatever name opportunists would label themselves. . . There are rights and wrongs in Western societies, as there are also rights and wrongs in the *ummah*. The weaknesses of the *ummah* can also be found within: despotism, lack of freedom of expression, socio-economic exploitation, vanity, power craze, dogmatism and exclusivism. (NST March 19, 2002:3)

UMNO CONNECTS PAS TO SEPTEMBER 11

We might say that PAS's main strength had been its religious mindset and its ability to gather a loyal, large base of supporters, especially from the heartland states. PAS's religious issues framing had won the battle in two previous elections with the support of Malays Muslims, who constitute 60% of the population. However, after the damage PAS had caused UMNO in the 1999 election, UMNO saw the opportunity to return the favor with September 11. Since the September 11 attackers were discovered to be the work of Al Qaeda—an Islamic hard-line terrorist group with *jihad* (holy war) as its goal—UMNO used this event to amplify the negative aspects of Islamic fundamentalist PAS.

PAS is Connected to September 11

PAS had already moved the country's political dialogue away from issues of secularism and nationalism toward religious issues (see Miller 2006), leaving the

door open for UMNO to negatively frame PAS. Mahathir waited a judicious period before attacking directly. However, on June 19, 2002, at the Putra World Trade Centre, Mahathir skillfully delivered a speech doing just that:

The fact is that in the attempt to gain support for itself, PAS deliberately misinterprets Islam. Over time, their interpretation became more farfetched and extreme. From accusing UMNO members of being infidels, not Muslim, they have reached the stage of declaring that God uses obscenities like their own party leader does and that God is a thug or gangster. There are many more interpretations of the teachings of Islam by PAS leaders which are against the true teachings of Islam. Only those who are immoral who will continue to lie even when their lies are exposed. God willing, if UMNO persists to voice out the truth, ultimately, a small number at least will open their minds and will reject falsehood and accept the truth. This is clear in the Surah Al-Imran, Verse 81, which states that: "Truth has (now) arrived, and Falsehood perished: for Falsehood is (by its nature) bound to perish?" And Surah Ali-Imran, Verse 105, which states that: "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity." (NST June 19, 2002:32)

According to *The Economist*, UMNO's old anti-PAS rhetoric had been depleted by the election, including allegations of links between PAS and a banned Islamic militant group, the KMM (April 21, 2003:3). The KMM allegations could never be verified, because the 70-plus alleged KMM members were being detained under Malaysia's Security Act (ISA), requiring neither evidence nor a trial. One of those held by UMNO was the son of PAS leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat, who subsequently served a two-year detention at the Kamunting Detention Centre in Perak (see Malaysia Human Right reports, SUHAKAM, 2002). However, Mahathir framed the connection as though it were true:

These people have gone abroad, became involved with the Taliban and accumulating weapons overseas, and now they have returned. . . . We believe that PAS influenced members of KMM. There are party members who are extreme and feel that the democratic process is too slow or did not help them. They are happier using violence to topple the government. (MK October 12, 2001)

The Economist noted that around 700,000 young Malays attend religious schools in the country and many more studying abroad in such Islamic centers as Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Many, though by no means all, of these schools are overtly political. Although religious extremism is not as much of a problem as in neighboring Indonesia, extremists had seen Malaysia as an ideal place from which to operate. UMNO had raised red flags by closing the religious schools after its investigations revealed that one of the schools was practicing *wahabi* teachings (*NST* July 7, 2002).

Defending UMNO's vision of Islam, vice president Abdullah Badawi stated that UMNO had done everything since independence to project Islam as a progressive and dynamic religion. The *fardhu kifayah* (community knowledge) had been widened to enable the Malays to compete in a modern world. There were educational opportunities for Malay children, even in rural states. "UMNO strongly believes that Islam is a very effective force in making the Malays more dynamic and progressive," Abdullah said. In the same article in *New Straits Times*, he stated that PAS had introduced values that destroyed Malay identity through a culture of hatred: "PAS planted the seeds of hatred among Muslims." He revealed that at every PAS *ceramah*, there were elements of defamation, hatred, and character assassination. "PAS leaders and members are proud and arrogant. They don't beg forgiveness, they don't admit mistakes and wrongdoings, they don't admit shortcomings and weaknesses—especially PAS leaders" (*NST* June 22, 2003).

While this opportunity for UMNO began building, not all of it could be attributed to September 11: The unraveling of the opposition pact started before then, as cracks began to appear on the issue of the Islamic state (*NST* June 17, 2001). Public feuding over the Anwar issues served to harden party lines, and the previous broad goals of democratic reform began to narrow. Perhaps sensing that PAS could, at this point, take only the more extreme position—and thereby paint itself into a corner—UMNO staked a “moderate Islam” position with the declaration that Malaysia was already an Islamic state (*NST* July 17, 2001).

“Malaysia is an Islamic State”

Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said Malaysia “has always been an Islamic state since its independence. The only thing is, we did not announce it.”

Malaysia, he explained, was an Islamic state “below the surface”:

If we claim that Malaysia is an Islamic country, the reasons are clear. Muslims in Malaysia are free to live as Muslims; there is no obstruction to the performance of their obeisance to Allah, and they enjoy justice as desired by Islam. Of course, those who commit crimes or abuse the religion for other purposes, those who oppose the government with violence and other means, those who hide the teachings of Allah which according to Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 174: “Those who conceal, God's revelations in the Book, and purchase for them a miserable profit—they swallow into themselves Naught but Fire. God will address them on the Day of Resurrection, Not purify them, Grievous will be their penalty,” these people will be punished under the laws of the country. And Allah promise in Surah An-Nahl, Verse 25: “Let them bear, on the Day of Judgment, their own burdens in full, and also [something] of the burdens of those without knowledge, whom they misled. Alas, how grievous the burdens they will bear.” (*NST* May 22, 2002)

New Straits Times political commentator Lawrence Bartlett, recognizing that Muslim countries were under the spotlight after the terror attacks, stated that the Malaysian government would invite any baffled Westerners to examine “a model Islamic state. That is how Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad

describes his country, and many in the multicultural and multi-religious society agree enough to have voted him back into power for the past 20 years” (*NST* September 18, 2001).

The Malaysian Youth Council published a statement in *New Straits Times* in September 2001, similar to Bartlett’s: Come see Malaysia as an example of a modern Islamic state.

If the world could take a break from the saturation of Western television coverage linking the words “Muslim” and “terrorist” and take a seat at a sidewalk café in downtown Kuala Lumpur, it might indeed be surprised. The stereotypical view of Islam as a dour and repressive religion that breeds hatred for infidels, or unbelievers, would not survive the length of time it takes to drink a cup of coffee. Chic miniskirt women stride towards their offices alongside others in head scarves and Arab tourists in full black *chador*. Beer is on tap, and the cafés compete for custom by playing everything from jazz to disco to Eastern music. Islam is not a violent religion. Muslims here are against violence and cruelty. (September 28, 2001)

This section of the Malay community, including MCA and MIC leaders within *Barisan Nasional*, knew that UMNO was not serious about going Islamic. However, a political commentator from the *Aliran Monthly* independent newspaper argued that Malays who cherish the idea of an Islamic state would have supported PAS long ago and would not be swayed by such pious platitudes. For many Malays, their disaffection is less about the creation of an Islamic state and more about restoring justice, accountability, good governance, the rule of law, and the sanctity of democratic institutions. The idea of an Islamic state is not something that is uniformly accepted by all sections of the Malay society, and fears that political discourse in Malaysia will be driven by Islam to the marginalization of non-Muslims—though theoretically possible—is not

grounded in reality (*AM* October, 2002, Issue 10:13). As Mahathir stated just a month after September 11:

Although we know that the Western media and certain quarters detest Muslims whom they portray as terrorists, still they try to show PAS as a moderate party that should be supported by non-Muslims to topple the UMNO-led government. It appears as if they would like to see PAS set up an Islamic state in Malaysia. Is it true that they would like an Islamic State? It is highly possible that they do, because they believe that if the country is governed by what they term as Islamic fundamentalists, there will be uneasiness among non-Muslims, which will retard Malaysia's development and progress, and weaken it until it is re-colonized.

If, because of efforts by the enemies of Islam, the support for UMNO dwindles, then UMNO would not be able to focus on the development of Malay/Islam, then probably UMNO would try to be more Islamic than PAS, rejecting what PAS labels as "secular" so that Malaysia continues to be backward, weak, no longer able to criticize the West and their apparatus when they commit injustice to developing nations. (*NST* October 12, 2001:15)

Mahathir continued to amplify frames against PAS as speaking against a democratically elected government. He proclaimed in his speech at UMNO's convention on June 18, 2002, that the world has acknowledged Malaysia as a Muslim nation and that many other Islamic governments regard Malaysia the best model nation for them, being in awe of Malaysia's economic development and development of Islam. He stated proudly that more than 100 Islamic and non-Islamic nations sent their students to study at the Islamic International University in Malaysia. But, he alerted, in Malaysia there were Muslims—referring to PAS—who allege that Malaysia is a non-Islamic nation and its government infidel and secular (*Star* June 19, 2002:18).

PAS Wants a Taliban-like State and jihad

By September 11, UMNO's rhetoric was already framed to undermine PAS and make UMNO the defender of Islamic faith and good Islam. Now, UMNO began to amplify its religious framing that PAS wanted a Taliban-like state and that PAS

was encouraging jihad against the U.S.—which, in fact, it had (see “PAS Encourages *Jihad* for Western Aggression against Taliban” later in this chapter). Mahathir began the negative stereotyping of PAS and was quoted as saying, “PAS is advocating separating male and female visitors in swimming pools and tour guides in their states—this kind of rules is reminiscent of the Taliban (*NST* October 15, 2001).

One of the most important concepts publicized and debated by UMNO was the concept of *jihad* (holy war). Although PAS expressed genuine condemnation of the September 11 attacks, it simultaneously encouraged its members to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. UMNO took the opportunity to discredit PAS as “a deviationist movement whose leaders are headed for hell, and un-Islamic worshippers of a God who was a ‘thug’” (*NST* June 19, 2002:5, quoted in Liow, 2004:191). As an *NST* editorial stated:

It is rather amusing to observe the shallow mentality that is pervasive among PAS leaders in their latest cry of *jihad* against attacks on the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. I wonder what made PAS leaders assume that an attack against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan is synonymous with an attack on Islam? This statement of theirs seems even more absurd when one observes the fact that the U.S. is trying to reach out to Muslims worldwide and assuring them that the attacks are not against Islam or even the people of Afghanistan but against a corrupt, hypocritic regime that harbours one of the deadliest and violent terrorist organisations ever. . . .

The irony of it all is *actually* the nature of the Taliban. The Taliban is a brutal regime that has no qualms about killing innocent people of different ethnicities in the north of Afghanistan, severely abusing women, and profiting from the production of opium while hiding behind the veil of a puritan Islamic state. If PAS draws the conclusion that the Taliban regime is a fair representation of Islam, then they probably haven’t done much homework and are probably shooting from the hip for political mileage. (October 11, 2001:17)

According to Mahathir, PAS members had killed a Christian state assemblyman, tried to steal arms from a police station, robbed banks, and

exploded a few bombs in various places. He stated that those responsible were arrested with a warning to PAS supporters in *New Straits Times*:

We have dealt with the would-be Muslim terrorists with circumspection. The majority of the people of Malaysia, Muslims and non-Muslims, support the UMNO government's action. We do not need foreign help or intervention. We are capable of dealing with any eventuality. The opposition Islamic Party PAS knows this, and they are unlikely to back violence. However, if they break any of our laws, the fact that they are in the opposition will not prevent the government from enforcing the laws on them. (*NST* February 5, 2002)

Later that same year, Fuad Ahmad (*Barisan Nasional*-Besut) told *The Star*, "I wasn't sure, but the bunch of *hudud* laws out of Trengganu and various statements from PAS leadership in the last year or so have convinced me that they fully intend to make Malaysia like Saudi Arabia or Sudan or Talibanistan. I fully believe that there would be a pretty big exodus of non-Muslims" (*Star* August 12, 2002). When asked further about PAS's *hudud*, Fuad replied:

I'm no thief, I'm no rapist, nor do I take bribes, but why should I be opposed to such a law? Because I am not willing to be the innocent victim to this unjust system. I do not want to see my friends get hurt by this system. Among other things, I also do not want to see other people, especially non-Muslims, see Islam as a barbaric religion. (August 12, 2002)

UMNO member Rasol Wahid (UMNO-Ajil) commented:

The gap between rhetoric and reality in Malaysia's Islamisation has become embarrassingly obvious, through it is interesting to note that nobody has pointed this out. On the eve of the American-led invasion of Afghanistan, PAS—along with other hard-line Islamist groups—claimed it would not stop its members from going on a *jihad* in Afghanistan. Voices were raised, chests were beaten sore, and threats were made. Yet not a single PAS member or supporter packed his bags. PAS's leaders claimed they stood behind the Taliban—but in the end, they stood where they did and watched the conflict from the comfort of their living rooms. (*NST* January 8, 2003)

Addressing the issue of Malaysian citizens going to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad said, "If they want to go, they can go. We are not stopping them, but we are not backing them. I think they are wasting their time" (*Star* October 3, 2001).

A key aspect of this framing is that the challenges of religion and politics in Malaysia were no different from the rest of the Islamic world, both before and after September 11. The struggle between secularist and traditionalist Islamic movements continues today in Malaysia as well as in Islamic countries around the world. The only difference is that, post-September 11, Muslims were now confronted openly by antagonists about Islamic religious identity. The events since have continued to have a serious impact on Muslim communities in Malaysia and throughout the Islamic world (*MM* September 23, 2002).

The Star columnist wrote on October 11, 2001, that the Taliban's stubbornness and extreme religious fervor clouded its better judgment. The columnist urged readers not to be taken in by the shallow ideas of PAS and reminded them that the attacks on the Taliban regime were not done indiscriminately. Mahathir's religious advisor, Abdul Hamid Othman, had similarly urged Muslims not to respond to calls for *jihad* against the United States. "Our advice to Muslims here is that, for the moment, don't get involved. Let's not act hastily" (*NST* September 23, 2001:11). Although PAS does not advocate violence, UMNO characterized the party as having a terrorist group mentality, brought on by infiltration by Muslim extremists (*NST* October 15, 2001).

Mahathir reminded Muslims that the Qur'an emphasizes that all that is bad is the people's fault and that all that is good comes from Allah. He paraphrased the Qur'an by saying, "If misfortune befalls the Muslim, it is due to them" (June 20, 2000). UMNO determined that some of PAS's members were threatening citizens through physical intimidation or by moral pressure (*MK*

October 6, 2002). The solution to the problem was to step up the negative framing and extreme images of PAS. Malaysian Ministry of Information messages were screened repeatedly during primetime television programs, juxtaposing CNN footage of a woman shot in the head by the Taliban with footage of leaders of PAS Islamic movement, calling them “the Taliban of Malaysia” (*MK* September 17, 2001).

The pro-government *New Straits Times* declared UMNO’s framing to be the true version of Islam. To amplify the negative aspect of Islam and *jihad* it reported, “Some preachers have even called on their congregation to prepare for a *jihad*. . . . Among those who have heeded such a call is Surayana, a student at an Islamic boarding school. “I have registered myself to go to Afghanistan. I have told my family that they might lose me” (*NST* September 27, 2001).

UMNO’s amplification of PAS members as extremist and ready to overthrow government by violence was highly effective among ethnic Chinese and Indian supporters, and this negative framing paid off when the DAP Chinese party split away from PAS and its *Barisan Alternatif* coalition (*MK* September 24, 2001). DAP spokesman Chen Man Hin explained that some party leaders had been reluctant to split away, but attacks in the U.S. and the PAS’s reaction convinced them (*NST* October 15, 2001). A DAP member stated after breaking with *Barisan Alternatif*:

There are claims that terrorists [who fight in the name of Islam] should not be called “Islamic terrorists.” Why not? What do we call them? A simple search of known terrorist groups shows how many have the words “Islam,” “Muslim,” “*jihad*” in their name, while still more mention these terms in their charter. These groups are the most active and hit the headlines repeatedly, whilst Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines all cite “problems” with groups that fight under the banner of Islam. All around the world we see the American flag

being burnt, and words of hate from Muslims, not only from the street but also from formal religious gatherings [in Iran]. It is little wonder given these circumstances that the words “Islamic” and “terrorist” are almost synonymous to the Westerner. (*NST* October 19, 2001:9)

In addition to the DAP split with *Barisan Alternatif*, a *New Straits Times* columnist was quick to advise that KeADILan should seriously consider following DAP’s lead and split from PAS, not only as a political benefit but also to preserve KeADILan’s dignity and its image as a party concerned with justice, equality, and human rights. A new KeADILan-DAP opposition coalition would be effective in the long run, especially so without the burden of an ancient tribal interpretation of an Islamic state (*NST* October 19, 2001).

The UMNO government realized that it would be difficult to erase personal ideology and values of PAS group members when the group claimed to represent the true version of Islam (*Star* October 19, 2003). Mahathir said, “I don’t understand why PAS supporters still accept their leaders who have unabashedly stated that God resorts to profanity and thuggery” (*NST* October 11, 2001:7). Mahathir also argued that the claim by PAS’s top leaders that they were *ulamas* descended from the Prophet was a political tactic to get the support of the Muslim community. “*Ulamas* who are descendants of the Prophet are those who make interpretations without any interests,” he asserted (*NST* October 11, 2001:7).

A popular example, and perhaps the most contentious action, came a year after September 11 when UMNO sponsored a conference for Muslims and non-Muslims from various faiths at Wisma Putra Kuala Lumpur to reflect on the consequences of the attacks and the aftermath for Muslims (*NST* September 6,

2002). The symbolic act of renouncing a perverted cause tells much about what else can be done to combat terrorism effectively. Mahathir called on Malaysia, as the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), to compel the United States to provide concrete evidence when making terrorism-related allegations (*NST* September 22, 2002). In doing so, UMNO not only steadfastly held onto its state Islamic teachings but drove home the message that even the beast in terrorism can be beaten if we understand it enough. Moreover, a *New Straits Times* commentator lent heavy credence to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad when he commanded, “*Allaah, subhaanahu wa-ta’aala*,” which essentially means, “Turn unto Allah, O believers, in order that you may succeed” (*NST* September 22, 2002:12), a masterful move because it quoted from specific verses in the Qur’an. The UMNO action pointed out in clear terms—even to uninitiated Muslims—that the cause of terror is nothing but a perverted sideshow, meant as a desperate attempt to give religion a meaning (*MK* September 27, 2002). By extending the frame to encompass these auxiliary interests, UMNO hoped to reach a larger crowd than its core frames had allowed. The Kuala Lumpur conference helped UMNO widen its sympathy pool, opening up possibilities for others to understand how UMNO amplified its religious beliefs and values in its struggle against PAS extremists.

After the meeting, when asked about the *hudud* code approved for the State of Terengganu, Mahathir said: “We don’t feel any guilt for rejecting it, as it is PAS’s *hudud* and not Islam’s *hudud*” (*MK* September 27, 2002). The Prime

Minister further said that according to Islam, justice was most vital in meting out punishment—but under PAS’s *hudud*, there were instances of injustice, including against women rape victims. He said:

PAS seems unbothered about justice in its vigor to introduce *hudud*. In Islam, the most important requirement is justice, and if something is unjust, then we cannot do it. For example, under Section 9 of the draft law, the burden of proof in rape cases falls on the woman’s shoulders, with the prospect of 80 lashes if she cannot produce four Muslims males as witnesses to the offence. (NST June 21, 2002:2).

Because rape victims under PAS’s *hudud* need to have four witnesses of impeccable character to prove their allegations, Mahathir exclaimed, “If four witnesses were to merely watch a woman being raped and not attempt to help her, would they not be regarded as having sinned [for allowing a woman to be raped] and are not be fit to be witnesses?” Nowadays, Mahathir explained, there were scientific means to prove allegations of rape, including DNA tests on blood and semen samples.

Islamic women’s rights groups and 10 additional organizations also criticized the Terengganu *hudud* law, stating that it violated the principles of justice and equality in Islam. Abdul Hamid UMNO religious advisor to Mahathir observed that “Sudan and Pakistan both tried [to institute such a law] but failed (NST June, 12, 2002).

He went on to state that PAS law proved that its leaders—including its acting president, Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang—did not have the in-depth knowledge of Islam that they claimed. Even though UMNO struggled for Islam, the party does not wish to use the word *Islam*: “The Turkish Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip Erdogan], during his recent visit to the country, told me that his

party does not use the word *Islam* for fear that if the party were to do something wrong, Islam will bear the brunt” (NST September 22, 2002:12).

UMNO not only offered a language but also cognitive tools for making sense of events and experiences by interpreting problems, evaluating situations, and offering remedies—or, as Snow et al. (1986) argue, “rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frame function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (P. 464).

Although more research is needed, it seems reasonable to argue that the more knowledge people gain about deep religious beliefs and values, the greater the likelihood that they will respond to any Islamic movement. If they encounter too much stress or are tortured because of political and socioeconomic disadvantage, they are likely to open their hearts to radical or fanatic Islamism (see Iannaccone, 2003). In this case, once a person chooses to become a PAS member to fulfill the word of God, this process of religious construction poses a threat to UMNO nationalist and secularist ideology. The UMNO diagnostic frame painted Islamic fundamentalist ideology as dangerous for Malaysian society, but the only solution offered by UMNO was simply to defeat PAS influence in the Muslim Malay society.

Islam Supports the Repression of Misguided Religion

The Bush doctrine’s deliberate warning—“You are either with us or with the terrorists”—gave the UMNO government free rein to suppress all Islamic movements suspect of being engaged in terror and separatist insurgency. This

suppression not only included PAS but *Jemaah Islah Malaysia* (JI) and *Kumpulan Mujahiddin Malaysia*—all on a CIA watch list.

The New Straits Times argued that with UMNO's clever use of the media and government machinery on one hand and unfair restrictions on the freedom of expression by opposition parties on the other, the ill-informed public, especially the non-Muslims, had been goaded into an UMNO-friendly mindset (*NST* September 12, 2001). *MalaysiaKini* political writer Steven Gan extended the frame when he wrote, "Look at what the PAS movement and radical Islamic group want to bring you. Safety of society and personal safety are at risk. You may as well forget about what radical Islam promises you. They promise you death" (October 19, 2001:1).

The Mahathir government acted to restrict sales of the PAS newspaper *Harakah* to only PAS members—hoping to prevent the larger Muslim Malay society, especially students, from rallying in support of the PAS Islamic movement. University students were targeted by UMNO, and two university student activists and leaders were arrested under ISA. Students who supported PAS were expelled without cause from their universities and colleges, and vocal and influential student societies were either shut down or their activities frozen. All active groups were labeled as militants and extremists by Mahathir's government. All this was done by using current repressive laws or by police intimidation of students and their families; at the same time, these students were denied due process (*MK* October 23, 2001).

It is critical to note that terrorist groups such as Jemaaah Islah (JI) manifest themselves in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. Some small, homogeneous groups organize their activities to engage in violence and physical intimidation. Because they operate illegally and cannot enforce contracts through the legal system, they must rely heavily on a network of trust, based on religious fanaticism. On September 18, 2002, just a year after the attacks, the *New Straits Times* headline was “100 JI Members at Large.” The Bali bombing occurred less than a month later, on October 12, 2002, and was linked to *Jemaah Islah Malaysia*.

After the “war against terror” started in the United States, it spread to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, and Malaysia. UMNO took advantage of U.S. enthusiasm for the war and its support of “allies” in the war to attack any groups aligned with Islamic movements. Local media reported a distinct nervousness in UMNO over rumors that the United States listed Malaysia as one of nine countries harboring terrorists, and Mahathir was quick to reassure the Bush administration that the Malaysia government would arrest and extradite anyone who had committed crimes outside the country.

UMNO believes that PAS leaders are interpreting the teachings of Islam wrongly and, because of the division, Muslims in Malaysia have become confused and cannot be united. To overcome this, Mahathir proposed financial punishment of PAS because it is misguided in its Islamic beliefs:

The best way to equip the people, especially the young people, is with the right teachings of Islam in order that they can ward off the wrong teachings. Unfortunately, these wrong teachings are implanted while the children are still small, in kindergarten and the People’s Religious Schools, and sometimes by religious teachers in the National Schools. We have seen that when this

generation matures they believe blindly this wrong interpretation of Islam. . . . They have now reached the stage of trying to overthrow the elected government by force of arms, to terrorize, to rob, and to kill people. Because of this, the government has to take action to stop the spread of these wrong teachings in the schools and other institutions. The government gave aid to the people's religious schools because parents like to send their children to these schools believing that they would become more knowledgeable about religion. But because it is not the true religion that is taught at these schools but instead teachings which are against the true teachings of Islam, the government cannot give aid to these schools anymore.

The government and Muslim leaders of the government would be committing a sin if we give support for anything that is against the teachings of Islam. . . . These are not religious schools but indoctrination centres for PAS. The government will oversee all deviations from the teachings of Islam and will provide facilities to study the proper teachings of Islam in the national schools to ensure the new generation can reject not only the wrong teachings of Islam but can distinguish between what is good and what is bad and what is right. (*NST* June 19, 2002)

Mahathir continued to speak of Islam as having an important role in the life of a great majority of Malaysians, that Malaysia Muslims are Sunnis and followers of Imam Shafie and, in that sense, should be united, he continued to frame PAS as having deliberately misinterpreted Islam in the attempt to gain power and support for itself (*NST* June 24, 2003). In *New Straits Times*, Mahathir promised action against those who would defy Islam:

What is clear is that the religion [of Islam] stresses justice in everything that is done by Muslims. If anything is done or any law which is enacted by ordinary man, no matter how learned he is which will bring about injustice, it is definitely not Islamic and against the teaching of Islam. Because of this, Muslims must reject laws made by people who have other interest which will bring about injustice, no matter what name is given to that law. Those who caused Islam to be despised by others for being unjust due to their interpretations, they will have to answer for their sins in the hereafter. This is promised. (*NST* June 21, 2003)

The government's aggressive control of the media to frame a negative picture of PAS groups created fear, not only among PAS and allied group members but also among students and the society as a whole. A *New Straits Times* editorial wrote that the public now sees the virtue of keeping vocal

opposition leaders under detention without trial in order to maintain security (*NST* September 27, 2001).

These are just a few examples of the autocratic exercise of UMNO's power to neutralize the influence of the PAS Islamic movement. All such actions after September 11 carried that new name: the war on terrorism. To make sure that Islam supported the repression of misguided religion, the Mahathir government closely monitored the activities of *iman* (preachers) and very often restricted their movements, imprisoned them, or closed mosques in which they preached and gathered (*Star* September 17, 2001).

Internal Security Act (ISA)

UMNO's Internal Security Act (ISA) is not connected directly to religious framing but rather to the restoration of justice and basic human rights, and a belief in pluralism. ISA's complex repercussions to society should be discussed as un-Islamic. After Mahathir condemned the terrorist attacks and indicated that his government was prepared to cooperate in tracking down those responsible (*NST* October 1, 1991), he expressed no hesitation in using ISA against terrorist suspects or political opposition, bypassing traditional judicial approval or scrutiny. Using whatever laws necessary to arrest suspects, Mahathir described the ISA as "the savior of the nation and its national stability" (*NST* October 30, 2002:11).

Malaysia Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi agreed, stating that ISA played a crucial role in dealing with terrorism. "We cannot afford the wait-and-see attitude, because by the time we think we have a clear picture of the threat, it would then be too late to act when lives and property are lost and destruction is

everywhere” (*Star* April 11, 2002:7). He further asserted, “The terrorist threat in Malaysia was under control due to the use of preventive detention laws such as the ISA against suspected individuals” (*NST* September 17, 2002:3). In many cases, ISA allows the police to arrest without warrant any person suspected of having acted, or who is likely to act, “in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia” (*Malaysia Constitution*, Section 8b(1)).

Under ISA, there is no requirement for formal charges or appearance before a court. Neither the police nor the government has to provide evidence to support the allegations (*Star* September 24, 2002). In defending ISA laws, Mahathir once said, “We don’t have to be apologetic about our endeavor to uphold the rule of law whilst maintaining a disciplined stand in maintaining security and order” (*NST* September 23, 2001). The Mahathir government has always tried to discredit the activities of human rights groups by playing to the Malaysian citizens, with the main argument frame used throughout the years is that human rights are “Western concepts”—alien to Malaysian society and not compatible with “Asian values,” which require loyalty and obedience to the government. This was reframed by Malaysian Justice Minister Dr. Rais Yatim in his keynote address to the Malaysian Law conference in Kuala Lumpur in 2003: “Not all rights through the United Nations are suitable for us. Our values as people living in the East must be considered. ISA has been decided by the government in this context” (*Star* December 12, 2003:8).

In the past 15 years, the identified security threats have included a varied collection of social activists, opposition leaders, and alleged Islamic extremists.

It is estimated that more than 20,000 people have been arrested under ISA since it became law on August 1, 1960 (Rais Yatim 1995:244). It should be noted that during the crackdown against student activists in 1974 and 1975, one of those detained under the ISA was Anwar Ibrahim, leader of the student and youth movement (ABIM) who later become Deputy Prime Minister before being ousted in 1998 by Mahathir (see chap. 4).

UMNO's ultimate goal behind ISA is to deter individuals from supporting or joining movements such as PAS. From a political perspective, the attack on the United States provided an opportunity for the Mahathir government to justify retention of the ISA, sometimes beyond the support of even the staunchest ISA advocates. Malaysian authorities threatened its use against those who spread rumors about stockbrokers and financial analysts involved in currency speculation and those who presented a negative economic picture of Malaysia.

PAS'S RESPONSE TO UMNO

In this section, I seek to examine PAS religious framing, and its use to respond to UMNO with particular references as to how PAS coped with political threats.

PAS AMPLIFIES RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND VALUES

Four phases of PAS framing were chosen as a result of September 11, 2001:

1. Terror attacks are contrary to Islam.
2. PAS is not associated with terrorists.
3. PAS demands a fundamentalist Islamic state—but not like Taliban.
4. PAS encourages jihad against Western aggression toward Taliban.
5. Women's role in PAS and ISA.

Terror Attacks are Contrary to Islam

As discussed in previous chapters, PAS and its allies have consistently claimed to seek recognition of the state in accordance with Islamic principles.

Unfortunately, in the minds of many, the events of September 11 tied the PAS Islamic movement to Al Qaeda and the Islamic movement in general, and PAS in particular became a target of the Mahathir administration under the pretext of protection from terrorism.

It is important to point out that PAS historically has had a political agenda, although the late 1990s saw a potentially significant electoral swing toward the call for making Malaysia an Islamic state. Despite noteworthy gains in the November 1999 election, PAS still has only 27 seats in the 193-seat parliament and controls just two of Malaysia's 13 states. Still, PAS influence had been growing steadily until September 11 and the efforts by the Mahathir government to link PAS to Islamic extremism. PAS leaders have been strident in their calls for Muslims to support Afghanistan, characterizing U.S. intervention as a crusade against Islam (*Star* February 1, 2002). PAS President Fadzil Noor issued a statement in the wake of September 11:

The undersigned leaders of Islamic movements are horrified by the [September 11] events in the United States which resulted in massive killing, destruction, and attack on innocent lives. We express our deepest sympathies and sorrow. We condemn, in the strongest terms, the incidents, which are against all human and Islamic norms. This is grounded in the Noble Laws of Islam which forbid all forms of attacks on innocents. God Almighty says in the Holy Qur'an: "No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another" (Surah al-Isra 17:15). (*MK* September 14, 2001:1; *MM* September 14, 2001)

Harakah published an article in *Muslimedia* expressing concern about the government's accusations that PAS is linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist networks

(October 14-28, 2003). The article argued that, although the evidence showed that one of the suspected September 11 hijackers who had also attacked the *USS Cole* in Aden Yeman—identified as a Saudi named Khalid al Midhar—appeared in a Malaysian surveillance videotaped meeting in Kuala Lumpur with a non-Malaysian suspect, there was no evidence of a direct link between PAS and Al Qaeda terrorist networks. In fact, the article challenged the government claim that PAS has a *wahhabism* mentality or is even associated with the *wahhabism* movement (*MM* October 14-28, 2003).

The traditions of Islam in Malaysia are incompatible with *wahhabi* literalism, Puritanism, and radicalism. An article in *Muslimedia* argued, “We should not overplay the influence of Saudi Arabian *wahhabism* in Malaysia. . . but categorizing PAS with a radical ideology such as *wahhabi* was wrong, twisted, and fabricated” (*MM* October 14-28, 2003:1). According to Rahim (2006), “The siege mentality of *wahabi*-inspired radical and militant Islamists is fueled by an acute sense of political defeatism, frustration, disempowerment, and humiliation in the face of Western domination by political elites in collusion with the West” (P. 3).

The government media’s framing of the September 11 aftermath, with an emphasis on PAS as a terrorist group was intended to hamper PAS’s efforts and present radical Islam negatively, to be considered extreme, dangerous, and militant (*NST* August 13, 2002). In responding to such claims, PAS Kelantan leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat rebutted:

It is sad that these people are Muslims themselves who claim to be the savior of Islam. This blanket persecution is despite the fact that many if not all of their approaches are peaceful, democratic, transparent, and abide to local and

international law. This adds another level of discrimination against Muslim movements worldwide. (*Star* March 14, 2002: 2)

These hypocritical Muslim rulers can swear by the Qur'an that it is not a war against Islam, but no Muslim, from Morocco to Indonesia, would swallow this deceit. (*MM* October 1-14, 2001).

PAS: Not Associated with Terrorists

Despite PAS's increase in power through previous elections, it was clear that UMNO remained too strong to be conquered by simply amplifying religious themes. The Anwar issue had died down, and UMNO's framing of PAS Islamic militancy post-September 11 began to take its toll. PAS leaders sought to allay such fears, stating that it was not an extremist party and that it rejected all forms of aggression and violence. As PAS vice president Abdul Hadi argued through

MalaysiaKini:

PAS, for as long as Malaysians can remember, has always been associated with words like *religious fanaticism*, *extremism*, *retrogression* and even *militancy*. These perceptions are so prevalent that many do not think there is anything in the history of the party to indicate otherwise. . . . [However] when the Hizbul Muslimin party was banned by the British in 1948, less than five months after it was founded with the sponsorship of the radical Malay Nationalist Party, its former leaders established PAS and vowed to mobilize Muslims towards implementing the demands of Islam to achieve democracy, social justice, and humanitarianism. (February 25, 2002:21)

In 2003, PAS called for a *muktamar* or conference to discuss the oppression of Muslims in the war on terrorism. The *muktamar* was framed in such a way that it would address the topic "the coming war is a crusade against Islam" (*MM* November 1-14, 2003). One speaker emphasized the deterioration of economic and social conditions after the economic crisis in Southeast Asia and the associated upheaval in Indonesia, in particular an environment favorable to the activities of terrorist, radical, and separatist groups (see Chen 2003). However, Zafar Bangash, director of the Institute of Contemporary Islamic

Thought (TICIT), took a softer tone in discussing some of the approaches of the Islamic movement during the conference:

Let us be clear about a basic point of principle: The Islamic movement cannot adopt the path of violence, especially in its struggle to overthrow the existing order in Muslim society. This is not based merely on classical Islamic political theory, which is quite problematic, but because this is what we understand from the *Seerah* [life-history] of the messenger of Allah [saw]. Muslims need to develop theory evolved on the question of not rebelling against illegitimate authority. Rebellion was discouraged by mean of official patronage, to ensure that illegitimate rules were not challenged; classical scholars were encouraged to guide Muslim sentiment into peaceful avenue of *nasiha* [advice, good counsel]. (MM November 1-14, 2003)

Nevertheless, the stalls outside the conference hall sold material on Islam and posters of Osama bin Laden, whom Washington accused of masterminding the September 11 attacks (MK November 1-14, 2003).

Despite PAS pronouncements, it remains clear that a central element of Islamist extremism remained the idea of the *jihad*, or struggle. According to Berman and Iannaccone (2005), an economic model can explain Islamist extremist organizations: All extremists of religious behavior is a product of rational choice rather than an exception to it (see table 8). Although this study is not designed to understand the reason and rationale behind terrorist attacks, still it is important to gain an understanding of why religious extremists are willing to murder: Their theology sanctions violence in the service of God (see Iannaccone 2003). Their victims are seen as enemies of God. In martyrdom, these extremists believe they will receive an immediate afterlife and huge rewards in return for their self-sacrifice (see Wintrobe 2003; Spinzak 2000).

Table 8

Why People Join and Commit to Extremist Groups

Why Do Religious Extremists Join?	Why Are Religious Extremists Loyal?
Grievances	Social pressure, deception, mind control, cognitive dissonance
Economic deprivation	Dependency
Cognitive limitations	Antipathy
Psychopathology	Delusion
	Drugs, sex, philosophy
	Status and rewards
	Coercion, threats, and force

Source: Iannaccone 2003:2-3.

As Schech (2007) explains, extremists believe that they will be triumphant in their struggle, regardless of the odds against them because Allah will help the “true believers” be victorious. This belief is primarily based on the military victories of Prophet Muhammad during the early years of Islam in the battle of Badr. The Qur’an states:

Allah had helped you at Badr; when ye were a contemptible little force; then fear Allah; thus may ye show your gratitude; Remember thou saidst to the faithful: Is it not enough for you that Allah should help you with 3,000 angels (especially) sent down? Yea, if ye remain firm, and act right, even if the enemy should rush on you in hot haste, your lord would help you with 5,000 angels making a terrific onslaught. (Qur’an; Sura 3: 123-125).

PAS Demands a Fundamentalist Islamic State—But Not Taliban

Not all people believed UMNO when it described PAS as being associated with terrorists. UMNO's critics argued that it would be shortsighted and irresponsible to say that PAS had suddenly become irrelevant for voicing strong support to help the Afghanis and condemning the attacks. On June 1, 2004, KeADILan vice president Chandra Muzafar spoke on behalf of PAS:

Of course, I myself do not believe at all that PAS subscribes to any theory of the clash of civilization as advanced by Samuel Paul Huntington. As a longtime friend of many mainstream PAS leaders and members, I think they are as tolerant as many of us, as evidenced by the religious freedom and tolerance as well as interethnic harmony and respect in Kelantan and Terengganu. The teaching of the Qur'an is clear and unambiguous: "There is no compulsion in religion." (Surah al-Baqarah 2:256)

Dr. Bakri Musa, Malaysian scholar and PAS member, articulated the situation well in his article "Hijacking Islam" for *MalaysiaKini*:

Islam has been hijacked by extremist groups as well as by governments, organizations, and individuals pushing their own private or political agendas. What is more frightening is that these groups use blind innocent faith to further their corrupt goals. This is their greatest weapon, and it would seem that they can do anything and get the silent support from the masses worldwide. There is no equivalent in the West. The Dalai Lama once said [that] religion is like food, you take according to your taste; if you like it hot, follow this way, if not follow another. They all lead to the same God. (October 1, 2001)

In interviews with *MalaysiaKini*, PAS vice president Abdul Hadi touched on several issues to describe the pacific nature of PAS. First, he stated that PAS is a continuation of the struggle of Islam as carried out by Prophet Muhammad and the history of Islam in which the prophets and messengers believed in employing peaceful means in their struggles. He stated that PAS would remain dedicated to peaceful means as long as there was room for freedom of expression and criticism. "We accept democracy as an approach to uphold and realise the Islamic aspirations, as democracy provides for freedom

despite several weaknesses. We maintain this approach all this time, whether we win or lose in the elections” (*MK* October, 18, 2002:3).

He further contended that, unlike PAS, UMNO had not been able to accept defeat in democratic contests such as the 1969 general elections when UMNO seats were affected and again in 1999 when UMNO lost Terengganu to PAS. Hadi felt that UMNO wanted a one-party rule for Malaysia and stated his reasons:

UMNO violated the constitution and democracy, denied us of the states oil royalties, and deliberately delayed federal funds to us. They also suppressed the media, [using them] to highlight their opinions and deny us a fair opportunity to answer to their accusations. . . . They then used the police force to ban *ceramah* [public talks] by the opposition on the grounds that they may cause instability. Our *ceramah* have always been peaceful until the police interfered and provoked the participants.

Interestingly to note that PAS Youth leader Mohd Sabu once quipped that we certainly do not have to worry about being an Islamic state, because we are a police state. While this observation is quite extreme, there is no denying that the police in Malaysia have a bigger role in affecting public society than the Islamic state. And because it is the police force that is dominant, the suppression of thought has quite a different dynamic here. Citizens believe that they are qualified to speak up. We do not feel that we are really that inferior compared to the West. (*Star* March 18, 2003)

Furthermore, Hadi maintained, “We want the people to look at the reality and not be influenced by the media controlled by UMNO. Who has PAS killed from UMNO and *Barisan Nasional* if we are a violent party? In the 1986 Memali [North Malaysia] incident, PAS members were killed. We have been the victims, not the perpetrators. Society should be able to make its own judgment about the reputation of PAS” (*MK* October, 18, 2002:3).

Hasam Mohd salled (PAS-Bukit Payung) also pointed to PAS’s history and was quoted by *The Star*:

Don’t forget that PAS has already ruled two states for years. Do you think as soon as they get power nationally, they are suddenly going to rip off their

exposing Taliban costumes and shoot all the Chinese? My answer is simple: Come live in Kelantan or Trengganu for a year and decide for yourself. PAS cannot be compared to the Taliban. (July 8, 2002)

Seen in this perspective, it could be argued that PAS's channel of mass communication, the *ceramah*, had been severely curtailed, restricted, and provoked into containing imprudent and rash statements. UMNO and other allied parties of *Barisan Nasional*, which control almost all mainstream media, played the double game: one view for the consumption of Muslims and another for non-Muslims. PAS tried to counter UMNO's showmanship by engaging in some of its own, as Hadi answered through *MalaysiaKini*:

Even in an Islamic state, there are individual rights which ought to be respected. People are free to practice their religion, culture and lifestyle as long as these do not affect the other communities. Muslims cannot disrupt the rights of the non-Muslims. This is a democratic space advocated in the religion. We cannot coerce them in this matter though it is only right for them to follow no other way of life than that of Islam. But according to Islam, every Muslim must accept the religion as the basis for their life. This is compulsory for them. It is not good for Muslims to make choices on certain matters which are already determined by the religion and the laws. (February 25, 2002: 3-12)

Based on PAS's own religious issues framing, it is reasonable to say that what PAS wants is a multiethnic, multi-religious country to become a state governed by Islamic law—albeit under the rigorous dictates of *sharia* based on the Qur'an and Hadish—and not Islamic Taliban rule (*AM* September 2001, Issue 9:5).

PAS Encourages jihad for Western Aggression against Taliban

In the wake of September 11, many expressed strong sentiments condemning the terrorist attacks; however, the subsequent U.S. military response and retaliation against the Taliban is what Muslims believe most offended the Islamic world. Emotionally driven rhetoric obscured the overriding factor: What was at

stake was the relationship between Islam and the West. The public debate was a war being waged between “crusaders” and *jihadists* (MK July 2002).

The Star wrote an article stating that, as of September 22, 2001, East Asian Muslims numbered 170.3 million in Indonesia, 22.1 million in China, 10.8 million in Malaysia, 3.9 million in the Philippines, 3.3 million in Thailand and 500,000 in Singapore. It is these numbers that each region’s religious radicals hoped to tap into to build greater solidarity for their cause. What they seek is “Muslim solidarity and Muslim brotherhood” against “certain powers who dislike Islam and who disagree with Islamic values” (*Star* September 22, 2001). Indonesia’s leading Islamic scholars gave their consent to such thinking. The Council of Ulama (Muslim scholars) approved a call “on all Muslims of the world to unite and mobilize their forces to fight in the path of Allah [a *jihad*] should the aggression of the United States and its allies against Afghanistan and the Islamic world take place” (*Star* September 22, 2001).

PAS also subscribed to the idea of *jihad*, and anti-American rhetoric became a regular feature during the PAS Friday sermons. Some PAS *iman* called on their congregations to prepare for a *jihad* if the U.S.-led international military attacked Afghanistan. An attack on the predominantly Muslim Afghanistan would be tantamount to an attack on Islam, according to these preachers (*NST* September 27, 2001). Nik Aziz Nik Mat said that Muslims are obliged to help in any way if any of their countries are attacked and that such support could even mean “sending personnel” (*NST* September 27, 2001:11).

U.S. backlash came largely from conservative Christian factions and were part of a string of anti-Islamic remarks in the aftermath of September 11. *New Straits Times* reported shortly after the attacks that popular U.S. televangelists Pat Robertson and Jimmy Swaggart caused anger with their anti-Islamic comments, drawing a rare rebuke from Bush to the Religious Right, one of his political power bases. Robertson described Islam as “the fountainhead” of terrorism and alleged that Muslims were bent on killing Jews. Swaggart referred to Islam’s Prophet Mohammed as a “sex deviant” and called for the expulsion of all foreign Muslim students from the U.S. (September 2001). Bush was quick to say that the remarks did not represent his views, the views of his administration, or most Americans.

A *Harakah* editorial predicted the reaction, stating that while the UMNO government must link PAS with Islamic extremism and the terrorist network from Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to achieve political advantage, such a position would be disastrous on the international front because Malaysia would then become numbered among those countries that harbor terrorists (September 21, 2001).

PAS President Fadzil Noor stated shortly after the U.S. offensive in Afghanistan, “The attacks were not only against the Taliban rulers but also a direct assault on Muslims. . . . America attacked a small and defenseless country without showing the world strong proof. They are war criminals. All Muslims must oppose these criminals—this time there is no denying a call to *jihad*” (*HK* October 2001).

PAS defended the rights of Muslims without prejudice to any government, including the Taliban. As *Aliran Monthly* wrote:

PAS Secretary-General Nashruddin Mat Isa said the party leadership had agreed on the *jihad* and that its targets were the enemies of Islam. He said, "Members no longer need to seek the approval of the party if they wish to take up the fight in Afghanistan." (*AM* week of October 5, 2001)

PAS supporters noted that they were not alone in sympathy for the people of Afghanistan. People of all faiths, cultures, and languages were concerned for the innocent people of that country—even those who supported the right of the United States to self-defense.

Malaysian moderate Dr. Ismail Ibrahim, chairman of the country's National Fatwa Council, rejected the cries for a holy war by vocal Muslim groups. He argued that Muslims in Malaysia should not fall for the *jihad* outcry. If the United States attacked Afghanistan, it would not be an attack on Islam but an attempt at finding the enemies of the United States (*NST* September 28, 2001). Mustapha Ali PAS leader also took a moderate stance through *MalaysiaKini*:

What is not right is calling the U.S. the "mother of all terrorists." That is stereotyping the United States as a country and all Americans, including American Muslims. It is as wrong as Dr. Mahathir calling Western fund managers and currency traders "wild beasts" during the height of the Asian financial crisis in late 1998 and early 1999, or smearing the Chinese community as "communists" and "Al Ma'unah" in last year's National Day message. Of course, it could be argued that in the U.S. too, there are fanatical Christian and extreme atheist groups which always slander Islam and stereotype all Muslims as "terrorists."

However, these non-Islamic fanatics and extreme atheists slander not only Muslims, but also other Christians, Buddhists, Hindus and all other people who do not subscribe to their controversial views and untested beliefs. . . . The greatest pitfall PAS must guard against in the future is perhaps the doublespeak propaganda of its political rival. Having emerged as a more national, inclusive and centrist party under the leadership of Fadzil Noor, PAS must not be trapped by its own emotion or UMNO's propaganda into parochial nationalism and fringe politics again. It should compete with UMNO to occupy the middle ground. (*MK* September 25, 2001)

Sensing that its opportunity was turning to threat, PAS attempted to undermine UMNO's attempts at frame alignment with a contested target through counterframing (see Benford 1987:75). The group tried to discredit the activities of UMNO by playing to the Malay-Muslim majority constituency with two major main issues: The first issue was the widespread hostility toward the government for its actions against Anwar Ibrahim and, second, objection to the use of oppressive laws in an effort to ensure the political survival of Mahathir and his cronies. According to PAS, UMNO is notorious for dealing with political opposition through trumped-up charges and detention without trial. Nik Aziz further commented:

Politics for us didn't begin when the West invented socialism, capitalism, or pragmatism. It began with Islam. Therefore, when we have problems, we don't turn to socialism, capitalism, or pragmatism. We return to Islam for our solution. (HK February 14, 2003:1-2).

The salient point is that PAS condemned the September 11 attacks but strongly opposed the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In a 2005 debate in the Malaysia parliament, the questions were framed: Was the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) behind the bombings in Bali and Jakarta, which left hundreds dead and scores injured? Were the bombings deliberately carried out to paint Islam in a negative light? These questions were put forward by PAS Youth Chief Salahuddin Ayub on November 12, 2005, when urging the government to play a more active role in dispelling the global perception that Islam is equated with terrorism. The Kubang Kerian parliamentarian also suggested the possibility that Indonesian cleric Riduan Issamuddin or Hambali, accused of masterminding the attacks, could have been on the CIA payroll "to portray Islam as the new enemy.

. . . The bombs that were used were too costly and not affordable for them. These kinds of sophisticated bombs could only be bought by the U.S.” (*NST* November 12, 2005:3).

PAS extended and amplified its frame by stating its goal of protecting human rights in general and Muslims in particular and by opposing any war perceived to be persecution of Muslims. In doing so, PAS bridged principles with other anti-war groups, such as the International Movement for a Just World. PAS joined protesters outside the U.S. embassy in Kuala Lumpur with signs saying, “No to War, No to Terrorism” and “Justice and Peace without Vengeance” (*NST* October 7, 2001). A delegation delivered a letter from 23 Malaysian organizations, including Christian and Buddhist groups, stating opposition to unilateral U.S. military action.

MalaysiaKini columnist Zulkifly Yusof wrote on October 24, 2001:

I must say it saddens me greatly the extent the Muslim readers have stooped to accommodate the so-called “justice” for the Americans vis-a-vis war against terrorism. I greatly wonder why that it now becomes acceptable to bomb a country with millions of innocent people just because the U.S. government suspects Osama bin Laden as the terrorist behind the WTC attacks. The stance of other Muslims should be only the strongest condemnation against America’s retaliation—these are your brothers dying.

It is foolish to equate this to support of terrorism. Islam condemns in the strongest terms those who kill innocent people, including what the Americans are doing now. The perpetrators of injustice and aggression must be brought to justice, but it is absolutely irrational to punish the whole nation because of acts of a few individuals. For equally baffling reasons nowadays it seems PAS has become an object of condemnation, for being insensitive, irrational, and extreme. PAS is not without mistakes; any party or group of people, for that matter, fall in the same quagmire. But it is shortsighted and irresponsible to say that PAS has suddenly become irrelevant for voicing strong support to help the Afghanis and condemning the attacks.

Lastly, as Muslims we should prioritize our support and allegiance. When innocent people, be they Muslim or non-Muslim, in some other parts of the world are being killed, it is not too much for all of us to voice our objection.

Women's Role in PAS

PAS has sympathized with Afghanistan's fallen Taliban regime, whose imposition of the *hudud* code in that country was condemned as barbarous and oppressive to women. For PAS, this is really a misguided analogy, but most importantly, PAS wants to turn multicultural Malaysia into a conservative Islamic state and has already enacted *hudud* (NST June, 12, 2002). Malaysian scholar Zainah Anwar argued:

A major reason for the silence that surrounds law-making in the name of Islam is fear and ignorance. The bifurcation of the modern education system means that the majority of UMNO who trained in secular schools have little knowledge of religion, and those PAS majority trained in religion have little understanding of the world outside. (Anwar 2005:123)

An ongoing issue within PAS is the party's perceived image of what a woman should be. PAS president Fadzil Noor said:

As in all parties, PAS has its own women's wing. In fact, our relationship with women's wings in BA is good. You can see that during elections and other programs, women come down and help together with the men. We may not have all those *Kelab Wanita* [UMNO's women's clubs] set up by the government using the taxpayer's money. . . . The critics must also realize that we are a new coalition and we have not had enough time to plan the role of women in BA. Yes, the participation of women in BA is smaller if compared to BN's, but we are new.

We have our reasons why PAS did not field women in the last general elections. We are reviewing that to see whether *Muslimat* PAS [women's wing] should stand in the next general elections. . . . I am also worried about groups such as the Sisters in Islam as they seem to be influenced by the feminist movement of the West. We have our culture and values, and we should fight in line with Islamic traditions. Actually, I am not sure what they are asking for when they criticize our policies on women. (MK June 25, 2002: 9).

PAS and ISA

The government's Internal Security Act (ISA) has long been criticized as undemocratic and a violation of fundamental human rights. Following the detention of Anwar and his colleagues under this draconian law in 1998, PAS and other opposition groups became much stronger nationally and

internationally. As a result, the methods of repression expanded: There is continued muzzling of the press by the Printing Presses and Publications Act, the Official Secrets Act and the Sedition Act. The University and University Colleges Act, 1976 continues to curb student political activities, their rights of speech, assembly and association. The right of speech and assembly is further restricted by the Police Act and the Penal Code. “Blasphemy” laws or “insult to Islam” laws under State Islamic laws further curtail speech on Islam (Ahmad 2005).

Likewise, for the first time, a lot of middle-class Malays are expressing their opposition to the ISA. It is not surprising, therefore, that UMNO has resorted to religious and communal scare tactics to create fear among the people about any change in government. PAS President Fadzil Noor argued that the government has become more repressive and has succeeded in controlling the police, judiciary, and media, thus undermining the neutrality and independence of these important state institutions.

In another key issue, the events of September 11 also encouraged the Malaysian public to take a more serious stance on human rights violations. PAS and human rights advocates have joined to discredit the UMNO government regarding ISA’s repressive laws. They have argued that the United States—past opponents of laws providing for detention without trial and legislation that violates international human rights law and standards—was now seen as diluting the same principles in the name of combating terrorism (*MK* May 22, 2002). While Mahathir and his government gained temporary political advantage with the

terrorist framing smears against PAS, none of the underlying human rights issues in Malaysia have been resolved. Because of that, the PAS framing and counterframing have aggressively exploited the human rights and antiwar issues to undermine UMNO and its collaboration with the United States.

Throughout the years, PAS has argued that UMNO and the Malaysian government have yet to demonstrate that any of the individuals it has detained have actually engaged in any illegal activity. PAS has also claimed that the government has not shown that the investigation, arrest, and detention of alleged militants could not have been handled through normal criminal procedures—ones that included proper procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the accused. Without these safeguards, the Malaysian government cannot be sure that all of the people it has captured are, in fact, dangerous individuals who planned to carry out attacks, or whether it has imprisoned people whose only crime is to be a member of a small group of charismatic Muslim clerics protesting U.S. actions. Without judicial resources, the future of these detainees is subject to the whims of the Malaysian government.

MalaysiaKini reported on January 15, 2002, that 31 ISA detainees, most of them classed as JI and held in the Kamaunting Detention Camp, wrote an 18-page document addressed to the *MalaysiaKini* and National Human Rights Commission detailing a catalogue of torture and ill treatment while in detention. What is extraordinary is that this is the first time that post-September 11 detainees have revealed what has happened during their time in detention and subsequent treatment in the camp. They described being stripped naked, forced

to stand for day-long interrogation sessions, being spat at by interrogators, and being forced to drink spittle. The detainees also claimed that they had their beards shaved or burned (*MK* January 15, 2002:5-9). To see how cruel ISA is, one of its detainees, Chinese activist Tian Chua, stated in *The Star*:

I was assaulted at the time I was detained and during the subsequent interrogations. I was also beaten up and threatened at the detention camp. When the police ransacked my living room, they did not allow me to follow them. I was forbidden to bring anything with me when under arrest. So, I did not have any towel, toothbrush, soap and extra clothes with me. For more than 30 days, I wore the same old clothing. I wore it after bathing even though my body was still wet. I wore it from wet to dry and from dry to wet, over and over again, day after day. During one interrogation session, the police officer questioned why I was so smelly. He was sitting at the other end of the table about four feet away. I replied, "You didn't allow me to bring anything with me or to see anyone from my family. I haven't brushed my teeth, have taken baths without soap, haven't washed my clothes, and haven't had any extra clothes to change for more than 30 days." Only after that did I get to see my family members and had my daily essentials. (*Star* September 11, 2002)

CONCLUSION

It is important to note that since PAS captured the two Malaysia states from the ruling UMNO in the national elections of 1990 and 1999, it achieved a more powerful position in the political sphere and transformed Malay Muslims' thinking and culture toward life after death (*akhirat*) instead of just the world (*duniawi*). With this in mind, UMNO and the government felt threatened by the PAS approach to political and economical matters. As a result of the events and aftermath of September 11, the challenge for UMNO has been to contain the PAS movement activity and use the September 11 crisis as an opportunity to gain majority support from Malay Muslims and to win over the thousands of PAS conservative members. For instance, although it is difficult to prove, it has been reported by the pro-government media that, since September 11, some PAS members have joined UMNO. In addition, the Chinese Action Party (DAP)

withdrew from the opposition front. As PAS President Abdul Hadi commented, “We always regard the withdrawal of DAP as stemming from its own internal problems” (*NST* August 14, 2002:1-2).

The government activities being carried out in the name of the “war on terror” have often been accompanied by emotional expressions that lead the Muslim population to wonder about its own religion and religious identity. On the surface, the government actions are part of the war on terror and, as such, may be considered legitimate and rational to the world as a whole. Yet the tragedy was also easily converted into an opportunity for UMNO that has cast Malaysia in a position that flies in the face of international human rights laws such as presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial. With its broad use of ISA and its refusal to bring these cases to trial, Malaysia has turned these principles on their head.

The power of frames to shape or control public discourse, winning support, and guiding collective action on any particular issue, is significant. At this juncture, UMNO faces a very traditional political dilemma, for its ability to use frames in the ways so far described is not unlimited. However, UMNO seems to have been more adept than PAS at framing since September 11, and the ability of UMNO to put forward suitable frames has become an extremely important tool. With it, it has defined public discourse on the issue on its own terms—or at least introduced terms more congruent with its own ideological interpretations. It bridges, amplifies, extends, and transforms frames to expand of sympathizers and adherents and strengthens the ability to dominate discourse in whatever

sphere it happens to operate. UMNO has ultimately been able to construct and develop frames to shape the political process in its favor.

The post-September 11 environment has led to changes in the opportunities for both the United States and the Malaysian UMNO government. Western countries are now lauded for employing various forms of preventive detention, and Malaysia's claims that preventive detention is necessary to keep terrorists at bay is represented as doubly validated. Rais Yatin argues, "The government had no intention of releasing more than 100 alleged terrorists held under the ISA, even for the purpose of a trial for fear they would be a security risk." He justifies this by using the example of the U.S. government's detention of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Bay (*NST* September 9, 2003:12).

The great Muslim ex-heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali when asked by a reporter how he felt about having Osama bin Laden as a member of the same religion, responded, "How do you feel having Hitler as a member of the same religion as you?" (*Bernama* October 15, 2001).

CHAPTER 7

OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

Using comparative historical analyses of media reports, I had examined the use of religious values and beliefs by UMNO and PAS as they framed ethnic and religious identity issues to facilitate their political goals and to respond to shifting opportunities and threats. I examined four historical events that were theorized to be incidents leading to the shifts in religious framing in response to opportunities and threats: (1) the opportunities of PAS in the 1990 general election, (2) the opportunities of PAS in the 1999 general election, (3) the Anwar religious background issue (regarding its possible contribution to PAS's 1999 election success), and (4) the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States (regarding its possible contribution to recent UMNO success).

APPLICATION OF THE CONCLUSIONS TO THE FOUR HISTORICAL EVENTS

THE 1990 ELECTIONS

Regarding the 1990 election campaigns, the study results show that two key factors combined with religious framing issues to produce opportunity for PAS.

First, the findings confirm the importance of PAS's religious issues framing to mobilize voters, especially the ability of the PAS religious frame to convey meaning and values to Malay Muslim people in the heartland states. The importance for groups to actively frame their efforts cannot be underestimated, as Snow and Benford (2000) argue: The more inclusive the frame, the more it

may mobilize participants who would not otherwise join. No one can deny that PAS religious issues framing did play a crucial role and effectively resulted in the overall success of the 1990 elections.

Second, the findings confirm that political instability within UMNO and among UMNO political elites provided opportunity to the PAS movement (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1996). The breakaway of Razaleigh Hamzah from UMNO to form *Semangat 46* (Spirit of '46) and a coalition with PAS contributed to PAS's limited success in the 1990 elections. PAS would not have been successful in the 1990 elections by just framing the religious issues without also taking advantage of UMNO's political instability within that period. Third, as this study confirms, there is no question that PAS's ideological and religious issues framing resonates with its Kelantanese Malay Muslim constituents.

Because of political instability within the UMNO organization, coupled with PAS's religious frame efforts, UMNO seemed to respond more often to threats than to opportunity (see Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In other words, its opportunities declined and the threats against it increased. Thus, UMNO worked mainly as a countermovement, as a political movement with nationalist ideology that made claims in response to those made by the PAS Islamic movement.

This study considered UMNO to be basically a countermovement because (1) PAS showed signs of success in both the 1990 and 1999 general elections, (2) the interests of mainstream society were threatened by PAS's Islamic goal to establish an Islamic state, and (3) political allies such as the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysia Indian Congress (MIC) were available to aid in

oppositional mobilization. For instance, fearing Islamic state *sharia* laws such as *hudud*, the non-Malays—especially MCA and MIC—voted heavily for the National Front, which enabled UMNO to maintain a two-thirds majority despite PAS's limited success in certain regions (NST December 2, 1999).

Religious issues often spark grassroots movements, and this groundswell may be the main source that helped PAS campaign organizations and political opportunities. Broadly speaking, the resulting opportunities facilitated PAS's success in the 1990 election. PAS's framing of its religious proposals influenced voters in Kelantan, a state in Northern Malaysia, solidifying an election mobilization.

THE 1998 ANWAR IBRAHIM SAGA

This study confirmed that, for an issue to have mobilizing potential, the frame must succeed in characterizing a social problem as an injustice (Snow and Benford 1992). Likewise, "The social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable must come to seem both unjust and mutable" (Piven and Cloward 1977:12).

In this regard, the study indicated that Anwar's supporters were able to create collective action frames by appealing first to the constituents' ethnic identities as Malay, Chinese and Indian, then forging a shared group identity as *Reformasi* (reform for social justice). This demonstrates the need for movement actors to ensure that a frame is inclusive and that it encompasses issues that are not discriminatory, which could exclude potential supporters. As Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) state, "Movement can create collective action frames,

demonstrate the efficacy of various means of political action, and draw media attention that activates balancing norms in mainstream media” (P. 1634). It is assumed that Anwar supporters of collective action anticipated that their actions and their involvement with others concerned about Anwar Ibrahim’s situation would work to resolve the problem (see McAdam et al. 1996).

In this regard, most Anwar supporters were in mainstream society, composed of multiethnic groups coming together to initiate collective action. Events related to the firing and attempts to publicly humiliate Anwar triggered a consciousness-raising for these people, either affecting them directly or having the potential to affect them in the future. In fact, the actions of the Mahathir government actively raised serious questions about the government’s legitimacy and its concern for human rights.

The group supporting Anwar in the wake of his firing and the calumny perpetrated by the Mahathir government was composed of persons who (1) perceived the government actions as unjust, (2) acted at least partially out of a desire for social change, and thus (3) perceived that they had something in common with others in the group. This confirms what Gamson (1992a) observed, that this is particularly likely to occur when individuals perceive injustice—either suffered by themselves or others with whom the actor is sympathetic. Gamson posited that a sense of injustice is a crucial component of any collective action frame (P. 7). A feeling of moral indignation can spur people into action. It also calls attention to opposing forces that are deemed to be responsible for the perceived injustice. On the other side of the claim, people

are unlikely to act if they do not define their situation as a collective problem that can and should be addressed through collective action (Snow et al. 1986).

Decisions about whether to be involved in social protest may be based on dynamic interaction and information flow. As Tarrow (1998) observes, during periods of increased contention there is a frequency and intensity of interaction that depends in part on rapid flow of information. One important development in the interactions that resulted from the Anwar problem was that the founding of the NJP (KeADILan) was led by Wan Azizah Ismail, Anwar's wife. The NJP represented a drastic shift from the communal politics that had dominated the Malaysian political landscape since independence, bringing the major ethnic groups—Malays, Chinese, and Indians—together in political unity as well as producing opportunity for the PAS Islamic movement. As Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) observe, "A movement sometimes succeeds in forcing public attention on issues by creating or exploiting critical, often unexpected, events" (P. 1638).

Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) also argue that "when a movement shows signs of success, others may see its gains as threats to their own interests" (P. 1639). In this case, the Anwar episode produced a threat to Mahathir and UMNO. "Different types of threats are likely to produce different types of countermovement" (P. 1639). The Anwar case was used by Mahathir to symbolize a whole set of values by attacking Anwar's character as immoral. The sodomy accusation was likely to threaten Malay Muslim constituents who reject that kind of behavior as immoral, sinful behavior, whether within or outside Islam.

This accusation was designed to attract people to participate in UMNO's countermovement actions; unfortunately, Anwar Ibrahim's religious values and beliefs were perceived by the general public to be stronger than the allegations and, as a result, essentially no one believed the allegations. This explains why the Anwar saga has contributed to PAS's political opportunities by amplifying its religious beliefs and values due to the "un-Islamic" way in which UMNO handled the Anwar case.

THE 1999 ELECTIONS

The findings show that two key factors in the 1999 elections combined with PAS religious framing issues to provide opportunity to PAS. First, analysis shows that once in power in the State of Kelantan after the 1990 election, PAS attempted to offer a new way of conceptualizing and gauging the wave of organization innovation that had given the Kelantan community a sense of belonging over the previous decade. PAS contended that UMNO and its secularist attitudes had destroyed the fabric of the Malay Muslim community. PAS's leader argued that Malay Muslims are a transient people living in a secular world with a lifestyle that is resulting in less religious and more economic and personal disruption. PAS tried to convey that Muslims felt uprooted, with no real sense of belonging. This position was attractive to many Muslims, who turned to the movement for community and kinship. The Kelantanese people in particular were genuinely attracted to PAS and stayed loyal to the party as they felt the warmth of acceptance. The communal life and shared beliefs gave meaning to their existence (see Gamson 1992a). Since taking power from UMNO in Kelantan in

1990, PAS has pursued “feel-good” initiatives for both the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

In the 1999 campaign, the successful *kulliyah* or lecture events every Friday morning led by PAS leader Nik Aziz attracted journalists to witness what PAS had done right since taking power from UMNO, based on Islamic principles and without discrimination against non-Muslims. Prior to the elections, *Harrah* and independent newspapers such as *MalaysiaKini* and *Asian Times* reported and publicized PAS events, which amplified public interest.

This review of events supports the argument that the most effective frames are usually those that resonate with the shared life experiences of those targeted for recruitment (Snow and Benford 1988). The Kelantanese people felt that their religious convictions required them to transform the world according to God’s plan. This explains why people in the heartland states cared little about UMNO’s economic development frame; they believed that their actions were based on reward in the afterworld. This perspective was implanted in the minds of conservative Malays by PAS’s amplified religious message frames. This study confirms that religious beliefs are oriented to supernatural forces, and they offer future rewards to compensate for hardships endured during a lifetime. While such beliefs can indeed be manipulated to maintain social order, they also contain seeds of rebellion. These findings stand in contrast to claims that participation can be explained in terms of selective incentives (Olson 1971).

The “afterlife” promises provided a main incentive for PAS constituents’ religious participation in collective action, instead of selective incentive, as Olson

(1971) claimed. Beliefs and values inspired people to engage in collective action for the intrinsic rewards rather than out of economic self-interest. Indeed, when frames deployed by social movements resonate with the deeply held values and beliefs of their target, potential supporters are more likely to join the cause (see Snow and Benford 1988). These same values may also have played a role in shaping PAS group members' willingness to protest against the UMNO-led government. While Iannacone (1990) posited religious behavior as a way to satisfy individual needs, for people in Malay heartland it is about living a life in accordance with transcendent ideals.

The Anwar Ibrahim saga brought together opposition groups among Muslim and non-Muslim political parties, such as *Barisan Alternatif*, against UMNO and its *Barisan Nasional*. This study confirms that "movement organizations forge their claims in response to numerous influences, including organizational needs, constituency preferences, changing political circumstances, and the venues in which they operate" (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1651). To make claims in the venue of the 1999 election, PAS willingly dropped its Islamic State agenda and altered its collective action frames to fit the *Barisan Alternatif* manifestos. More significantly, PAS's election slogan changed from "PAS, Party of Allah" in 1986 to a more softened "Progress with Islam" in the 1990 and 1999 elections.

My findings support Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) proposition that "the movements generate countermovement response to the degree that they put their issues of concern into play, suggesting the viability and necessity of

countermobilization” (P. 1635). In this study, the groups put their religious issues of concern into play, suggesting, political allies are available to aid oppositional mobilization (P. 1635). UMNO reaped its sweetest political success within the *barisan nasional* coalition—the Mca and Mic—which does not impose the *sharia* or any trapping of a Malay Islamic State, saved umno from pas political threats.

This study confirms Meyer and Staggenborg’s (1996) proposition that “movements that face strong opposing movements will be unable to take advantage of favorable political conditions after victories because countermobilization preempts the development of new claims” (P. 1652). UMNO’s new claim tried to discredit the *Barisan Alternatif* with the argument that the social and economic policy alternatives posed by the opposition alliance were not serious alternatives at all, because the basic goals of the opposition—the fundamentalist PAS, the National Justice Party led by Anwar’s wife, the Chinese-dominated DAP, and the smaller Malaysian people’s party—differed widely. UMNO claimed that PAS’s objective of an Islamic state was fraught with obvious danger for the unity and stability of the nation (*NST* November 12, 1999:11).

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

No doubt, UMNO strategic choices made it clear that the ruling UMNO was faced with a serious challenge for control of Malay politics by PAS in the 1990 election, the Anwar saga in 1998, and the 1999 election—all prior to 2001. However, UMNO made solid gains (political opportunities) in the wake of September 11, 2001. UMNO’s position changed from political threats to emerging political

opportunities after that date. At that point in time, UMNO was amplifying liberal or moderate Islam, while PAS continued to embrace fundamentalist *jihad*—an embrace unfavorable to PAS in the aftermath of September 11.

This study shows that the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, constituted a key factor in producing opportunity for UMNO. The study confirms that both movement and countermovement generally need allies among elites and that such allies can generate or support an effective countermovement. U.S. support for the war on terror provided tactical opportunities for Mahathir in his battle against PAS's group ideology. While the events of 1990, 1998, and 1999 led to success for the Islamic movement and presented a threat to UMNO, the events of 2001 turned threat into opportunity by creating outrage, urgency, and a sense of threat to national security on the part of the local, national, and international communities. UMNO succeeded in forcing public attention toward terrorist issues by exploiting the events for their own political interests. One of the results was a clear increase in solidarity in all levels of society.

Significantly, the attacks of September 11 raised public consciousness and resonated strongly with all segments of the public, with profound implications for PAS and other Islamic groups. The immediate aggressive framing formulated by UMNO was used to its advantage by UMNO, requiring PAS to formulate a countermovement mobilization (see "Proposition 2" of Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1638). More important, after September 11, 2001, UMNO proved willing to give up its secular ideology by claiming that Malaysia was

already an Islamic state, as shown by the address of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad on September 29, 2001 (Liow 2004).

PAS knew that the terrorist attacks and the immediate public concern placed PAS in trouble, so it adjusted its tactics. As Gitlin (1980) suggests, “Movements must be not only innovative but must escalate their tactics in order to get media attention” (as cited in Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1651). Their counterframing focused on the Internal Security Act and challenged UMNO’s policy that labeled some Islamic groups as “terrorist.” PAS painted the actions of the Malaysian government and its allies as attacks by the West that constituted a threat to basic Islamic religious beliefs. Such an immediate and serious threat to religious beliefs can lead to a strong response—in the case of Islam, serious consideration of *jihad* as one of several possible responses. This position is in contrast to claims by Olson (1971) that the perception that one’s religious beliefs are under attack does not necessarily lead directly to collective action.

SUMMARY OF RELIGIOUS FRAMING

The effects of these four historical critical events on the framing and counterframing strategies of UMNO and PAS are mixed. On the one hand, the position of PAS toward issues pertaining to religion and Anwar resonated with those who are aligned with multiethnic Malaysian identity. These events should provide more frame content opportunities for PAS. In fact, PAS took the advantage in the Anwar events, claiming that UMNO threatened religious values in the Muslim community, which required UMNO to look for counterframing opportunities. On the other hand, the events around September 11, 2001,

provided dramatic opportunities for UMNO's framing of a threat to Malaysian and world peace by terrorists, whom Mahathir attempted to associate with Malaysian conservative groups such as PAS. This study indicates the importance of the role of religion, political space, framing, and counterframing provided by political alignments and party competition to gain opportunities and to avoid threats. The differences in the religious identity construction are clearly seen in table 9.

Table 9

Social Characteristics that Contributed to Each Group's Religious Framings

UMNO	PAS
Emphasis on ethnic identity	Emphasis on religious identity
Specific territory and state	<i>Ummah al Islamiyya</i> (community of believers)
Establishment religions (<i>al-Islam al rasmi</i>)	Populist religion (<i>al-Islam al shabi</i>)
Moderate, liberal, and conservative	Fundamentalist, conservative
Separation of state and religion	State and religion
Islam Hadhari	Islam based on Qur'an and Sunnah

Opportunities or Threats in Political Mobilization

First, this study shows that political mobilization for conducting elections may be seen as a set of discursive opportunities or threats that either defend or determine which of the strategic framing or counterframing attempts by movements or countermovements are more likely to achieve visibility, resonance, and perceived legitimacy in the public domain. As Meyer and

Staggenborg (1996) argue, movements generate countermovement response to the degree that they put their issues of concern into play, suggesting the viability and necessity of countermobilization (P. 1635).

Counterframing

Second, this study demonstrates that opportunities and threats are strongly shaped by the events and issues defined by the effectiveness of two distinct types of frame processes in politic frame alignment and counterframing—and that one or the other of these emerges as particularly important for social movement or countermovement success. Social movements attempt to undermine their opponents' attempts at frame alignment with contested targets through "counterframing—attempts to rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework" (Benford 1987:75).

Four Conditions for Effective Political Frame Alignment and Counterframing

The purpose of this study was not to provide a strong argument or test of hypotheses but simply to suggest a new direction in the analysis of the relationships between framing and counterframing religious issues and between opportunities and threats in the development of social movement.

In summary, the analyses presented in this paper show that discursive opportunities and threats and consequent framing and counterframing are the materials of reality required for the construction of social movement and countermovement strategies. This would explain how all four of these conditions between UMNO and PAS were expected and were confirmed in the four key

historical events selected for analysis in this study. The historical key events that this study uncovers may have simply created an environment that would be a confirmation of the shift of the religious framing methodology process to result in either opportunities or threats.

CONCLUSION

How can these alignments be understood? We must look at UMNO's brand of modernism, despite Mahathir's declarations that UMNO is *not* moderate (as critics have argued) but actually supports fundamentalist Islam. UMNO has tried to equate Islam with modernity, economic development, material progress, rationality, and liberalism. "The Islamization of their political agenda has invariably to be reconciled with its *raison d'être* as defenders of Malay identity" (Liow 2004:189). Essentially, Mahathir and UMNO have tried to frame Islam as a progressive religion that could be embedded with notions of modernity, economic development, and a knowledge economy.

In this frame dispute, the "UMNO" and "PAS" will always find a way to make their positions known in the political arena. It may be through amplified frames or muckraking speeches, or it may be one voice that speaks for many.

Political writer Anil Netto wrote the following commentary in *Aliran Monthly* in September 2002:

An Islamic state is but the first step to putting religion and politics into the mix. What is scary is what comes after that. If you follow the logic of reasoning here, ultimately the Constitution would be secondary and rules of God would be primary and be put into practice. You can see for yourself how well other countries do when they put religion into the mix with politics and religion ahead of their Constitution. Many things would not make sense anymore. In theory, yes, one can keep saying that religion is for the good of people and such, but in reality and in practice, especially in the fields of politics, such theories can never happen to that extent.

Let's take a good example, one of the religious commandments, "Thou shall not kill." This is the best example here: Look around you and tell me, how many factions of people kill in the name of religion? Discriminate against people based on religion? Many and many more. I know, these things are done by human beings, but human beings are the agents that spread God's Word in this plane of reality; therefore, God's Word can be twisted here and there. Theoretically speaking, God's Word is infallible, but in reality, God's Word is always twisted by the leaders. A good example is Al-Qaeda. When you are in politics, you are in an even better position to twist God's Word, just like UMNO is doing.

So, politics and religion, oil and water. Do not even think about mixing them, or else bad things will follow. Forget about the glorious days of the Islamic Civilization—we are way past that. There isn't a leader as capable as those great Khalifs or as capable as Saladin. Those are legendary heroes and people. No one in Malaysia is as great as those. (Issue 9)

Countering this position, PAS has argued that the Islamization proposed by the UMNO-led government is not really designed to lay the foundations of an Islamic state but is, in fact, part of an elaborate scheme to make the country *appear* more Islamic while remaining firmly entrenched within the global liberal-capitalist economic system (Farish Noor, *MK* March 22, 2003). PAS strives to give traditional Islam a greater prominence, not only in the personal lives of the people but in the public sphere as well (Liow 2004:188). PAS holds that a state modeled on Islamic principles is necessary to address the religious issues. PAS's ultimate objective is to establish all of Malaysia as a country based on Islamic legal theory, derived from the primary sources of Islam—the Qur'an and Sunnah—as opposed to UMNO's Islam Hadhari (Hussein 2002).

UMNO's sole purpose is to defend Malay rights and privileges and to ensure Islam Hadhari is implemented to the fullest. As *MalaysiaKini* published on October 2, 2004, even MCA, MIC, Gerakan and the 10-plus other non-Malay, non-Muslim political parties in *Barisan Nasional*, support UMNO on this. The MCA President clearly said so:

If they did not agree, they would have left the ruling coalition. To demonstrate this support, representatives from all these parties attended the UMNO assembly. What UMNO wants is what *Barisan Nasional* wants as well. When UMNO talks, it is like the entire *Barisan Nasional* talking. There is no dispute here. (MK October 2, 2004)

In 2003, a new UMNO president and new Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who replaced Mahathir, commented in *New Straits Times* on November 16, 2006, that as Islam Hadhari—or “civilizational Islam” as it is now known—is not a blank check for ultra conservatism, it is not a blank check for permissiveness. Islam Hadhari promotes tolerance of other religions and is a reminder to Muslims that Islam is more than just literal laws and prohibitions.

From a PAS perspective, “fundamentalist Islam” would also involve a fight against corruption and a push for justice and democracy for the masses. There is a connection between religion and politics in that religious motives draw groups into political action. To illustrate, consider Gills’ (1998) statement of economic factors in church-state relations, arguing:

In places where evangelical Protestantism and “spiritist” sects made inroads among poor Catholics, Church leaders championed the rights of the poor and turned against authoritarian regimes to retain parishioners. Where competition was minimal, bishops maintained good relations with military rulers. . . . If one actor benefits only at the expense of another, the losing partner has no incentive to participate in the exchange. When either partner in the bargain believes that the costs of the bargain outweigh the benefits, defection (in this case disestablishment) occurs. . . . The crucial issue becomes what both the church and state gain from establishment and what conditions would place strain on this bargain. (P. 49)

Similarly, as shown previously, PAS has gained electoral success by repeatedly revising its religious issues framing by including social justice for the poor and non-Muslims. In fact, UMNO does not have any qualms about capitalism economic policies such as charging taxes or interest, etc., because although they claim that they are an Islamic State religion, they are very secular

in nature. PAS, on the other hand, has very strict rules about usury, etc., so that it's harder for them to "keep up" with the larger budgets and spending. The irony is that a strict religious sect, by nature, is one whose members do NOT engage in secular activities and have a set of strict guidelines...so, in one way, PAS members do not need a lot of money because they're not "worldly" however, in a political sense--where money matters as far as gaining support--that very trait of strict sectarianism is a negative for PAS. To the point, like sects, PAS cannot exploit economies of scale as fully as mainstream State churches, because of the costs involved as the sect membership grows. Thus, because of the very nature of sects, they're not money-minded and, in the long run, that hurts a group like PAS because they have to compete politically with groups that have plenty of money to spend.

This explains why the contention between the PAS and UMNO has taken shape in terms of religious identity framing. Group identification of both PAS and UMNO takes on new significance for understanding the passion with which some group members defend their identities, why the rhetoric of religion and ethnic identity is so central to cultural conflicts in contemporary Malaysian politics, and why efforts to challenge one group's identity with another identity takes on religious tones. In other words, the disputes entail disagreements regarding how the religion of Islam should be presented in the public realm.

UMNO and PAS have engaged in frame contests over religious issues for a very long time—more than 50 years. These contests have been fought through speeches, newspaper columns, rumors swirling through the Internet,

and occasional bursts of strife. The conflict has been expressed in highly symbolic rhetoric, predominately shaped by politics designed to appeal to the religious sentiments framing Muslim votes for political gain. The groups have framed each other's perspectives on ethnicity and religion in ways that highlight differences and generate counterframes. The contests have been fought during the country's economic depressions, recessions, booms, busts, floods, and riots—and yet societal reaction to religious culture has played out in private, with the public sphere only minimally changed.

So what does the history of the 1990, 1998, 1999, and 2001 events reviewed in this study tell about the future of Malaysia? The answer, whatever it is, will be found in matters of religion:

Religion provides life, the world, and history with meaning, through a sacred reality that transcends those mundane realities. But in doing so, religion established a perceived objective reality above and beyond temporal life, the world, and history, and then occupies an independent and privileged position to act—through those who believe the religion—back upon mundane world. That which is sacred and transcend temporal, earthly reality also stands in the position to question, judge, and condemn temporal earthly reality. In this way, the ultimate legitimator of the status quo can easily become its ultimate judge. (Smith 1996:6)

Through this analysis, the study has led to the conclusion that the framing and counterframing of religious issues influenced the political opportunities and threats of both political parties in Malaysia. We cannot deny that opportunities and threats, and the framing and counterframing of religious issues, proved to be important in the construction of social movement and countermovement strategies. Social movement and countermovement language was used to signify religious rhetoric to influence the public realm. It is logical to assume that, based on this study, the main strength of PAS is that religion is the nature of its

appeal and resonates with a loyal and large base of supporters, as PAS relies on traditional supporters. After all, it is primarily through language that most ideological battles are fought. As Connolly (1983) argues, the language of politics is not a neutral medium that conveys ideas independently formed; it is an institutionalized structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions. Consequently, the concepts of politics—such as democracy, liberty, and equality—do not simply provide a lens through which to observe a process that is independent of them. They are themselves a part of political life, sorting priorities and informing perspectives on numerous issues.

PAS is no stranger to this fact. As PAS's justification and legitimizing were cast in ideological terms that call for a return to the Qur'an and practices of the Prophet (Noor 2003, in *MK*), no doubt PAS's use of Islamic language and symbolism is rich with religious rhetoric as it attempts to apply Islamic principles and values to Muslim life.

This is merely a glimpse of the many ideas that PAS uses in framing religious issues and the ways in which PAS approaches each idea. PAS religious issues generally make sense. For example, many UMNO Muslims now view the *hijab* as pertaining solely to women's dress, making connections between a man's obsession with moralizing about how a woman should dress and an overall political superstructure that can defend itself only by sequestering half of its population from the public space.

To realize this, one only needs to see the impact of PAS leaders such as Nik Aziz (Kelantan Chief Minister) and Hadi's (Terengganu Chief Minister),

whose fiery sermons (called *ceramah* or lectures) circulated in Malaysia via audiocassettes while PAS was in charge in their States. It was a strange combination: Both PAS leaders called for a return to an idealized Islam of the past, spread through thoroughly modern means. Obviously, PAS's religious framing of such a blueprint—if the contents are what it says—is just as good to put UMNO into political threat conditions. Still, PAS needs real commitment to the restoration of justice and basic human rights, good governance, and a belief in pluralism as well as a reasonable, practical program for health, education, and poverty eradication, which is what the 1999 election manifesto was all about. This more liberal vision of Islamic policy may provoke some disaffection among its traditional constituents in the Malay heartland, who, for two decades, have been fed on the rhetoric that secular politics equates UMNO equates godlessness.

Although PAS won the States of Kelantan and Terengganu, abstract ideas such as democracy and human rights, judicial independence, good governance, and complex international issues may be difficult to grasp for PAS's traditional constituents. So far, it is easier for PAS to shout the slogan that the “Islamic state” will take care of everything. But this is exactly what value-judgement is all about: the slow, painstaking political education of voters. At the same time, PAS's obsession with the idea that secularism has no place for God is obsolete.

Equally significant, this research has shown that media rhetoric and slogans are important in politics. PAS's political opportunities have influenced its

religious framing and aspired to be the PAS strength in the 1990 election. In the Anwar saga in 1998 and another election in 1999, it used these events to play the religion card by framing religious issues to influence the public realm for their political opportunities. Obviously, being a party founded on Islamic ideals, PAS religious framing as espoused in PAS's own constitution, relies on the Qur'an as its primary source of reference. Followed by the Sunnah, the consensus of the *ulamas* were the key shifts in 1990, 1998, and 1999 events for PAS's political opportunities.

PAS, for as long as Malaysians can remember, has been associated with words such as *religious fanaticism, extremism, retrogression, and even militancy*. These perceptions are so prevalent that many do not think there is anything in the history of the party to indicate otherwise. When the *Hizbul Muslimin* party was banned by the British in 1948, less than five months after it was founded with the sponsorship of the radical Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), its former leaders established PAS and vowed to mobilize Muslims toward implementing the demands of Islam to achieve democracy, social justice, and humanitarianism (Mutalib 1994).

But September 11 and its aftermath changed everything. The event and its consequences have threatened to reduce the complex interaction between the Islamic world and the West to an "us versus them" encounter, one between good and evil, between freedom and democracy, and between the forces of evil and darkness. The Muslim world is paying a heavy price for the vile actions of a few under the name of religion. The tragedy of September 11, motivated by

religion, forced into the open the deep-seated, entrenched prejudices and ignorance that are still widespread between Muslims and the West.

Despite the heavy rhetorical challenge of UMNO State religious framing from the PAS Islamic movement, UMNO Islamizing has brought Islam into the public arena since Malaysia's independence in 1957 and has established a measure of control over its flow in society and politics (Khoo 1995; Nasr 2001). As shown in previous discussions, in order to maintain its secular ideology, UMNO used state religion to regulate Islamic politics, extending its control over Islamic institutions and Islamic movements. In Malaysian politics, UMNO used religious beliefs, values, and traditions that would inevitably be reflected in its laws and institutions, with sufficient safeguards and compromises to ensure the rights and interests of smaller groups (Malays).

It might be argued that very few modern nation states are comprised of a single race or religion and even a particular ethnicity; there will always be groups and classes with competing interests and ideas. As commentator Nasr (2001) explains, "Islamization was designed to create circumstances in which Islamists would perceive their interest to be compatible with those states" (such as Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, and so on) (P. 25). The strategic choice was "to champion the cause of Islam in order to shore up its authority and legitimacy, outmaneuver its opposition, and gain stability" (P. 25). UMNO leaders, as always, claimed that they had fought against the encroachment of Western secularism that threatened to undermine the faith and unity of the Malay Muslims (Noor 2003).

But none of the UMNO Islamic measures are adequate to satisfy PAS or any Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. In fact, such a fundamental voluntary reorientation of UMNO and state can be explained only as a rational choice to further the interests of the UMNO. The UMNO and state would internalize Islamic values, “not only to combat Islamist challenge to its authority but also to become stronger and to expand its power” (Nasr 2001: 27). For example, in response to UMNO’s attempt to push its Islamization program, the PAS stepped up its ideological offensive.

The Islamization programmed proposed by UMNO led government was not really designed to lay the foundations of Islamic state but was in fact part on an elaborate scheme to make the country appear more Islamic while remaining firmly entrenched within the global liberal capitalist economic system. (Noor 2003a:5)

However, one fact is clear: The unexpected attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States and their aftermath have reversed the situations for UMNO and PAS. UMNO’s political opportunities took on a religious tone, in the negative connotation of interpretation that PAS leaders are religious fanatics, extremists, retrogressionists, and even militants. For UMNO, as the PAS extremist group emerged, deviated from religious teachings, and advocated the overthrow of the UMNO government via violent means would invariably link PAS to Al-Qaida’s terrorist network groups. The events of September 11 led to UMNO opportunity and PAS religious threats.

Religious framing and counterframing content, strategies, and mechanisms influence the political opportunities and threats through series of key shifts. Those are material realities in understanding frame disputes as well as the construction of particular historical events in the struggles between social

movement and countermovement. Thus, we cannot deny that PAS's political opportunities influence religious framing that remains part of the past and an ongoing historical material reality of the world.

However, according to the *New Straits Times*, PAS has a membership of 800,000, making it the largest opposition party in Malaysia (March 19, 2005), while UMNO has over two million membership (March 17, 2004)—too strong for PAS to beat. But as the largest and most powerful opposition party in Malaysia, PAS has successfully moved the country's political discourse away from issues of secularism and nationalism toward religious issues framing by reconstructed itself in a new image under the guidance of traditional *ulama* leaderships (see Liow 2004; Miller 2006). This research recognizes that PAS's political opportunity for its previous electoral success influenced by inherent in its religious issues framing. Recently, PAS also has tried to better integrate women, who account for roughly 50% of the party's membership into leadership position (Liow 2004; *NST* March 19, 2005). Yet it is not possible to argue that as religious values and beliefs are amplified, women are joining the sisterhood of PAS in greater numbers than in the past. Studies predict that as professional Muslim women are more actively recruited into the pre-existing network, PAS will increase in size and power (see Munson 2001). This study makes the claim that, in addition to framing and counterframing, political opportunities and threats are definitely influenced by religious issues, resulting in a structure that has profound impact on strategies, tactical choices, and outcomes through the careful interpretation of events.

This analysis draws heavily on religious issues framing and understanding the role that religions play in private and public lives, a theme that recurs in a wide variety of political debates on these four critical events where religion has been politically mobilized by both sides. Based on this study, we might conclude that PAS's religious identity tells us who they are, how they should behave, and that their ideas and framing activities differ from those of UMNO, which takes Islam for granted and claims a monopoly on religion. Stated differently, PAS leaders and its grassroots election campaigning offered a difference in religious framing perspectives as a vehicle to express that religious impulse in a vision of a moral society. For PAS, its reality would be an Islamic community (*ummah*) in which religion is integral to State and society. This belief is more clearly affirmed in the Muslim doctrine of *tawhid* (unity of God) and articulated in Islamic law (*sharia*). *Tawhid* is the affirmation that "there is no God but the God (Allah)" (Esposito 1987:5-6; see also Hussein 2002). UMNO secularists likewise make a compelling case for analogous forces that enforce monopoly, that is, establish a State religion. It is also clear that UMNO's State religion is intended to become a religion for the elite.

Applying the economic reasoning of Smith (1776) and Iannaccone (1991), one important argument of State-church relations is regards making clergy an elite group. Instead of focusing on the religious needs of congregants, UMNO religious officials and UMNO leaders engage in secular activities, as well as offering services to other elite groups within their own party. Therefore, the PAS

Islamic movement is able to enter the religious market by providing better service to its members and the Malaysian community as a whole.

In any case, framing and counterframing are important cognitive shortcut tools that are crucial for social movement and countermovement to interpret the world and represent that world to others. Perhaps religious issues can significantly affect the intractability of a frame dispute by creating political opportunities in incompatible interpretations of events. As Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) state:

The movement development, tactic, and impact are profoundly affected by a sifting constellation of factor exogenous to the movement itself. . . .When movements effectively create or exploit events, they are likely to encourage countermovement mobilization at the same time that they advance their own causes. (PP. 1638, 1633).

Almost universally, religious issues framing is built on underlying structures of beliefs, values, norms, and experiences. Historical events show that religious rhetoric entails extensive ideological, cultural, theological, and spiritual baggage that serves not only to aid in interpreting events and presenting a strategy advantage but also is closely allied to the opportunities and responses to threats (risks involved with different choices). In order for religious issues framing to shape the trajectory of the social movement outcome and avoid threats, political opportunity must be created through interpreting events.

To conclude such comparison examinations of religious frame disputes, the analysis presented in this paper suggests that religious beliefs and values matter --is a crucial component in politics and social movements success; and as such this study also yield that under electoral threat, UMNO amplified its support for the production of Islam, arguing that it had created an exemplary Islamic

state. However, this opportunity for PAS led to the amplification of Islamic beliefs and values that could unite diverse religious and ethnic conditions.

REFERENCES

- Abdul Hamid, Fauzin. 2001, January/June. "Islamic Resurgence: An Overview of Causal Factors. A Review of *Ummatic* Linkages." *Journal IKIM* 9(1):15-47.
- Abootalebi, A. R. 1999, March. "Islam, Islamists, and Democracy." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*.
- Abu Bakar, M. 1991, September. "External Influences on Contemporary Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 132:220-228.
- Ahmad, S. 2005. "Islam in Malaysia: Constitutional and Human Rights Perspectives." *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 2(1).
- Al-Bana, Hassan. "To what do we summon mankind?" Retrieved from (http://www.glue.umd.edu/~kareem/rasayil/liaysh_e.htm).
- Aliran Monthly*. Various issues from 1990, 1999, and 2005. Polygraphic Press Sdn. Bhd. Cheras Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Retrieved from (<http://anliran.com.html>).
- Anwar, Z. 2005. "Law Making in the name of Islam: Implications for Democratic Governance. P. 123 in *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century*, edited by K. S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. Singapore: ISEAS.

- Appiah, K. A. and H. L. Gates, Jr. 1995. "Editor's Introduction: Multiplying Identities." Pp. 1-6 in *Identities*, edited by K. A. Appiah and H. L. Gates, Jr. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Arjomand, S. A. 1984. *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Asia Times*. Various issues, 1999-2001. Retrieved from (www.atimes.com).
- Awang, A. H. 2002. *Amanat Haji Hadi: Penghuraian dan Penjelasan Dato' Seri Tuan Guru Haji Abdul Hadi Awang*. Kuala Lumpur, Singapore: Jabatan Penerangan PAS Pusat.
- Ayubi, N. 1991. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Azzi, C. and R. Ehrenberg. 1975. "Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance." *Journal of Political Economy* 83(1):27-56.
- Babb, S. 1996. "Frame Resonance in the U.S. Labor Movement, 1866 to 1886." *American Sociological Review* 61:1033-1052.
- Barro, R. J. and R. M. McCleary. 2003, October. "Religion and economic growth." *American Sociological Review*.
- , 2004, May. "Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel." Presented at Harvard University.

- Bearman, E. and L. R. Iannaccone. 2005. *Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad and the Deathly*. Working paper 11663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benford, R. D. 1987. *Framing, Activity, Meaning, and social Movement Participation: The Nuclear Disarmament Movement*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas/Austin.
- 1993. "Frame Disputes in the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *Social Forces* 71: 677-701.
- 1997. "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective." *Sociological Inquiry* 67:409-430.
- Benford, R. and S. Hunt. 2001. *Cadrage en Conflict: Movements Sociaux et Problems Sociaux (Social Movementes Dans des Arenas Publiques [The Forms of Collective Action: Mobilizations in Public Arenas]*. Paris: Ecole de Hautes Etudes e Sciences Sociaux.
- Benford, R. and S. A. Hunt. 2003. "Interactional Dynamics in Public Problems Marketplaces: Movements and the Counterframing and Reframing of Public Problems." Pp. 153-181 in *Challenges and Choices: Constructionist Perspectives on Social Problems*, edited by J. A. Holstein and G. Miller. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Benford, R. and D. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26:611-639.

- Berezin, M. 2001. "Emotion and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection of the Polity," Pp. 83-98, edited by Goddwin, Jasper and Franncesca Polletta. Chicago, IL, and London, U.K.: University of Chicago Press.
- Berger, P. 1967. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Bernstein, M. 1997. "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by Lesbian and Gay Movements. *American Journal of Sociology* 103:531-566.
- Bernstein, M. 2005. "Identity politics." *Annual Review of Sociology* 31:47-74.
- Beyer, P. 1994. *Religion and globalization*. London: Sage Publications.
- Buechler, S. M. 2000. *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Case, W. 1994. "The UMNO Party Election in Malaysia: One for the Money." *Asian Survey* 34:916-930.
- , 2001. "Malaysia's Resilient Pseudodemocracy." *Journal of Democracy* 12(1):43-57.
- Cerulo, K. A. 1997. "Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23:85-409.
- Chaves, M. 1994, March. "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority." *Social Forces*:749-774.

- Cohen, A. P. 1985. *The Symbolic Construction of Community*. Chichester, U.K.: Ellis Horwood.
- Connolly, W. E. 1983. *The Terms of Political Discourse*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- Dabasi, H. 1987. "Symbiosis of religious and political authorities in Islam." P. 193 in *Church-State Relations*, edited by T. Robbins, and R. Robertson. Edison, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Della Porta, D. and M. Diani, 1999. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Eisinger, P. K. 1973. "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." *American Political Science Review* 67:11-28.
- Ellison, C. G. 1991. "Identification and Separatism: Religious Involvement and Racial Orientations Among Black Americans." *Sociological Quarterly* 32:477-494.
- Ellison, C. G. and D. Sherkat. 1993. "Conservative Protestantism and Support for Corporal Punishment. *American Sociology Review* 58:131.
- Eriksen, T. H. 2001. "Ethnic Identity, National Identity and Intergroup Conflict: The Significant of Personal Experiences." Pp. 42-70 in *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction*, edited by R. Ashmore, L. Jussim and D. Wilder. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

- Esman, M. J. 1987. "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power." *Comparative Politics* 19:402.
- Esposito, J. L. 1983. *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1998. *Islam and Politics*. 4th ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Finke, R. and R. Stark. 1992. *The Churching of America, 1776-1990*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Funston, J. 1980. *Malay Politics in Malaysia. A Study of the United Malay National Organization and Party Islam*. Kuala Lumpur, Singapore Lumpur: Heinemann.
- . 2000. *Malaysia's Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization?* Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Gamson, W. A. 1989. "News as Framing: Comments on Graber." *American Behavioral Scientist*, 332:157-161.
- . 1992a. The Social Psychology of Collective Action. Pp. 53-76 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by A. Morris and C. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- . 1992b. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamson, W. A. and A. Modigliani. 1989. "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power." *American Journal of Sociology* 95(1):1-37.

- Gamson, W. A., and G. Wolfsfeld. 1993. "Movements and Media as Interacting Systems." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 526:114-127.
- Gauhar, A. 1978. *The Challenge of Islam*. London: Islamic Council of Europe.
- Gellner, E. 1997. *Nationalism*. London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Gill, Anthony. 1998. *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America*. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press.
- Gitlin, T. 1980. *The Whole World is Watching*. Berkeley, CA: University California Press.
- Giugni, M. G. and H. Kriesi. 1990. "Nouveaux Mouvements Sociaux Dans les Années '80: Evolution et Perspectives." *Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique* 30:79-100.
- Goh, Beng-Lan. 2002. *Modern Dream: An Inquiry into Power, Cultural Production, and the Cityscape in Contemporary Urban Penang, Malaysia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell SEASP.
- Goffman, E. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. New York: Harper.
- Gomez, T. and K. S. Jomo. 1997. *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1999. *Malaysia's Political Economy*. Rev. ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

- Goulbourne, H. 1998. The Participation of New Minority Ethnic Groups in Britain Politics. Pp. 181-203 in *Race Relations in Britain: A Development Agenda*, edited by T. B. Blackstone and T. Bhikhu. London, U.K.: Routledge.
- Harakah*. Various issues from 1990, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2005. Kelantan: Kuala Lumpur. Retrieved from (<http://www.harakahdaily.net/em/>).
- Hargrove, B. 1979. *The Sociology of Religion: Classical and Contemporary Approaches*. Arlington Heights, IL:AHM Publishing Corporation.
- Harper, T. N. 1996. New Malays, New Malaysian: Nationalism, Society and History. In *Southeast Asian Affairs*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Hertog, J. and D. McLeod. 1995. "Anarchists Wreak Havoc in Downtown Minneapolis: A Multi-Level Study of Media Coverage of Radical Protest." *Journalism Monographs* 151:1-48.
- Hilley, J. 2001. *Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition*. London, U.K.: Zed Books.
- Huntington, S. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma.
- Hussein, S. A. 1998. *Muslim Politics in Malaysia: Origins and Evolution of Competing Traditions in Malay Islam*. The Foundation for Global Dialogue.

- Hussein, S. A. 2002. "Muslim Politics and the Discourse on Democracy."
Pp. 74-107 in *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practice*, edited
by F. Loh Kok Wah and K. Boo Teik. Richmond, U.K.: Curzon.
- Iannaccone, L. R. 1990. "Religious Participation: A Human Capital
Approach." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29:297-314.
- , 1991, April. "The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam
Smith and the Economics of Religion." *Rationality and Society*:156-
177.
- , 1994a. "Why Strict Churches are Strong." *American Journal of
Sociology*, 99(5):1180-1211.
- , 1994b. *Reassessing Church Growth: Statistical Pitfalls and Their
Consequences*. Working paper, Santa Clara University, CA.
- , 1997. "Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of
Religion. Pp. 25-44 in *Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summary
and Assessment*, edited by L. A. Young. New York: Routledge.
- , 1998. "Introduction to the Economics of Religion." *Journal of Economic
Literature* 36(3):1465-1495.
- , 2003. *The Market for Martyrs*. Presented at the 2004 meetings of the
American Economic Association, San Diego, CA.
- Iberra, P. and J. I. Kitsuse. 1993. "Vernacular Constituents of Moral
Discourse: An Interactionist Proposal for the Study of Social
Problems." Pp. 25-58 in *Reconsidering Social Constructionalism*:

- Debates in Social Problems Theory*, edited by J. A. Holstein and G. Miller. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Ibrahim, A. 1985. "The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia." P. 217 in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, edited by A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique, and Y. Hussin. Singapore: ISEAS.
- , 1996. *The Asian Renaissance*. Kuala Lumpur, Singapore: Times Books International.
- Jafri, Khalid. August 1998. "50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister." Retrieved from (http://www.geocities.com/freedom_malaysia/50Dalil.html).
- Jasper, J. 1998. "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and Around Social Movements." *Sociological Forum* 13:397-424.
- Jenkins, J. C. 1983. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9:527-553.
- Jomo, K. J. and A. S. Cheek. 1992. "Malaysia's Islamic Movements." Pp. 79-106 in *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, edited by J. Kahn and F. Loh. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.
- Kelley, D. 1986. *Why Conservative Churches are Growing: A Study in the Sociology of Religion*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press. (Original work published 1972)

- Kent, S. A. 1990. "Deviance Labeling and Normative Strategies in the Canadian 'New Religions/Counterculture' Debate." *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 15:393-416.
- Kessler, C. 1978. *Islam and Politics in a Malay State, Kelantan 1838-1969*. Ithaca, NY, and London, U.K.: Cornell University Press.
- Khoo, B. T. 1995. *Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamed*. Kuala Lumpur, Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- , 2004, September, No. 72. *Searching for Islam in Malaysian Politics: Confluences, Divisions and Governance*. Working paper series. Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong.
- Klandermans, B. 1997. *The Social Psychology of Protest*. Cambridge, U.K.: Blackwell.
- Koopmans, R. and D. Rucht. 1999. "Protest Event Analysis: Where to Now?" *Mobilization* 4:123-30.
- Kriesi, H., R. Koopmans, J. W. Duyvendal, and M. G. Giugni. 1995. *New Social Movements in Western Europe*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kurtz, L. 1995. *Gods in the Global Village: The World's Religions in Sociological Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1969. "Consociational Definition." *Consociational Democracy in World Politics* 212.

- Lincoln, C. E. and L. H. Mamiya. 1990. *The Black Church Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing For Change*. New York: Free Press.
- Liow, J. C. 2004. "Political Islam in Malaysia: Problematising Discourse and Practice in the UMNO-PAS "Islamisation Race." *Commonwealth Comparative Politics* 422:184-205.
- Loh, F. K. W. and B. T. Khoo. 2002. *Democracy in Malaysia*. Richmond, U.K.: Curzon Press.
- Luckmann, T. 1967. *The Invisible Religion*. New York: MacMillan.
- MalaysiaKini*. Various issues from Various issues from 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2004. Singapore. Retrieved from (<http://www.malaysiakini.com>).
- Marty, E. and R. S. Appleby, eds. 1993. *Fundamentalism and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Martinez, P. 2002, April. "A Response to Dr. Tom Michel." Bulletin of the Program Area on Faith, Mission and Unity Christian Conference of Asia. Retrieved from (<http://www.daga.dhs.org/cca/resources/ctc/ctc01-01/ctc0201e.htm>).
- Mayer, M. 1991. "Social Movement Research and Social Movement Practice: The U.S. Pattern. Pp. 47-120 in *Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA*, edited by D. Rucht. Boulder, CO: Campus/ Westview.

- McAdam, D. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- 1988a. "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism." Pp. 125-154 in *From Structure to Action*, edited by B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, and S. Tarrow. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- 1994. "Culture and Social Movements." Pp. 36-37 in *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, edited by E. Larana, H. Johnston, and J. R. Gusfield. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- 1999. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, D., J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald. 1988. Social Movements. Pp. 695-737 in *Handbook of Sociology*, edited by N. J. Smelser. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framing*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- McAmis, R. D. 2002. *Malay Muslims: The History and the Challenges of Resurgence Islam in Southeast Asia*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

- McCarty, J. D. and M. N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82:1212-1241.
- McPhail, C. 1991. *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- McVeigh, R. 1999. "Structural Incentives for Conservative Mobilization: Power Devaluation and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915-1925." *Social Force*, 77:1461-1496.
- Melucci, A. 1980. "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach." *Social Sciences Information*, 192:199-226.
- , 1988. "Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements." Pp. 329-349 in *International Social Movement Research*, edited by B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, and S. Tarrow. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- , 1992. "Frontier Land: Collective Action between Actors and Systems." Pp. 238-258 in *Studying Collective Action*, edited by M. Diani and R. Eyerman. London, U.K.: Sage.
- Meyer, D. S. and S. Staggenborg. 1996. "Movements, Countermovements, and the structure of Political Opportunity." *The American Journal of Sociology* 101(6): 1628-1660.
- Miller, E. 2004. "The Role of Islam in Malaysian Political Practice." *Al-Nakhlah*. Medford, MA: Tufts University/Fletcher School.

Mitton, R. and K. Baru. 1996, June. "Inside Story Malaysia: Return to Islam.

Is an Opposition Party Turning Kelantan State into a Little Iran?"

Asiaweek.com. Retrieved from

(www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0607/feat1.html).

Modood, T. 1997. "Difference, Cultural Racism, and Anti-Racism." Chap. 9

in *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics*

of Anti-Racism, edited by P. Werbner and T. Modood. London, U.K.:

Zed Books.

Modood, T. and R. Berthoud. 1997. *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and*

Disadvantage. London, U.K.: London Policy Studies Institute.

Mohamed, Alias. 1994. *PAS Platform: Development and Change, 1951-*

1986. Pertaling Jaya: Gateway Publishing House.

Mohamad, M. 1970. *The Malay Dilemma*. Kuala Lumpur, Singapore: Times

Books International.

-----, 1998a. *The Building of a Nation*. Kuala Lumpur, Singapore: Times

Books International.

-----, 1998b. *The Way Forward*. London, U.K.: Weidefeld and Nicolson.

Morris, A. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Free

Press.

Morris, A. and C. Herring. 1987. "Theory and Research in Social

Movements: A Critical Review." *Annual Review of Political Science*

2:137-195.

- Munro-Kua, A. 1996. *Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- Munson, Z. 2001. "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." *Sociological Quarterly* 42(4):487-510.
- Musallam, B. F. 1983. *Sex and Society in Islam*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Muslimedia*. Various issue 1998, 1999, and 2000. Retrieved from (<http://www.muslimedia.com>).
- Mutalib, H. 1990. *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- , 1993. *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- , 1994. "Islamisation in Malaysia: Between Ideas and Realities. Pp. 150-169 in *Islam, Muslims and Modern State*, edited by H. Mutalib and T. Hashmi ul-Islam. London, U.K.: Macmillan.
- Muzaffar, C. 1987. *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Penerbit Fajar Bakti.
- Nasr, S. V. R. 2001. *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
- Neher, C. D. 1994. *Southeast Asia in the New International Era*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview.

New Straits Times. Various issues from 1990, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2005.

Kuala Lumpur, Singapore.

Nik Mat, Nik Aziz. 1995. *Kelantan: University Politik Terbuka, Nilam Puri*.

Kelantan: Maahad ad -Dakwah Wal -I Mamah.

Noor, F. A. 2003. "The Localization of Islamist Discourse in the Tafsir of

Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Murshid'ul Am of PAS." Pp. 195-235 in

Malaysia Islam, Society and Politics, edited by V. Hooker and N.

Othman. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

-----. 2003a, March 22. "The Future of Progressive Islam in Southeast Asia,

Parts I-III. *MalaysiaKini* [electronic version]. Retrieved December 15,

2005, from (www.malaysiakini.com).

-----. 2003b, August 1. "Blood, Sweat, and *jihad*: The Radicalization of the

political Discourse of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) from

1982 Onwards." Pp. 208-211 in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*.

-----. 2004. *Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-*

Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951-2003. Kuala Lumpur, Singapore:

Malaysian Sociological Research Institute.

Olson, M. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the*

Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ongkili, J. P. 1985. *Nation-building in Malaysia, 1946-1974*. Oxford, U.K.:

Oxford University Press.

- Osman, M. T. 1985. "Islamization of the Malays: A Transformation of Culture. In *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, edited by A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique, and Y. Hussein. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Othman, N. 2004. Islamization and Democratization in Malaysia in Regional and Global Contexts. In *Challenging Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia*, edited by A. Heryanto and S. K. Mandal. London, U.K. and New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Parti Islam SeMalaysia. *FAQ: Introduction to PAS*. Retrieved from (<http://www.parti-pas.org/faq1.php>).
- . 2003, November. *The Islamic State Document*. Retrieved from (<http://www.parti-pas.org/IslamicStateDocument.php>).
- Piven, F. F. and R. Cloward. 1977. *Poor People's Movements*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Polletta, F. and J. M. Jasper. 2001. "Collective Identity and Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27:283-310.
- Qutb, S. *Introduction, Milestones*. Retrieved from (http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/book/milestones/Introduction.asp).
- Rahim, L. Z. 2006, February. "Representing and Misrepresenting Islam: The Discursive Struggle Between Literal and Liberal Islam in Southeast Asia." *Austral Policy Forum* 06-02A9. Melbourne, Australia: RMIT University.

- Ratnam, K. J. 1985. "Religion and Politics in Malaysia. P. 143 in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, edited by A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique, and Y. Hussein. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Rex, J. 1991. "Ethnicity and Ethnic Mobilization in Britain." *Monographs in Ethnic Relations No. 5*. Warwick, U.K.: CREK.
- Riechert, B. P. 1996. "Advocacy Group and News Media Framing of Public Policy Issues: Frame Mapping the Wetlands Debates." *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 50(07A):2723.
- Robbins, T. and R. Robertson. 1987. *Church-State Relations: Tensions and Transitions*, edited by T. Robbins and R. Robertson. Oxford, U.K.: Transaction Books.
- Rucht, D. and F. Neidhardt. 1999. "Methodological Issues in Collecting Protest Event Data: Units of Analysis, Sources and Sampling, Coding Problems. Pp. 65-89 in *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, edited by D. Rucht, R. Koopmans, and F. Neidhardt. Berlin, Germany: Sigma.
- Rule, J. 1988. *Theories of Civil Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ryan, C. 1991. *The Time Activism*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Salleh, H. 1999. "Development and the Politics of Social Stability in Malaysia." In *Southeast Asia Affairs*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

- , 1992. "Peasants, Proletarianization and the State: FELDA Settlers in Pahang." Pp. 107-32 in *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics In Contemporary Malaysia*, edited by J. S. Kahn and F. Loh Koh Wah. Sydney, Australia: Allen and Urwin.
- , 1981. Bureaucrats, Petty Bourgeois and Townsmen: An Observation on States Identification. In *Monash Paper on Southeast Asia, No. 8*, edited by K. Bharu. Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Salehi, M. M. 1996. "Radical Islamic Insurgency in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979." Pp. 47-63 in *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*, edited by C. Smith. New York: Routledge.
- Samsul, A. B. 1995. *Orang Kaya Baru: Origin, Construction and Predicament of Malay Nouveaux Riche*. Working paper for Workshop on Cultural Constructions of Asia's New Rich, Asia Research Center, Murdoch University, Australia.
- , 1996b. "Nations of Intent in Malaysia." Pp. 323-347 in *Asian Forms of the Nation*, edited by S. Tonnesson and H. Antlov. Richmond, VA: Curzon Press.
- , 2002. "Malaysia's International Role Post-September 11." *IDSS Commentaries*.
- Samuel, H. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma.

- Schech, Gregory. 2007. "The Rationality of Islamic Extremists: An Economic Perspective." *The Integrative Centre for Homeland Security at Texas A&M University* 12.
- Schwartz, S. H. 1977. Normative Influence on Altruism. Pp. 221-279 in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 10), edited by L. Berkowitz. New York: Academic Press.
- Sherkat, D. 2005. "Religion, Social Movements, and Politics." Pp. 1-20 in *Handbook on Sociology of Religion and Social Institutions*, edited by H. R. Ebaugh. New York: Kluwer Press.
- Sherkat, D. E. and T. J. Blocker. 1994. "The Political Development of Sixties' Activists: Identifying the Influence of Class, Gender, and Socialization on Protest Participation." *Social Forces* 72:821-842.
- Sherkat, D. E. and J. Wilson. 1995. "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in Religious Markets: An Examination of Religious Switching and Apostasy." *Social Forces* 72:993-1026.
- Shore, C. 1993. "Ethnicity as Revolutionary Strategy: Communist Identity Construction in Italy." Pp. 27-53 in *Inside European Identities*, edited by S. Macdonald. Oxford, U.K.: Berg.
- Skoepol, T. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions*. London, U.K.: CV Press.
- Smith, A. 1791. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. 6th ed. London, U.K.: Strahan.

- Smith, C., ed. 1996. *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movements Activism*. New York: Routledge.
- Snow, D. and R. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, Participant Mobilization. *International Social Movement Research* 1:197-217.
- . 1992. "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. Pp. 133-155 in *Frontiers of Social Movements Theory*, edited by A. Morris and C. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Snow, D., B. Rochford, Jr., S. Worden, and R. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment: Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51:464-481.
- . 1997. "Frame Alignment: Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *Social Movements: Perspectives and Issues*. New York: Mayfield Publishing Company.
- Snow, D., and D. McAdam. 2000. "Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social Movements: Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus. Pp. 41-67 in *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*, edited by S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, and R. W. White. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Spector, M., and Kitsuse, J. I. 1977. *Constructing Social Problems*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- The Star*. Various issues. 1990-2004. Star Publication (Malaysia-Bhd). Pertaling Jaya Cheras Selangor. Retrieved from (<http://thestar.com>).

- Stark, R. 2003. *For the Glory God*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stark, R. and W. S. Bainbridge. 1985. *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- , 1987. *A Theory of Religion*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Statham, P. 1999. "Political Mobilisation by Minorities in Britain: Negative Feedback of "Race Relations"? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25(4):565-573.
- SUHAKAM. 2004. *Human Rights Watch Report 2004*. Retrieved December 15, 2005, from (<http://hrw.org/report/2004/Malaysia>).
- Swatos, W. H., Jr. 1998. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Society*. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press.
- Sweller, J. 1988. "Cognitive Load during Problem Solving: Effects on Learning. *Cognitive Science* 12:257-285.
- Tarrow, S. 1994. *Power in Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1996. "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements." In *Power in Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarty, and M. W. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- , 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, V. and N. Whittier. 1992. "Collective Identity and Lesbian Feminist Mobilization." Pp. 104-129 in *Social Movement Theory*, edited by A. Morris and C. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Tilly, C. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- , 1984. "Social Movements and National Politics." Pp. 297-317 in *State Making and Social Movements*, edited by C. Bright and S. Harding. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press/Sage Foundation.
- Tsuruoka, D. 1994, August 11. "Malaysia: In the Name of Security." *Far Eastern Economic Review*:25-26.
- Turner, R. H. and L. M. Killian. 1987. *Collective Behavior*. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Van Dyke, N. and S. A. Soule. 2002. "Structural Social Change and the Mobilizing Effect of Threat: Explaining Levels of Patriot and Militia Mobilizing in the United States. *Social Problems* 49(4):497-520.
- Verba, S., K. L. Scholzman, H. Brady, and N. H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, 23:453-497.

- Von der Mehden, F. R. 1987. Malaysia: Islam and Multiethnic Politics. In *Islam in Asia Religion, Politics and Society*, edited by J. L. Esposito. New York/ London, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
- , 1988. "Malaysia and Politics." Pp. 247-261 in *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism*, edited by S. T. Hunter. Bloomington, IN: UP.
- Wallerstein, I. 1995. What are We Bounding, and Whom, When We Bound Social Research? *Social Research* 62:839-856.
- Wang, L. K. 2001. "Media and Democracy in Malaysia." *Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture*, 92:67-88.
- Weber, M. 1930. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London, U.K.: Allen and Unwin.
- Winter, J. P. and C. H. Eyal. 1981. "Agenda Setting for the Civil Rights Issue." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45:376-383.
- Wittner, L. S. 1984. *Rebels against War: American Peace Movement, 1933-1983*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- World Factbook*. 2005. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Zakaria, R. 1988. *The Struggle within Islam: The Conflict between Religion and Politics*. New York: Penguin Books.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

FAQ

INTRODUCTION TO PAS

What is PAS?

PAS, or Islamic Party of Malaysia, is originated from the pathway of *Hizbul Muslimun* established on March 14, 1984, before the independence of Malaysia. British rule banned *Hizbul Muslimun* in August 1948. Nonetheless, the spirit of the members continued, and on November 24, 1951, PAS was established. PAS is a registered body and not an underground movement.

What is the principle and base in the Constitution of PAS?

Islam is the underlying principle, and Allahuakbar is PAS's proclamation. PAS is neither a communist nor a nationalist party. The ultimate aim of PAS is to form a government and a society that fundamentally embrace Islamic values and its ordinance in order to seek Allah's blessings. PAS upholds the holiness of Islam and its supremacy as well as its independence.

Why was the Islamic Movement or Harakah Islam established?

As an Islamic requirement, "There may spring from you a nation who invites to goodness and enjoins right and forbid indecency" (Ali-Imran:104). The clergymen are the heirs of the prophets and messengers (*ambiya'*). On November 14, 1948, at Sekolah Agama Al-Syarif in Gunung Semaanggol, Perak, the conference of clergymen and Islamic gurus unanimously agreed

on the need to establish an Islamic movement since the non-existence of an Islamic State.

How does one register as a PAS member?

PAS is a registered body, and it abides by the Malaysian Laws. Thus, PAS membership is open to all Malaysians who are Muslims and have reached the age of puberty, regardless of ethnicity. Malays, Chinese, Indians, Aborigines, and all Muslims of Malaysia who reside in this country are eligible to apply PAS membership. Being member of PAS in Malaysia is not a crime. Therefore, it does not matter if you are a government servant, professional, businessman, clerk, academician, farmer, fisherman, musician; you can be a member of PAS. Application forms are available at your nearest PAS branch.

What is the situation for non-Muslims if PAS were to govern the country?

They have the right to religious beliefs. They have the right and freedom to practice and express their business opportunities—those not against the beliefs of Islam—private property and family members, the right to an education, job opportunities, welfare, and social affairs.

If PAS were to govern the country, what about alcohol consumption, prostitution, gambling, and bribery?

The basic principle is that whatever activities that can bring damage to oneself and cause harm to others in the society is forbidden. The consumption of alcohol amongst the non-Muslim will be allowed in a limited amount but is totally prohibited to Muslims. Gambling, prostitution, and bribery are not Islamic culture and teaching; thus, they are banned from being practiced by Muslims.

Why are PAS and UMNO not in agreement?

The basic underlying principle of PAS is Islam. PAS can only unite with other parties that wholly accept this principle. The principle of UMNO is nationalism. PAS accepts Islam as the way of life and desires to generate Malaysia as a welfare state, which is always under the pardon or forgiveness, as well as the blessings of Allah, whereas UMNO continues to practice secularism in Malaysia and excludes many aspects of Islam.

PAS does not agree with some segments in the Federal Constitution because they contradict the humanitarian values and basic universal justice, while UMNO persists in sticking to the Constitution, which does not comply with the principle of universal justice. PAS prohibits any form of gambling, prostitution, bribery, charging interest (*riba*), and frivolous entertainment, while UMNO is not serious in handling these matters.

What is the principle of PAS regarding cooperation with UMNO and other political parties?

The underlying principal of PAS is Islam. PAS unites on the basis of Islam, as mentioned in Al-Quran, “And hold fast, all of you together to the cable of Allah, and do not separate” (Ali-Imran:103). Being steadfast on the basis and principles of Islam is a pre-condition to unity. Unity and solidarity can be achieved only when the basic principles are loyally and faithfully obeyed.

Will PAS be able to govern Malaysia?

According to Allah’s will, PAS is ready to govern Malaysia if given the majority mandate by the people in election. PAS is obliged to develop the country, similar to other parties who will win the election. However, the development will be meaningless and even harmful for the country if behavioral values are still in inferior condition. Thus, both developments must be complimentary. PAS’s governing agenda is to cultivate a developed welfare state that is under the pardon and blessing of Allah.

Why did PAS become a political party?

PAS became a political party to promote and invite people to goodness, stand for the truth, and forbid indecency and wrongdoing. PAS needed authority to implement these principles, and the power to govern can be possessed legally only through the democratic system. This is done by taking part in elections. Although PAS is not deferential to the country’s

democracy system, nonetheless, PAS seized the opportunity of the democratic system in the country to spread the word of Islam. This is to fulfill the Islamic needs, which are to uphold the Islamic laws.

Source: Parti Islam SeMalaysia. FAQ: Introduction to PAS. Retrieved from (<http://www.parti-pas.org>).

APPENDIX B

THE ISLAMIC STATE DOCUMENT

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

“Those who, if We give them power in the land, establish worship and pay the poor due and enjoin kindness [the right] and forbid iniquity [the wrong]. And Allah’s the sequel of events.”

–Surah Al-Hajj:41

“Allah commands that you should render back the trusts to those to whom they are due; and that when you judge between men, you judge with justice: Verily how excellent is the teaching which he gives you! Truly, Allah is Ever All Hearer and All Seer.”

–Surah An-Nisa’:58

“Listen and obey even if your leader is a slave from Habsyah [Ethiopia], his hair the like of raisins, for so long as he listens and obeys the Book of Allah.”

–al- Hadith

**PREFACE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC
PARTY OF MALAYSIA (PAS)**

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.

PRAISE be unto Allah, Lord of the Universe, Peace and Blessings be upon our leader and our Prophet, Muhammad, most honored of all the Prophets and upon his family and his companions, and whoever sincerely follows in their footsteps until the Day of Reckoning.

First and foremost, I would like to express my profound gratitude unto the almighty Allah, for it is only through His grace and permission alone that we are able to publish this monumental document in our struggle, at a time when the entire community is eagerly awaiting its publication. The publication of this document is sufficient evidence to squash allegations made by its enemies that PAS will not establish an Islamic State. It was even alleged that the entire membership of PAS never had the slightest intention of establishing an Islamic State in Malaysia.

Verily, the responsibility establishing an Islamic State is as important as performing the daily obligatory rituals of Islam. This is, in fact, evident from the principle of an Islamic maxim which states:

“If an obligatory act can only be performed with the availability of a specific item, then the procurement of that item is equally obligatory.”

It is with this realization that PAS champions the cause for Islam as a *Deen wa Daulah* (Way of Life and a State) to be established in our beloved country of Malaysia, based on the principles of *sharia* and guided by the dictates of the Almighty Allah:

“And We have sent down to you the Book in truth, confirming the Scriptures that came before it in and guarding it in safety. So judge among them by what Allah has revealed, and follow not their vain desires, diverging from the truth that has come to you. To each among you We have prescribed a law and a clear way, if Allah had so willed, he would have made you one nation, but that [He] may test you in what He has given you; so compete in good deeds. The return of you [all] is to Allah; then He will inform you about that in which you used to differ.”

–Surah al-Maad'idah

The aspiration of establishing Islam in the domains of societal and political life has borne fruit when Kelantan and Terengganu were governed by PAS. With this success, Islam is being practiced in both governance and administration in these two states within the legal bounds permitted taking into consideration obstacles and limitations that have to be encountered.

With the publication and dissemination of this document, we are hopeful that the Malaysian society will now be able to better appreciate the

concept and model of the Islamic State and Government as striven for by PAS since its inception. The document also serves to clarify the concept of a true Islamic state as opposed to a “pseudo Islamic state.”

Should PAS be mandated to govern Malaysia, God willing, an Islamic state as outlined in this document will be implemented to the best of our ability.

“Towards Victory”

Allahu Akbar!

Dato’ Seri Tuan Guru Haji Abdul Hadi Awang

President

Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)

Source: Parti-Islam SeMalaysia, *“The Islamic State Document,”*
November 2003, from (<http://www.parti-pas.org/IslamicStateDocument.php>)

THE ISLAMIC STATE DOCUMENT

PREAMBLE

1. Islam is both a Belief system and a *Deen*, which is a complete and comprehensive way of life, that was revealed by Allah Almighty to the last of the Prophets, Muhammad Ibn Abdullah (may peace be upon him), to be an eternal Guidance and Blessing not only to man but also to the entire Universe. Allahs says in the Holy Qur'an:

“And We have sent you (O Muhammad) not but as a mercy for the whole Universe.”

–Surah Al-Anbiyaa’

3. From the understanding and conviction that Allah is the Creator and Organizer of the whole Universe, springs the belief that Allah is the provider of the guidance and teachings for man to organize the complete system of individual, societal, and national life. Islamic political leadership is, therefore, an important institution necessary for the achievement of human progress.
4. PAS takes full cognizance of the reality and sensitivity of this country's multiethnic, multi-religious and multicultural makeup.

Hence, from its inception, PAS has stated, in no uncertain terms, its stance on the status and position of Islam as a comprehensive system of life embracing the entire domain of sociopolitical life; be it at the individual, societal, national, and international arenas.

5. The political history of this nation has witnessed that, since its inception in 1951, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) has been committed to and consistent with the observation and practice of parliamentary democracy. PAS has accepted democracy as the best methodology through which it should realize the ambition, vision, and mission of its political struggle.
6. As an Islamic political party, PAS advocates the implementation of Islam as a comprehensive way of life, identifying various major guidelines (derived from the cast principles and provision of the *sharia*) which are to be implemented in the establishment of an Islamic state.
7. PAS is fully committed in preserving both the interests of the religion [of Islam] and that of the nation and manifests this commitment categorically in the Vision and Mission statements as found in Section 5(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of the party:
8. To struggle for the establishment of a society and government in this country that embodies and manifests Islamic values and laws that seek the pleasure of the Almighty.

9. To uphold the sovereignty of the country and the sanctity of the religion of Islam.

10. In Section 7 of the party's Constitution, PAS reasserts that:

“The highest source of authority is the Holy Qur'an, the Prophetic Tradition (Sunnah of ar-Rasul), Consensus (*Ijma'*) of the *ulama* and Analogy (Qiyas) which are clear and evident.”

11. The first Islamic State was established in the multiracial, multicultural and multi-religious society of Medina in the period of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphates and so shall it need to be established until the end of time.

12. The Constitution of Median, known as *Sahifah Medina*, has duly stipulated the rights and responsibilities of every citizen in a just manner for the plural society of Medina and those who took abode in the state.

13. The Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah have laid down the broad guiding principles of the Islamic State, which if taken together, primarily leads man to obedience and submission unto Allah. Allah says in the Holy Quran:

“I’ve not created Jinn and men, save that they may serve and worship me.”

–Surah Az-Zaariyat:56

14. To place the holy Qur’an and the Prophetic Tradition (*As-Sunnah*) as the primary source of legislation in the governance of the state and its judiciary is imperative and mandatory to the Islamic State as evidently emphasized by Allah’s commandment in the Quran:

“Surely We have sent down to you (O Muhammad) the Book in truth, that you might judge between men by that which Allah has shown you; so be not a pleader for the treacherous.”

–Surah an-Nisaa’:105

15. The Islamic State based its legislation on the laws of the Almighty Who is Most Gracious and Most Merciful. It is therefore impossible for these laws to be the cause or source of injustice.

16. The Islamic State is an ideal state cherished and longed for by all who love peace and true justice.

17. The true Islamic State is a state which is peaceful and prosperous while receiving the pleasure of Allah the Almighty. When peace is combined with forgiveness from Allah, true peace will result.

18. Muslims are entrusted to say in their prayers:

“Truly, my prayer, my worship, my life, and my death are only for Allah, Master and Cherisher of the entire Universe.”

The above oath, repeated in the daily prayers of the Muslims, is meaningless unless its true demands are earnestly fulfilled. To fulfill the demands of this oath, it is imperative that a true Islamic state be established.

19. Unless an Islamic State is established, the true import and demands of this oath could not be manifested in its entirety.

20. The Islamic system of government as outlined above is the conviction of a true believer [of Islam] and will lead to the embodiment of Islam in its purest form.

THE CONCEPT (*TASAWWUR*) OF AN ISLAMIC STATE

From the understanding that Islam is a comprehensive way of life that pertains to both its character as a religion and a state (*Deen* and *Daulah*), the concept of an Islamic State is derived. It is an embodiment of the principles and ideals of Islam in all aspects of life, both at the national and international levels.

Source: Parti Islam SeMalaysia, “*The Islamic State Document*,” November 2003, retrieved from (<http://www.parti-pas.org/faq1.php>).

APPENDIX C

50 REASONS WHY ANWAR IBRAHIM CANNOT BECOME THE PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA

The Prophecy

Khairuddin Abu Hassan is the cousin of Anwar Ibrahim, while the late Sulaiman Palestine was his uncle. Sulaiman Palestine was one of the founding fathers and the fourth longest UMNO member. He was one of those UMNO veterans responsible for inviting Anwar into UMNO and shaping his political career. Khairuddin once said that before Sulaiman passed away, he left a prophecy. The prophecy says that Dr. Mahathir shall not appoint Anwar as the Prime Minister of Malaysia. As long as Anwar is in UMNO, the party will be in jeopardy. Dr. Mahathir was instead asked to appoint Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Foreign Minister) or Sanusi Junid (Chief Minister of Kedah) as Prime Minister if Dr. Mahathir wished to save UMNO, the Malays and the country.

Anwar Is Not With Vision 2020

After five years of being the Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO Deputy President, Anwar Ibrahim now pose a new dilemma in the party and the country's leadership.

Anwar's failure to tackle the economic issues since he assumed the Minister of Finance position five years ago is becoming clear to the people

that he cannot be entrusted to follow through and make the Vision 2020 concept a success for the country and its people.

Instead of doing his job, Anwar interfered with the Prime Minister in other administrative matters that are way outside his jurisdiction and responsibility.

It is as if Anwar wants to challenge the extraordinary capabilities of Dr. Mahathir, his brilliant leadership, his futuristic vision and his abilities to expertly handle national and global issues.

Due to the persistent failures of Anwar in the past five years, Dr. Mahathir deserves the opportunity of a new deputy and successor.

As such, leaders and UMNO members who are concerned about the party's struggles must demand that the Deputy Prime Minister and the UMNO Deputy President be replaced to a leader who is more productive, not power and money crazy, and not behave as if he is already the Prime Minister.

In short, moral obligations must be taken into consideration besides other values like sincerity and honesty of the leader. The wave of change must, however, be about the conscience of party continuity and ingenuity. It is up to UMNO members to find the right solution. This is important since the responsibility to handle the change in leadership is solely for the UMNO Deputy President and Deputy Prime Minister position.

As the backbone of *Barisan Nasional*, UMNO is responsible for formulating a meaningful destiny. This can only be achieved if all parties are

sincere and willing to accept the fact that the No. 2 leader that was chosen five years ago cannot be entrusted upon to preserve and protect the religion, the party, the people, and the country.

Otherwise, internal conflicts will always exist, and the commitments to the country's bright and successful future under the leadership of Dr. Mahathir will be tarnished and destroyed by Anwar in whom we have put our trust without knowing the factual truth about his background.

Actually, UMNO members do not know much about Anwar. He is still regarded as an outsider, and his sudden appearance in UMNO attracted lots of bad interpretations. Anwar's arrival as an UMNO leader is just like the emergence of Tun Perak in the Melaka Sultanate during the rule of Sultan Muzaffar Shah in the 14th century. In the beginning, Tun Perak was only the administrator of the Kelang territories representing the Sultan of Melaka. Later, he became the Deputy Prime Minister in Melaka. The Prime Minister at the time was Bendahara Seri Nara DiRaja. Tun Perak, however, wished to seek more power and authority although he was already in a very high position in the Melaka government.

Tun Perak created conflicts among the people, other ministers and the Sultan so that they disliked Bendahara Seri Nara DiRaja. At last, after all the conniving, he succeeded in overthrowing the Prime Minister and became Prime Minister himself.

The struggle to make Vision 2020 a success is a struggle that requires a very important change in the country's political leadership. Otherwise, all efforts towards this struggle will be doomed to fail.

The majority of the population realizes that in order to achieve Vision 2020, it requires change in perception, attitude, values, decision, and action in every aspect of social, economy, and politics. This change will make the population more positive in their perceptions, possess good moral values, more caring, make good decisions and judgments, and be more dynamic in their actions.

These changes give a psychological impact towards the success of Vision 2020. Now, the majority of the population, the leaders, and UMNO members subscribe to these changes as a prerequisite to the success of Vision 2020.

Due to this, UMNO members make spontaneous demands for Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, who coined the Vision 2020 idea and concept, to have a successor who is dynamic, progressive, and can uphold the vision of the people, religion and the country.

Anwar, when offering himself for the Deputy President's post five years ago, said, "I shall abide by the party's vision to upgrade the well-being of the people through the Vision 2020 concept in concurrence with the changes within UMNO."

Anwar not only disappoints the people by engaging in immoral activities but also distanced himself from the Vision 2020 concept. He seldom speaks about Vision 2020 since he became Deputy Prime Minister.

The 50 Reasons

1. Vengeance

Anwar Ibrahim possesses vengeance against not only his enemies but also his friends. He holds a never-ending vengeance against Sanusi Junid (Chief Minister of Kedah), Rahim Thamby Chik (former Chief Minister of Melaka), Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Foreign Minister), and many others making him unpopular as a leader.

2. Rebellious

His “go against the leader” attitude is his norm ever since he became active in UMNO in 1982. In the same year, he challenged Suhaimi Kamaruddin for the post of UMNO Youth Chief.

3. Divide and Rule

This is Anwar’s strategy to grab power within UMNO and the government. He conspired and created chaos in UMNO Kedah in order to prevent Dr. Mahathir from appointing Sanusi Junid as the Chief Minister of Kedah. He also forced Rahim Thamby Chik to resign from his Chief Minister of Melaka position.

4. False Swearing

Anwar bravely swore that he would not challenge Ghaffar Baba for the post of UMNO Deputy President. It was proven to be a lie.

5. Destroy Mahathir

Anwar vowed to destroy Dr. Mahathir in front of the late Haji Sulaiman Palestine because he was detained under the ISA when Dr. Mahathir was Education Minister.

6. Does Not Practice What He Preaches

Lying is part of Anwar's leadership qualities. He said he was anti-money politics when, in fact, he was the leader of money politics during the UMNO Deputy President elections in 1993.

7. Father of Corruption

Corruption is at its highest during Anwar's tenure as the Finance Minister. So much so that people call Anwar the "Father of Corruption."

8. Broken Family

Anwar comes from a broken home. His father, Ibrahim Abdul Rahman, took his maid as his second wife. Anwar's mother, Hajah Che Yan, was so emotionally distressed from this that she became paralyzed. Anwar's brother, Mokhtar, was a drug addict. Anwar's family, which was poor then, is now very rich and living in extravagance during Anwar's tenure as Finance Minister.

9. *Eloped*

Anwar eloped to Thailand with Azizah since he could not get the blessing of Azizah's father, Wan Ismail, to get married. Wan Ismail hated Anwar so much that he took his gun to chase Anwar out of his house. In the end, Azizah's mother took the initiative to legally marry them again at their home in Bukit Mertajam. This attitude proves that Anwar will disregard the law, family, culture, and Islam as long as he can get what he wants.

10. *Sodomist*

Everybody was talking about Anwar performing sodomy on his driver, Azizan, when the secret was out. However, Anwar's hobby of sodomy is not new. It began when he was still in secondary school at the Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) and in college at University Malaya (UM). A lot of people would want to come forward to tell all. Just wait and see.

11. *Adulterer*

The sister of Mohamad Azmin Ali (Anwar's private secretary), Ummi Hafilda Ali, told the story about Anwar's sex scandal with Shamsidar Taharin (Mohamad Azmin Ali's wife).

12. *Fathered Illegitimate Child*

An illegitimate child was born by the name of Afifa as a result of the sex scandal between Anwar and Shamsidar.

13. A Cheat

Anwar not only has been cheating on his wife but is also a homosexual.

14. Aggressive

The name *Anwar Ibrahim* itself portrays fighting and warring (AN-WAR). As such, he is fond of creating chaos, crises, conflicts, and wars.

15. A Religious Fake

During his leadership of the ABIM movement, he used Islamic principles as his strong fundamentals to achieve his political ambitions. However, after he joined UMNO, all those principles and Islamic struggles were actually pretences and fake. Anwar became an infidel when he gave Friday sermons and led prayers when he himself was full of sins. On many occasions, he did not only utter the Quranic verses wrongly but was also seen wearing silk clothing, prohibited in Islam, when leading prayers.

16. Doomed by God the Almighty

God the Almighty will not bless Anwar for all his terrible sins. He will not be able to administer the country properly since God already dooms him.

17. Belittled UMNO

When Anwar was the leader of ABIM and a student, he loudly despised and belittled UMNO and its leaders, but not long after that he praised those that he despised.

18. Leader without Vision

Anwar is a leader with no vision. His vision is only on bad intentions such getting himself rich from corruption, a power takeover through UMNO, and homosexuality.

19. Abuse of Power

Although Dr. Mahathir is the Prime Minister, Anwar ignored him and portrayed the image as if he himself is Prime Minister. For instance, Anwar acted unilaterally on foreign policy matters, which foundation has been laid correctly by Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Due to this, there were differences in the government's stand on foreign policies between Dr. Mahathir, Anwar and Abdullah. Anwar uses government machineries as tools to achieve his own political ambition.

20. Puppet of the United States

A lot of people were shocked when Anwar was accorded a red carpet treatment complete with a 21-gun salute by the Americans as if he were the head of state when Anwar visited Washington, D.C. Dr. Mahathir was never given this special treatment although he is the head of state.

Similar special treatment by the Americans was also accorded to Boris Yeltsin while Gorbachev was still president of the Soviet Union. Not long after that, the Soviet Union disintegrated and Boris Yeltsin became the new president.

Is the United States planning the same for Malaysia? The Malaysian people can make many conclusions on Anwar's special relationship with the United States. Is Anwar an agent of the CIA?

21. Riba

As Finance Minister of Malaysia, Anwar failed to defend the previously excellent economic status of the country. The economy continues to plunge. But, surprisingly, the Americans still regard Anwar as a brilliant economist.

Recently, Anwar was appointed as Chairman of the IMF Development Committee. IMF is the American financial institution that gives out loans to countries facing economic problems such as Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea. The loans were given out with very strict conditions specially designed to suffocate those countries. So, Anwar is party to the practice of *riba* in the IMF, which is forbidden in Islam. Anwar can never make the IMF practice Islamic banking as practiced in Malaysia.

22. Liar

Anwar is a chronic liar. He claimed that ABIM was founded by him, and the word ABIM came from the abbreviations of his name. The fact is, Sanusi Junid and Professor Nawawi Ghazali founded ABIM. Nawawi was its first president while Sanusi was the deputy president.

23. ABIM

Before Anwar left ABIM for UMNO, he swore that he would make UMNO an ABIM organization. No wonder many ABIM members are now in

UMNO, holding important positions such as chiefs, deputy chiefs and committee members in UMNO divisions and branches throughout the country.

24. Party '46 Rejoins UMNO

Anwar opposed the rejoining of Party '46 to UMNO, which was headed by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. Anwar took every effort to prevent any Party '46 members from holding high positions in UMNO.

As a leader, it is unbecoming of Anwar to do this since Party '46 is sincere in dissolving its party to rejoin UMNO.

25. Bringing Down UMNO Leaders

Anwar will find ways to bring down and remove whoever is regarded as politically strong in UMNO so that his men will replace them. Among his victims were Ghaffar Baba, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Sanusi Junid, Rahim Thamby Chik, Mohamad Taib, Anuar Musa, and Daim Zainuddin.

26. Disrespectful

Ghaffar and Dr. Mahathir were among those who founded UMNO in 1946. After years of championing the UMNO struggles, it is only fair that Ghaffar deserves the Deputy Prime Minister's post. But Anwar, who had just joined UMNO, became UMNO Deputy President and Deputy Prime Minister by destroying other leaders who have done a lot for the people and the country. Anwar is disrespectful of these leaders.

27. A Hypocrite

Anwar is a hypocrite and, as such, made many mistakes that made him an unsuitable leader.

28. A Homosexual

God the Almighty forbids homosexuality. As a homosexual, Anwar's character, personality, and behavior are questionable since he is a sinner.

29. A Snob

Ever since Anwar became a minister, he has forgotten his Islamic ideals and struggles. His ideals and principles now are completely the opposite. If he can, he hopes to have an autocratic power and regime.

Once when Anwar was Education Minister, he was invited to officially open a primary school in Masjid Tanah, Melaka. But sadly, Anwar said, "Why should I come?"

30. Contradicts the Prime Minister

Although Dr. Mahathir is still the Prime Minister, Anwar behaves as if he is already the Prime Minister. Dr. Mahathir's statements regarding certain projects or issues were frequently contradicted or even denied by Anwar.

31. Controls the Media

Anwar effectively controls the local media, namely Utusan Malaysia, Berita Harian, and TV3. Anwar's speeches were often front paged by these newspapers while Dr. Mahathir's, although making more sense, were placed inside.

32. *Victimizes*

Through these media, Anwar victimizes other leaders by harping on their ugly sides and not giving them the opportunity to defend themselves. For instance, Rahim Thamby Chik was clearly accused by these media for corruption and having sex with a minor although he was never convicted in the courts.

33. *Flat Forehead*

If one were to observe closely Anwar's forehead, one would see that he has a flat forehead. According to Fung Shui predictions, those with this physical feature will never become a great leader or the number one man in a country.

34. *Waves*

The book entitled *Waves* written by Anwar portrays his life as constantly wavy and unstable.

35. *Fall of the Ringgit*

Prior to Anwar becoming the Finance Minister, the Ringgit stood at RM2.20 to USD \$1. But now, the Ringgit has plunged to RM3.90 to USD \$1. The price of daily essentials soared up to 60% higher as a result of the drastic fall in the value of the Ringgit. By Anwar being appointed as chairman of the IMF Development Committee, it should influence the rise of the Ringgit not the continued plunge.

36. *The Nation's Loss*

The continued economic slowdown is the result of the loss of up to RM12.8 billion by Bank Negara in currency trading. Bank Negara should not be involved in currency trading but should protect the country's reserves. Bank Negara was regarded as the "Big Bully" in currency trading until it incurred huge losses. Currency traders in Europe and the United States disliked the role that Malaysia played. They decided to retaliate and targeted the Ringgit.

As Finance Minister, Anwar told the people that the huge losses were only on paper. This is the capability of our Finance Minister who had no knowledge and is so inexperienced in economic matters but entrusted to safeguard the country's wealth.

37. *Education*

Anwar Ibrahim holds a degree only in Malay Studies from University Malaya. He failed the first year. As such, he has no idea at all about business and economy. He cannot be relied upon to administer the country's finances.

38. *Nepotism*

From a poor family, Anwar's father, Ibrahim, is now a very wealthy man until he wishes to marry a third wife. If Ibrahim cannot get the blessing of the other two wives for this third marriage, he can elope to Thailand—Anwar style.

Anwar's brother, Rani, used to be declared a bankrupt. But now he is also a very wealthy man. Wan Ismail, Anwar's father-in-law, who took out his gun and chased Anwar away for eloping with his daughter Azizah to Thailand, now loves Anwar very much. Wan Ismail was given 30 million shares in a public listed company worth RM90 million by Anwar.

39. Abuse of Power

Imagine if Anwar becomes the Prime Minister. Not only would Malaysia become poorer and his families become filthy rich but also all youths in the country will fall prey to his lust. The Youth and Sports Ministry will be forced to line up youths, especially gays, each week to fulfill Anwar's lust. All ministers will be fired except those who are willing to let Anwar sodomize them.

Syed Hussin Al-Attas (a writer who is not a professor) will never accept a job from Anwar since he is not a gay and not a person who likes to steal other people's wives. It would be different if Anwar offered him lots of money. He will grab it for sure.

40. The People of the Prophet Lot

According to the local news, there are an estimated 20,000 gays in the city of Kuala Lumpur. The number increases rapidly, and it is worrisome that Kuala Lumpur will become the village of Sodom in Palestine where almost its entire inhabitants were homosexuals. The people of Sodom totally ignored the warnings of the Prophet Lot that God the Almighty forbids their behavior.

Finally, God the Almighty except the Prophet Lot and some of his followers destroyed Sodom and its entire people. We are afraid that God will do the same to Malaysia if the rapid increase in homosexuals in Kuala Lumpur is uncontrollable. Anwar is mightier than the people of Lot since he can have sex with both men and women.

41. Disliked by the People

Anwar's sex scandals, homosexuality, corruption, abuse of power, puppet to foreign powers and others, make him an unpopular leader. Anwar's bad behavior will lead to chaos not only within UMNO but also the whole country.

42. Malays Become Poorer

Before Anwar became the Finance Minister, there were many wealthy Malays. But soon after Anwar took over from Daim Zainuddin, the Malays become poor. For five years they waited patiently for the economy to recover, but it never did. The Malays will become poorer the longer Anwar is the Finance Minister. Only Anwar's family is getting richer and wealthier.

43. Bleak Future

Malaysia is well known worldwide due to the efforts of the Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. In a relatively short period, Malaysia will be transformed from a third world country to a developed country. The Vision 2020 concept is making Malaysia achieve the developed country status. The people will be united and enjoy a high standard of living.

Can Malaysia achieve this vision if Anwar becomes the Prime Minister? The people predict that the country's future will be bleak under Anwar's administration.

44. Strategy

During this economic slowdown, Anwar still persists in lining up his political strategy to grab power by toppling Dr. Mahathir. Anwar commands that all his generals and lieutenants must contest and win important posts in all UMNO divisions during the elections held recently.

Fortunately, the rules and regulations of the UMNO Supreme Council thwarted Anwar's plans. As a result, Anwar's staunch supporters did not hold many of these positions. If Anwar's strategy is successful, he plans to contest and remove Dr. Mahathir in the 1999 UMNO elections.

45. Money Politics

The immense wealth of Anwar and his men with their money politics will ensure their candidates win in UMNO elections.

In the election for UMNO Divisional Chief for Langkawi in 1995, Anwar's cronies used money politics to ensure Sanusi Junid's chances of winning was totally diminished. The influence of money politics was so strong that Sanusi lost to Anwar's crony, Abu Bakar Taib, the Member of Parliament (MP) of Langkawi.

It was the same for Kota Melaka. Due to money politics by Anwar, Rahim Thamby Chik lost to Anwar's crony.

46. Eats Squatting Down and With Chopsticks

Malay customs are usually associated with Islamic values. Anwar used to champion Islam when he was in ABIM. But when he became a minister, his Malay customs disappeared. Anwar was recorded squatting down while eating in public and even used chopsticks while eating with the Prime Minister.

47. MTEN (NEAC)

Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad was too lenient with Anwar despite Anwar showing disrespect to him. Dr. Mahathir had to find ways to control the country's finances for orderly expenditure.

In order to prevent Anwar from spending public funds unnecessarily during the economic slowdown, the Prime Minister established the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) and appointed Daim Zainuddin as its executive director.

48. A Disgrace to Anwar

Anwar should realize that the establishment of the NEAC clearly showed that his credibility of managing the country's finances is gravely questionable. If Anwar is a man with high morals and principles, he should resign as Finance Minister.

49. Destroyer

UMNO and Malay unity, which so far is very stable, will be destroyed if Anwar becomes Prime Minister replacing Dr Mahathir. This is based on the facts laid out in this book.

50. Prophecy

Finally, the prophecy by Haji Sulaiman Palestine to Dr. Mahathir before he passed away.

Haji Sulaiman Palestine was Anwar's uncle. He was also an UMNO veteran who had full knowledge of Anwar's secrets and weaknesses. Due to this knowledge, he left a prophecy so that Dr. Mahathir will not choose Anwar as Prime Minister because it will lead to the disintegration of UMNO.

Dr. Mahathir was strongly advised by Haji Sulaiman Palestine to choose Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as Prime Minister if Dr, Mahathir wishes to see UMNO in safe hands.

The Filth of a Deputy Prime Minister

Anwar is a homosexual through his same-sex relationship with one of his victims who has the courage to come forward. He is Azizan Abu Bakar, who used to be Anwar's driver but is now the driver of Mohamed Azmin Ali.

Anwar has a secret affair with Shamsidar Taharin who is the wife of Mohamed Azmin Ali.

Anwar lied about Ummi Hafilda Ali (the sister of Mohamed Azmin Ali) about her having a crush on him through love letters sent to him solely for his political survival.

Anwar disgraced his own private secretary by having a scandal with Shamsidar Taharin without the knowledge of Shamsidar's husband.

Anwar disgraced the whole family of Mohamed Azmin Ali.

Anwar abused his power to cover up all his lies, deceits, and filth.

Anwar disgraced Islam by projecting an image of a devout Muslim by delivering sermons all over the place when, in fact, he is a devil in disguise.

Anwar does all sorts of devious things to threaten the credibility of UMNO's leadership as the backbone of the nation without considering its implications to the development of the people and the country.

Reasons for Report Submitted by Ummi Hafilda

1. To ask the Prime Minister's wisdom to investigate every report submitted.
2. To ask for protection and security on behalf of the writer and the whole family.
3. To expose the truth for the sake of the party and country.
4. To overcome grave emotional pressure in the whole family when the case became public knowledge.
5. To ask the Prime Minister to save Mohamed Azmin Ali from continuing his service with a monster, Anwar Ibrahim.

6. To ask the Prime Minister to take appropriate action if the reports submitted are true to give a clear signal to other leaders not to abuse their power and position.
7. To stop the sexual acts against the order of nature, which is forbidden by God.

Source: Jafri, Khalid. August 1998. *"50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister."* Retrieved from (http://www.geocities.com/freedom_malaysia/50Dalil.html).

APPENDIX D
CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE AGAINST ANWAR IBRAHIM
JULY 1998 TO NOVEMBER 1999

July 1998

1. Economic crisis fuels tensions in Malaysian government.

September 1998

2. _Anwar sacked as deputy prime minister and finance minister after months of economic policy differences with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad.
3. Anwar expelled from UMNO. Mr. Anwar accuses the prime minister of paranoia and resisting urgently needed political reform.
4. Malaysia erects currency barriers as economy plunges into recession. Malaysian Prime Minister “paranoid.”
5. Thousands join reform rally. Anwar Ibrahim alleges a smear campaign against him after two men reportedly confess to allowing him to sodomize them.
6. Mohamad Ahmad, Anwar's former private secretary, arrested under Section 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code in connection with police

investigations into the book, *50 Reasons*. He is unconditionally released on September 23.

7. Sodomy charges increase heat on Anwar. Two additional Anwar associates—former speechwriter, Munawar Anees, and Anwar's adopted brother, Sukma Dermawan—arrested and sentenced to six months in prison after pleading guilty to engaging in “unnatural sex” and allowing Anwar to sodomize them. They later recant their testimonies and appeal their convictions on the grounds that their guilty pleas were involuntary. Lawyer for Munawar Anees is Balwant Singh Sidhu, is also lawyer for Datuk K. S. Nallkaruppan.
8. Businessman *K.S. Nallakruppan*, an Anwar associate, is arrested on a charge of unlawful possession of live ammunition. He is charged under Section 57(1)(b) of the ISA which carries a mandatory death sentence if convicted. Affidavits later filed at the High Court also accused Nallakaruppan of arranging some of Anwar's sexual liaisons and suggested that because they traveled together abroad, Nallakruppan may have had access to official secrets.
9. Mohamed Azmin Ali, another Anwar's former private secretaries, remanded to prison to “facilitate investigations” into the book, *50 Reasons*. He had been called for questioning since 1995 in connection

with corruption and questioned seven times about contents of the book.

He is released unconditionally on September 22.

10. Anwar supporters hold political rally at the stadium in Kota Bharu; police reject permit for the rally and say organizers will be charged under the Police Act. They say applications for permits must be made two weeks before public gathering. Police seize more than 500 cassettes of Anwar speeches, stating content may be seditious ("Police Know Identity of Anwar's Roadshow Organisers," *Utusan Malaysia* September 21, 1998). Perlis police deny permit for another Anwar rally, this time on security grounds.
11. Anwar arrested at his home by police after 35,000 supporters march to demand the Prime Minister's resignation. Also arrested were six others including UMNO youth leader Zahid Hamidi and officers of Malaysia Islamic Youth Organization (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM). All detained under Section 73(1) of ISA. In response to questions about whether Mahathir knew of Anwar's police beating, UMNO lawyer says Section 73 of ISA policy does not have to inform Home Minister (a post Mahathir holds) about every stage of investigations and every action taken against detainees, not even of arrests.

12. Hours later, Anwar's wife tells supporters she will continue his struggle. Malaysian riot police break up Kuala Lumpur protest demonstration by Anwar supporters.
13. In response to fears among Anwar supporters, police say he is "safe and sound" in custody.
14. A demonstration of 3,000 Anwar supporters in Merdeka Square, Kuala Lumpur, broken up by police; 29 demonstrators held for questioning under the Police Act.
15. Anwar appears in public to be formally charged on corruption and "unnatural sex." With a black eye and bruised hand, he accuses captors of beatings until he was bloody and half-conscious. The charges involve engaging in carnal intercourse with five people between December 1993 and April 1998; interfering with an Anti-Corruption Agency investigation into the activities of his private secretary; and trying to interfere with police interrogation of witnesses to his alleged sodomy. Lead counsel for Anwar is Raja Aziz.
16. Mahathir Mohamad suggests injuries sustained by Anwar may be self-inflicted. A Malaysian doctor says the bruising is the result of assault. UMNO Youth head Zahid Hamidi released unconditionally, together with four ABIM leaders. Zahid resigns from UMNO.

October 1998

17. Kuala Lumpur High Court places gag order on public discussion of Anwar case. Anwar Ibrahim pleads not guilty to charges of corruption and committing illegal homosexual acts, in a second appearance at the high court in Kuala Lumpur.
18. Malaysian Bar Council meets in extraordinary session and passes series of resolutions unanimously calling for repeal of ISA, for persons so detained either be released or charged under other laws, and for the government to respect constitutional freedoms of movement, peaceful assembly, association, speech, and expression.
19. Anwar released from ISA detention after 24 days but remanded to Sungai Baloh prison after his application for bail was rejected on the grounds of “danger of witnesses being tampered with as the charges involved interference with witnesses” (*NST* October 15, 1998). Four people arrested on September 20 in connection with the Anwar case remain in detention: lawyer Zulkifi Nordin arrested September 29; lawyer Ruslan Kassim, UMNO youth chief for Negeri Sembilan; former executive secretary of PAS Abdul Malek Hussein; and president of Jemaah Islah Malaysia Haji Shaari Sungit, arrested on October 12. Fourteen others were released.

20. Police forcibly break up rally of thousands in support of reform in central Kuala Lumpur; 140 detained, of whom 128 were charged October 21 with illegal assembly under Section 27 of the 1967 Police Act. All but one pleaded not guilty; released on bail of RM1,000 each.
21. Home Ministry warns vendors and bookstores to stop selling *Harakah* Malay-language newspaper published by PAS because its publication permit did not allow it to be sold to non-PAS members. The Ministry said it was also publishing distorted and sensational news.
22. Police break up rally of thousands at Merdeka Square with pepper spray and water cannons. Rally turns violent with more than 278 people are arrested.
23. Shaari Sungit released unconditionally from ISA detention.
24. Zulkifli Nordin released unconditionally from ISA detention. In statement from prison, Anwar denounces use of police force to break up anti-government demonstrations. Anwar also denounces police violence.
25. Sukma Darmawan files habeas corpus petition claiming his conviction and sentencing were unlawful, because he should have been tried in a Muslim court as a Muslim (Syariah Subordinate Court). A judge in the Kuala Lumpur High Court throws out an appeal by Anwar against his imprisonment, setting a November 2 trial.

November 1998

26. Anwar trial begins. Anwar tells reporters he is “in good health and expecting a good trial.” Day ends in controversy over judge’s refusal to allow observer status to foreigners.
27. First prosecution witness delivers fresh allegations of homosexuality.
28. A senior police officer discloses that he has found indications of a conspiracy to smear Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar sex claims “false.”
29. Hundreds of Anwar supporters demonstrate in Kuala Lumpur in first anti-government demonstration since the start of the trial.
30. In TV interview, Prime Minister Mahathir dismisses calls for his resignation and defends the sacking of his deputy.
31. Judge in the trial tells defense lawyers to avoid allegations of political conspiracy and concentrate on the charges of corruption.
32. Anwar files legal challenge against his sacking by Mahathir Mohamad.
33. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visits wife of Anwar Ibrahim before cutting short a trip to Malaysia.
34. Malaysian Government reacts angrily to criticism about reform process by U.S. Vice President Al Gore, describing his comments as “most disgusting.”

- 35. Anwar trial resumes after adjourning for a week while Malaysia hosts a summit of Asian-Pacific countries.
- 36. Former senior police officer testifies for prosecution, saying Anwar forced him to modify key documents to clear allegations of sexual misconduct.
- 37. Trial is thrown into disarray as one of Anwar's lawyers is given three-month jail sentence for contempt of court.

December 1998

- 38. Former driver for Anwar wife Azizan Abu Bakar tells High Court that Anwar turned him into a "homosexual slave" but abruptly changes testimony days later.
- 39. Anwar judge refuses defense demands to disqualify key prosecution witness Azizan Abu Bakar.
- 40. "Mistress" claim in Anwar trial.
- 41. Prosecutors at Anwar trial produce mattress in court which they claim was stained with semen from Anwar's alleged sexual misconduct.
- 42. Anwar and wife call on Malaysians to strengthen their struggle for justice in Christmas message.

43. Doctor appearing as prosecution witness says there is no evidence that Anwar's adopted brother was sodomized.
44. A government chemist at the trial says a mattress produced in court was stained with DNA from Anwar's semen.

January 1999

45. Malaysia attorney-general says police were responsible for injuries sustained by Anwar Ibrahim while in custody.
46. Malaysia police chief resigns over beating of Anwar while held in police custody.
47. Prosecution lawyers amend charges against Anwar so they no longer have to prove that he was guilty of sexual misconduct.

February 1999

48. Summons served on Mahathir by former deputy in a private prosecution for slander.
49. Anwar gives a commission of inquiry a graphic account of how he was beaten in police custody on the night of his arrest.
50. Wife of Anwar says strong possibility she may challenge Mahathir for his own constituency in the next elections.

March 1999

51. Former Police Chief Tan Sri Rahim Noor admits he hit Anwar Ibrahim, saying he did so in fit of anger and under pressure from rising social unrest.
52. Trial of Anwar Ibrahim comes to abrupt halt with the defense team facing possible arrest, with judge citing them for contempt as they refuse to make closing arguments.
53. Judge Augustine Paul rejects application for him to stand down after Anwar's defense team accuses him of bias.
54. Anwar's lawyers close their case, saying his only crime was to stand up against powerful politicians. Judge warns them to keep politics out of the courtroom.

April 1999

55. Mahathir Mohamad files his defense against a \$25m defamation case brought by Anwar.
56. Anwar's wife launches new political party to fight upcoming elections, calling on opposition groups to unite to oust Prime Minister.
57. Rioting breaks out in Kuala Lumpur after Anwar convicted of corruption and jailed for six years.

58. Ex-police chief charged with Anwar beating.

59. Lawyers appeal Anwar conviction.

May 1999

60. Anwar judge institutes press gag.

June 1999

61. Anwar goes on trial for second time, charged with sodomy.

62. Anwar's brother states threats forced his sex confession.

August 1999

63. Setback for Anwar defense team as judge rejects defamation suit filed against Mahathir.

September 1999

64. Trial suspended as Anwar is hospitalized with what his lawyers say is arsenic poisoning.

65. The case continues as Mahathir defends the judiciary against calls for royal commission into independence of country's legal system.

66. Thousands of supporters hold rally to mark first anniversary of Anwar's arrest with a number of key pro-reform allies arrested.

67. Former driver who accused his Anwar of sodomy is himself found guilty of sexual misconduct by an Islamic court and sentenced to three months in jail.

October 1999

68. Medical witnesses testify that Anwar does not have acute or chronic poisoning as he alleges.

69. Justice Arifin Jak issues subpoena calling on Mahathir to appear as defense witness in the trial of former deputy.

November 1999

70. Complaining of headaches and weight loss, Anwar once again admitted to hospital for medical check-up.

71. As campaigning begins for Malaysia's early general election, Mahathir renews attack on Anwar, accusing him of faking illness to incite opposition supporters to riot.

Source: BBC Monitoring from *MalaysiaKini*: "A Crisis Unfolds: Timeline," Chronology of the Case against Anwar Ibrahim, August 8, 2000.

APPENDIX E

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

ABIM – Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Revivalist)
APU – Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Ummah Solidarity Movement)
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BA – *Barisan Alternatif* (Opposition Coalition) Formed For 1999 Election
BN – *Barisan Nasional* (Ruling Coalition)
DAP – *Democratic Action Party* (Chinese-Based)
ISA – Internal Security Act
KeADILan – *Reformasi*-oriented political party established by Anwar 's wife
KMM – *Kumpulan Militant Malaysia* (*Malaysia Mujahideen* movement)
NAM – Non-Aligned Movement
NST – *New Straits Times* (official Malaysian newspaper)
OIC – Organization of the Islamic Conference
PAS – *Parti Islam SeMalaysia* (pan-Malaysian Islamic Party)
PRM – Malaysian Peoples' party
RM – *Malaysian Ringgit* (National Currency)
S46 – *Semangat 46* (Spirit of '46)
UMNO – United Malays National Organization (head of ruling BN Coalition)

Malay and Arabic Words and Concepts

Alim, ulama – Muslim religious scholar(s)
Bahasa Melayu – Malay language
Bumiputra – “Sons of the soil,” literally referring to native and ethnic Malays
ceramah – Malaysian political gathering
Dewan Muslimat – PAS Women's Wing
Dewan Pemuda – PAS Youth Wing
Dewan Ulama – PAS's *ulama* council
fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence
fitna – Disorder
hakimiyya – Divine sovereignty of God
Harakah – PAS's newspaper
hisba – Ombudsman
hudud – Islamic penal code
ijma – Consensus
Ijtihad – Interpretation
Islam Hadhari – “Civilization” or progressive Islam; approach by UMNO
Jahiliyya – Ignorance
Khalwat – Close proximity between unmarried Muslims of the opposite sex
Kuliyah – Lecture
Majlis Ulama – *Ulama* council

Maslaha – Public interest
Menteri Besar – Chief executive of a Malaysian state
Muktamar – PAS's annual general assembly meeting
Murshid'ul Am – PAS's spiritual leader
Nass – Explicitly defined Islamic provision
Qisas – Retaliatory punishment
qiyas – Analogy
Ustab – Islamic/Muslim Teacher
Reformasi – Malaysian Reform Movement that began in the late 1990s
Riba – Usury or interest
Sharia – Divine law
Shura – Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad
Tabung Haji – Pilgrims Board Fund
Tafsir – Quranic exegesis
Tawhid – Oneness of God
ta'zir – Discretionary punishments
tudung – Head scarf
umma – Community of believers
zakat – Alms

VITA

Graduate School
Southern Illinois University

Wan Kamal Wan Napi

Date of Birth: November 1, 1963

402 S Walker, Carbondale, Illinois 62901

8 Jalan Belangkas, Kampong Pandan
55100 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia

Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Bachelor of Art, Political Science, May 1997

Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Master of Science in Education May 1999

Special Honors and Awards:

Best Leadership of the Year/International Student at SIUC
Excellence in Community Development/Black Affairs Community of
Carbondale (BAC)

Dissertation Title:

THE ISLAMIZATION OF POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: HOW RELIGIOUS
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS INFLUENCE
RELIGIOUS FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING

Major Professor: Dr. Darren Sherkat